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ABSTRACT
ENABLING PEER-TO-PEER SWARMING FOR
MULTI-COMMODITY DISSEMINATION
MAY 2011
DANIEL SADOC MENASCHE
B.Sc., FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO
M.Sc., FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Donald F. Towsley
Peer-to-peer swarming, as used by BitTorrent, is one of the de facto solutions
for content dissemination in today's Internet. By leveraging resources provided by
users, peer-to-peer swarming is a simple, scalable and ecient mechanism for content
distribution. Although peer-to-peer swarming has been widely studied for a decade,
prior work has focused on the dissemination of one commodity (a single le). This
thesis focuses on the multi-commodity case.
We have discovered through measurements that a vast number of publishers cur-
rently disseminate multiple les in a single swarm (bundle). The rst contribution
of this thesis is a model for content availability. We use the model to show that,
when publishers are intermittent, bundling K les increases content availability ex-
ponentially as function of K. When there is a stable publisher, we consider content
viii
availability among peers (excluding the publisher). Our second contribution is the
estimate of the dependency of peers on the stable publisher, which is useful for pro-
visioning purposes as well as in deciding how to bundle. To this goal, we propose
a new metric, swarm self-sustainability, and present a model that yields swarm self-
sustainability as a function of the le size, popularity and service capacity of peers.
Then, we investigate reciprocity and the use of barter that occurs among peers. As
our third contribution, we prove that the loss of eciency due to the download of
unrequested content to enforce direct reciprocity, as opposed to indirect reciprocity,
is at most two in a class of networks without relays. Finally, we study algorithmic
and economic problems faced by enterprises who leverage swarming systems and who
control prices and bundling strategies. As our fourth contribution, we present two
formulations of the optimal bundling problem, and prove that one is NP hard whereas
the other is solvable by a greedy strategy. From an economic standpoint, we present
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium between publishers and
peers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Swarming Systems
How would you disseminate a collection (bundle) of les, if you needed to? Some
people would probably either send copies of each of the les to their friends, or post
them online in a website and announce its link. However, these strategies might be
too costly, specially if the number of les and the demand are substantial { each
le needs to be replicated multiple times by a single server in order to reach all
of its requesters. In order to mitigate such costs, one option consists of splitting
the les into pieces, oering dierent pieces to dierent requesters. Requesters then
complete their downloads by cooperating with each other in order to gather all pieces.
By leveraging resources provided by users, such as bandwidth and disk space, this
solution, also known as peer-to-peer swarming, decreases costs, such as bandwidth
and energy, for the server. It also builds robustness since users can complete their
downloads even in the absence of the server. But what if many of the les in the
collection are unpopular? Could it be the case that there are no opportunities for
users to cooperate, since they are all interested in dierent content? In this case, is
it still possible to take advantage of peer-to-peer swarming in order to mitigate costs
and build robustness?
In this thesis, we show how peer-to-peer swarming can be leveraged for the dis-
semination of multiple les, with dierent sizes and popularities. We are particularly
interested in understanding the impact of users who, possibly inuenced by recom-
mendation systems, download unrequested content, or content that they had not orig-
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inally sought. Our contributions are broadly classied into two areas: (a) we present
models which allow us to quantify the impacts of the download of unrequested content
on metrics such as mean download time and content availability and (b) we investi-
gate the reciprocity that occurs among peers, bounding the loss of eciency due to
the download of unrequested content for bartering purposes. Although we will focus
on peer-to-peer swarming for the dissemination of stored content in a wired network,
in Chapter 6 we will indicate how our results might be extended to peer-to-peer net-
works for live content dissemination [102] or to delay-tolerant peer-to-peer networks
where contacts are inuenced by the mobility of users [18].
1.2 Motivation
Peer-to-peer systems are one of the de facto solutions for content dissemination
in today's Internet. Daily, millions of users utilize peer-to-peer systems to exchange
les in the Internet, and the use of peer-to-peer systems by enterprises is steadily
growing [4, 92, 94, 8, 88]. As mentioned in the previous section, peer-to-peer systems
decrease costs to publishers and provide scalability and robustness by leveraging re-
sources provided by clients. As demand for content increases, system capacity scales
accordingly, as the clients collaborate with each other while downloading the desired
content. As the demand for multimedia les and the sizes of these les increase,
peer-to-peer systems become an important content dissemination solution for many
content providers [4, 94].
Peer-to-peer swarming, as illustrated by BitTorrent [20], is a simple and popular
peer-to-peer content delivery mechanism [46]. A swarm is a set of peers interested
in the same content (le or bundle of les) that exchange blocks of the les among
themselves. Peers periodically query a tracker to obtain a random subset of other
peers in the swarm. The fact that, in existing swarming systems, trackers do not
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exchange control information with each other allows any user to publish its les
independently, at any time.
Prior work on peer-to-peer systems focused on the dissemination of one le (com-
modity). However, a publisher may be responsible for the dissemination of multiple
les and users may be interested in multiple les as well. This gives rise to novel
and important research questions, especially in light of the long tail phenomenon,
empirically observed in some entertainment businesses [5].
1.2.1 The Long Tail
There is evidence suggesting that in today's entertainment market there is rising
demand for obscure titles, also known as niche content [5]. According to Chris Ander-
sen, the future of entertainment is in the millions of niche markets, each of which is
possibly associated to a small demand, but together representing a signicant fraction
of the revenue of enterprises such as Rhapsody, Amazon.com and Netix. In 2004,
products not available in traditional stores were responsible for 22%, 57% and 20%
of the sales of Rhapsody, Amazon.com and Netix. In November of 2008, Page [67]
reported that 20% of the revenue of Raphysody came from songs that are not in
the top 52,000. This reduction in the blockbuster eect indicates that in the eld of
content delivery the enterprises that can \make everything available", at a low cost,
can have a signicant advantage.
Peer-to-peer swarming scales to tolerate massive ash crowds, but its applicability
to serve less popular content is limited. That is because, for less popular content,
there might not be opportunities for peers to collaborate in downloading content. In
this thesis, we deal with strategies to cope with such a challenge.
Key principle: In a market where enterprises that can make \everything
available, with small costs" thrive, customers seek niche content. The demand for
each item might be small, but the aggregate demand can be signicant. The use
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of peer-to-peer swarming to disseminate such kind of content poses novel challenges,
which can be in part addressed by letting users download unrequested content. In
Chapter 2 we will show that a linear increase in the arrival rate of requesters for a
content yields exponential gains in availability.
1.3 Swarming Systems Primer
A swarm is a set of peers concurrently sharing content of common interest. A
content might be a le or a bundle of les that are distributed together. The content
is divided into blocks that peers upload to and download from each other. Since there
is no interaction between peers across swarms, each swarm can be studied separately.
BitTorrent is one of the most popular applications that uses peer-to-peer swarming
for content dissemination, and we will use it to illustrate how swarming works. Unlike
a traditional server-based system, BitTorrent includes a tracker that promotes the
interaction of participating peers. The identities of the trackers are announced to
peers in torrent les, which can be found and downloaded through search engines
such as Torrent Finder [91]. Peers periodically query the tracker to obtain a random
subset of other peers in the swarm in order to exchange (upload and download) blocks
with them. Peers also discover new neighbors from other peers, in addition to the
tracker, when the Peer Exchange (PEX) extension is enabled.
There are two kinds of peers in the system: seeds and leechers. Seeds are peers
that have completed their downloads and are available to upload blocks. Leechers are
peers that have not completed their downloads and are actively downloading (and
uploading) blocks of the le. Thus, leechers turn into seeds upon completing their
downloads. Leechers adopt a tit-for-tat incentive strategy while downloading the le,
i.e., leechers preferentially upload content to other leechers that reciprocate likewise,
and \choke" or ignore leechers that do not reciprocate.
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As many leechers leave the system immediately after completing the download,
content publishers often support a seed that we refer to as the publisher. A publisher
is guaranteed to have all of the blocks constituting the le. In the rest of this thesis
we assume that each swarm includes at least one (possibly intermittent) publisher.
BitTorrent peers adopt the rarest rst policy to decide which blocks to request and
download from their neighbors. According to the rarest rst policy, a peer prioritizes
the rarest blocks when selecting the ones to download next. We say that a peer is
interested in another peer if the latter can provide blocks to the former. Since rarest
rst guarantees a high diversity of blocks in the system, any peer is almost always
interested in any other peer, which in general yields high system performance [50].
Note, however, that in BitTorrent peers only have local information about the
system. Hence, they can only implement a local rarest rst policy. The intrinsic
limit on the number of connections that a user can establish naturally provides each
of them with only a myopic view of the system. Firewalls, NATs and other exogenous
factors may also prevent users from establishing connections among themselves.
1.4 Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are to develop models, measurements, tools and
algorithms to understand and improve peer-to-peer swarming with respect to the
following criteria:
 Bundling implications: multiple les can be disseminated in a single swarm
through bundles. Pure bundling occurs when a user can only download the
entire bundle or nothing; mixed bundling occurs when users are oered a choice
between downloading the entire bundle or separate parts of the bundle. One of
our aims is to study the implications of bundling on content availability, when
publishers are intermittent, and on eciency, when publishers are intermittent
or always available.
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 Content availability: when publishers are intermittent, content can become
unavailable. Our second goal is to quantify content availability as a function
of the popularity and size of the contents (les or bundles), arrival rate of
publishers and capacity of publishers and peers.
 Eciency in distributing content: if publishers are always available, we
evaluate the dependence of peers on publishers as a function of the popularity
and size of the les. For this purpose, we propose a new metric, swarm self-
sustainability, and show how bundling aects this metric.
 Bartering implications: the dissemination of multiple les in an integrated
way yields new opportunities for users. Users can download content that they
had not originally sought, for bartering purposes. Another aim of this thesis
is to evaluate the implications of dierent forms of bartering and reciprocity
that occur among peers. We also propose strategies for match-making between
users, and to issue recommendations on content value for bartering.
1.5 Contributions
The main contributions of our research are the following:
 Modeling content availability and bundling implications [60, 58]: The
rst contribution of this thesis is a model of content availability and its usage
to quantify the implications of bundling. We have discovered through mea-
surements that a vast number of publishers currently disseminate multiple les
in a single swarm (bundle). We use our model to show that, when publishers
are intermittent, bundling K les increases content availability exponentially as
function of K.
 Estimating the self-sustainability of swarms [59, 61]: Our second con-
tribution is the development and analysis of a model to estimate the dependency
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of peers on a stable publisher. This model is useful for provisioning purposes
as well as in deciding how to bundle. We propose a new metric, swarm self-
sustainability, which measures the fraction of time that all blocks of a le are
available among peers (excluding the stable publisher). Our model yields swarm
self-sustainability as a function of the le size, popularity and service capacity
of peers.
 Bounding the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity [57]: We
investigate reciprocity and the use of barter that occurs among peers. As our
third contribution, we prove that the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity,
as opposed to indirect reciprocity, is at most two in a class of networks without
relays. Our simulations indicate simple strategies for content recommendation
and match-making between users allowing most user to download the demanded
content, incurring a system loss of eciency smaller than two, in scenarios of
practical interest.
 Addressing algorithmic and economic issues faced by enterprise swarm-
ing systems [58]: We study algorithmic and economic problems faced by en-
terprises who leverage swarming systems and who control prices and bundling
strategies. As our fourth contribution, we present two formulations of the op-
timal bundling problem, and prove that one is NP hard whereas the other is
solvable by a greedy strategy. From an economic standpoint, we present con-
ditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium between publishers
and peers.
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1.6 Previous Work
In what follows, we present a broad overview of previous work related to the topics
discussed in this thesis. More comprehensive bibliographic review is presented at each
chapter.
Peer-to-Peer Modeling
This thesis proposes techniques, models and algorithms applicable to the analysis
of peer-to-peer swarming for multi-commodity dissemination. Guo et al. [39] were the
rst to identify, through measurements, potential benets of leveraging collaboration
among multiple swarms. Related work [56, 101, 71] that considered transmission of
multiple contents across users interested in dierent les did so either in a real time
setting [56, 101] or focusing on aspects complementary to those presented in this
thesis, such as reputation mechanisms [71].
Availability and Bundling
In this thesis we analyze bundling as a mechanism to allow users to share dierent
les in a single swarm. Recently, bundling has been suggested as a way to eciently
serve unpopular content in peer-assisted content delivery systems [17] and automatic
ways to bundle les have been proposed [42]. More generally, in the music industry
there has been increased interest on the implications of bundling from an economic
standpoint [77, 29].
Incentives
The literature on incentives in peer-to-peer systems focusing on the relation be-
tween incentives and freeriding [82], clustering [49] and system design [71] is vast.
Our work is the rst to compare the fundamental benets and disadvantages of direct
and indirect reciprocity for the dissemination of digital goods.
In the economics literature, direct reciprocity bartering schemes are considered
precursors of more sophisticated economies involving money and indirect reciprocity.
Arpejis et al. [6] argue that prices can also play an important role in peer-to-peer sys-
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tems. The authors compare implicit prices in bilateral exchanges (direct reciprocity)
with explicit prices in multilateral exchanges (indirect reciprocity) and propose a
system that implements the latter. Our work, in contrast, suggests that in the con-
text of peer-to-peer le sharing, direct reciprocity has its own advantages and might
suce to implement an ecient system. More generally, our work on direct and in-
direct reciprocity might be extensible to innovation networks [72] and to biological
networks [66].
Self-Sustainability
Although we were the rst to study self-sustainability, our model is similar in
spirit to the one presented by Hajek and Zhu [40] which in turn is based on the one
by Massoulie and Vojnovic [56]. However, whereas these previous works analyzed the
innite population case (see also [31]), we are also interested in the small population
regime. For small populations, Markov Chain (MC) models have been proposed by
Veciana et al. [95], providing insights on the performance of the system but not dealing
with the problem of availability of blocks among peers.
1.7 Bibliographic Notes
Most of the content of this thesis appears in [60, 58, 57, 59, 61]. All the works are
fruits of collaborations with Professor Don Towsley. [60] is joint work with Professors
Arun Venkataramani and Antonio Rocha and Dr. Bin Li. [58] is joint work with
Dr. Giovanni Neglia and Professor Shlomo Zilberstein. [57] is joint work with
Dr. Laurent Massoulie. Finally, [59, 61] were conducted together with Professors
Edmundo de Souza e Silva, Rosa M. Leao, Antonio Rocha and Arun Venkataramani.
Chapter 5 is also partially based on results rst presented in my synthesis project
at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, prepared under the supervision of
Professors Don Towsley and Shlomo Zilberstein, and available upon request.
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1.8 Availability of This Thesis
This thesis is available in eletronic format at
http://www-net.cs.umass.edu/~sadoc/thesis
Possible corrections and additional material will also be made available in the
above URL.
1.9 Thesis Overview
This section concludes our introduction. The remainder of this thesis is organized
as shown in Figure 1.1. In Chapter 2, we propose a model for content availability, and
use it to evaluate the implications of bundling. In Chapter 3 we study the dependence
of peers on a stable publisher, by evaluating the content availability among peers
(excluding the stable publisher). In Chapters 4 and 5 we discuss economic aspects.
Chapter 4 deals with reciprocity and bartering and Chapter 5 deals with competition
and equilibrium. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation, pointing out some
directions of future work.
Note that as we progress from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5, the proposed models
are more abstract and less hands on. Accordingly, the validation of the models is
grounded qualitatively on real data and quantitatively on controlled experiments in
Chapter 2, on simulations of BitTorrent in Chapter 3 and on simulations of a stylized
peer-to-peer system in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, insights on the proposed model are
obtained through its numerical evaluation.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELING CONTENT AVAILABILITY AND
IMPLICATIONS OF BUNDLING: THE INTERMITTENT
PUBLISHERS CASE
This chapter and the next focus on the problem of content availability. In this
chapter we consider a scenario with intermittent publishers, and present a model
to quantify content availability and the implications of bundling. Using the model,
we obtain bounds and approximations for content availability and average download
times, as well as asymptotic results concerning the implications of bundling on these
two metrics.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a mathematical model to study content availability
and the implications of bundling in swarming systems such as BitTorrent. We use
an extension of an M/G/1 queue to model the self-scaling property of BitTorrent
swarms, i.e., more peers bring in more capacity to the system. The key insight is to
model uninterrupted intervals during which the content is available as busy periods of
that queue. The busy period increases exponentially with the arrival rate of peers
and publishers, and the time spent by peers and publishers in the swarm.
Our model enables us to analyze the impact of bundling, a common strategy
adopted by BitTorrent publishers. The basic idea is that instead of disseminating
individual les via isolated swarms, a publisher packages a number of related les
into a bundle and disseminates it via a single larger swarm. Bundling is of interest
because it leads to greater content availability. To appreciate why, consider a bundle
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of K equal size, equally popular les. Equating the popularity of a swarm to the
arrival rate of peers to that swarm, requests arrive to the bundle at a rate K times
greater than for individual les. As we will observe our model implies that the busy
period of the bundled swarm equals the busy period of the individual swarm times
e(K
2), i.e., the busy period of the bundled swarm is exponentially larger than that
of an individual swarm.
In some cases, the increased availability can reduce the average download time
experienced by peers. The download time of a peer consists of a possibly non-zero
waiting time spent while content is unavailable and a service time spent in actively
downloading content. If the reduction in waiting time due to bundling is greater than
the corresponding increase in service time, the download time decreases. We validate
this conclusion in x2.4 through large-scale controlled experiments on PlanetLab using
the Mainline BitTorrent client [50]. Our experiments also show that the conclusions
of our model qualitatively hold even with more realistic request patterns, peer upload
capacities, and heterogeneous popularities.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this chapter.
Measurement: We present a large-scale measurement study of real BitTorrent
swarms that shows that (1) content availability is a serious problem due to pub-
lisher unavailability, (2) bundling of content is widely prevalent, and (3) bundled
content is more available than unbundled content.
Availability model: We present a queuing-theoretic model to analyze content avail-
ability and download times in BitTorrent-like swarming systems. To our knowledge,
this is the rst model that relates content availability to arrivals and departures of
peers as well as publishers.
Implications of bundling on performance: We use the model to analyze the
implications of bundling, a widely prevalent yet little studied phenomenon, and show
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that (1) bundling improves availability, and (2) bundling can reduce download times
for unpopular content when publishers are highly unavailable.
Experimental validation: We validate the model using large-scale controlled ex-
periments with the Mainline BitTorrent client [50] on PlanetLab showing that the
model accurately predicts download times in swarms with intermittently available
publishers for both bundled and individual content.
2.2 Measuring content availability and bundling in BitTor-
rent
In this section, we present a large-scale measurement study of BitTorrent that
shows that 1) content unavailability is a serious problem in BitTorrent today, and
2) bundling of content is widely prevalent and that bundled content exhibits greater
availability.
In the rest of this section, we classify users between leechers and seeds (see x1.3),
since in our measurements we do not distinguish users who arrive to the network
with content (publishers) from users that remain in the network after completing
their downloads (seeds).
2.2.1 Content Availability in BitTorrent
We start with a denition of content availability. Recall that content is divided
into blocks to be distributed among peers (refer to x1.3 for a primer on swarming
systems).
Denition 2.2.1 (System Denition of Content Availability). Content is available
if either at least one seed is present or leechers collectively have all blocks. Content
availability is the fraction of time at which content is available.
Seeds may become unavailable in practice due to several reasons. Publishers
serving a large number of les may close down seeds after the initial popularity wave
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subsides in order to reduce bandwidth costs. A seed may also be a user publishing
home-generated content that cannot aord to stay online all the time. Seeds illegally
uploading copyrighted material often disappear quickly for obvious reasons [26]. Even
for legitimate content, maintaining highly available seeds entails administrative eort
and cost, which runs counter to the goals of content seeds that value BitTorrent as
a cheap alternative to a client-server approach, according to which clients download
content exclusively from servers.
In this section we assume that content is available only if a seed is available, so as
to tradeo between the number of monitored swarms and the amount of processing
per swarm. Kaune et al. [47] shows through measurements that, in the BitTorrent
network, not more than 24% of peers can complete their downloads in the absence of
seeds, which indicates that seeds have a signicant impact on content availability. In
the next section, we model content availability resulting both from seeds as well as
from leechers alone.
2.2.2 Measuring unavailability
How available is content in BitTorrent swarms? To answer this question, we
conducted a seven-month long measurement study of BitTorrent swarms as follows.
We developed and deployed BitTorrent monitoring agents at 300 nodes on Planetlab
from August 3, 2008 to March 6, 2009. Once every hour, a host at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst receives an RSS feed advertised by GoogleReader of recently
created torrent URLs from Mininova (a large torrent hosting site), and sends each
URL to a subset of the monitoring agents on Planetlab. The agents join the swarms
and begin to monitor their peers. Our agents leverage the Peer Exchange (PEX)
protocol extension, which enables them to discover new neighbors from other peers
in addition to the tracker. To avoid copyright issues, our agents collect only control
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plane information without actually uploading or downloading content, which suces
for our purposes as in this section we equate content availability with seed availability.
To distinguish seeds from leechers, our agents record the bitmaps received from
connected peers. The bitmaps are part of the BitTorrent protocol and a peer uses
them to convey the blocks it possesses to its neighbors. Each entry in the trace
collected by the agents consists of a swarm identier, a peer identier (IP address
and port number) and its bitmap recorded roughly periodically for each discovered
peer in the swarm. Our traces consist of more than 14 million distinct IP addresses
and 66K distinct swarms.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of seed availability for the monitored swarms.
The solid curve shows the availability in the rst month after the creation of the
swarm, when we expect the content to be the most popular. The extent of seed
unavailability is severe: less than 35% of the swarms had at least one seed available
all the time. The availability of seeds in the swarms over the entire duration of the
measurements is even lower as shown by the dotted curve: almost 80% of the swarms
are had no seeds 80% of the time.
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Figure 2.1. CDF of seed availability in 45,693 swarms each monitored for at least
one month.
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2.2.3 Content bundling
Bundling of content is a common practice in BitTorrent today. In this section, we
study the extent of bundling and its impact on availability. The trace used in this
section is a snapshot of BitTorrent swarms taken on May 6, 2009. For each of the
1,087,933 swarms in this snapshot, we record its content category (e.g., movies, TV,
books etc.), names and sizes of constituent les, creation date, and instantaneous
number of seeds and leechers. Note that we could aord to monitor many more
swarms in this dataset than the previous one as we did not have to record details of
peer arrivals and departures inside each swarm.
2.2.3.1 Extent of bundling
We analyze the extent of bundling in three of nine categories present in Mininova,
namely, music, TV shows and books. These three categories together account for
45.98% of the swarms and 31.93% of the peers in the system. We chose these three
categories because it is easier to automatically detect bundling by checking for the
presence of multiple les with known extensions (e.g., .mp3 for songs, .mpg for TV
shows and .pdf for books). Detecting bundling is nontrivial in some categories,
e.g., a DVD for a single movie is often organized as a collection of video les that are
never distributed individually, making it dicult to check for the presence of multiple
movies without manual inspection.
Among music swarms, albums are common. We classify a music swarm as a bundle
if it has two or more les with common audio le extensions such as .mp3, .mid and
.wav, which results in 193,491 of the 267,117 monitored swarms being classied as
bundles.
Among TV show swarms, many bundles consist of sets of episodes in a season.
We classify swarms that have two or more les with common video le extensions
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such as .mpg and .avi as bundles, which results in 25,990 of the 164,930 monitored
swarms being classied as bundles.
Among book swarms, we observe that collections, i.e., torrents containing the
keyword \collection" in their titles, usually consist of a bundle of books connected
by a broad theme, e.g., the \Ultimate Math Collection (1)" of size 5.81 GB has 642
books. We classied 841 of the 66,387 monitored swarms as collections. Classifying
swarms that contain 2 or more les with common le extensions such as .pdf and
.djvu as bundles results in an additional 6,270 bundles.
2.2.3.2 Bundled content is more available
In this section, we present evidence that suggests bundling is correlated with
availability. We rst consider book swarms. We nd that 62% of all book swarms
had no seed available on May 6, 2009, whereas that number drops to 36% if we
consider only book collections.
We next analyze our traces more closely for content that is available both in
isolation and as part of a larger bundle. We observe that among the unavailable
collections, some of them were subsets of bigger collections, e.g., the 23 swarms con-
sisting of collections of Gareld comics from 1978 to 2000 had no seeds. However, each
of these collections can be found in a single super-collection aggregating all Gareld
comics. The super-collection had seven seeds. After a manual inspection of all 841
book collections, we concluded that 210 had no seeds and were not subsets of other
collections, which results in 210/841 = 25% unavailability for content disseminated
through collections (compared to 62% above for a typical swarm).
As another example, we consider swarms for the popular TV show \Friends".
There was a total of 52 swarms associated with this show. Among them, 23 had one
or more seeds available, and the remaining 29 had no seeds. The 23 available swarms
consisted of 21 bundles (and 2 single episodes), whereas the 29 unavailable swarms
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Figure 2.2. Illustration of the dynamics of a swarm: active and idle periods are
represented by plain and dotted lines, respectively.
included only 7 bundles. These observations suggest a strong correlation between
bundling and higher availability. The next section presents an analytic model that
quanties the causal relationship between the two.
2.3 Model
In this section, we develop a model for content availability in BitTorrent. The key
insight underlying the model is to view BitTorrent as a coverage process or equiva-
lently an extension of an M/G/1 queuing system. The model shows that 1) bundling
improves availability, and 2) for swarms with highly unavailable publishers, the avail-
ability benet of bundling more than osets the increased time to actively download
more content, resulting in a net decrease in user-perceived download times.
2.3.1 Model overview
Requests for content arrive according to a Poisson process with rate . Publishers
arrive according to a Poisson process with rate r. The content has size s, and is
assumed to be innitesimally divisible. We also assume that the service capacity of
the system scales with the number of peers, the mean download rate of peers being .
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We analyze content availability in two settings that dier according to whether
peers are impatient or patient. Impatient peers leave the system immediately when
content becomes unavailable. The residence time of patient peers, in contrast, com-
prises their active download times as well as their waiting times during periods in
which content is unavailable. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that residence
time of publishers and active le download times are exponentially distributed, with
means 1=u and s=, respectively.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how content availability in BitTorrent depends upon the
arrivals and departures of publishers and peers. Each horizontal line segment repre-
sents the time interval during which a peer (represented by a thin line) or a publisher
(represented by a thick line) stays online. A swarm is initiated by the arrival of a
publisher, which also marks the start of the rst active period. The swarm's lifetime
is divided into alternating active and idle periods. Content is available during active
periods and unavailable during idle periods. If a publisher is always online, the rst
active period lasts forever and content remains always available.
So long as we have one or more publishers, or sucient number of online peers,
content is available, and downloads can progress. An active period ends when the
following two conditions are satised: 1) there are no publishers online, and 2) the
coverage, i.e., the number of peers currently online, drops to a xed threshold coverage
m (causing some blocks to become unavailable). By assuming a xed threshold cover-
age, the active period approximately captures a contiguous period in which content is
available. For example, Figure 2.2 shows that after all publishers leave at time t1, the
active period continues with the help of peers alone until a publisher reappears at time
t2. An active period may alternate any number of times between a phase consisting
of one or more publishers (Phase 1) and a phase consisting of peers alone (Phase 2).
Peers arriving during either phase in a active period nd the content available. At
t4, there are no publishers and the number of peers drops to the coverage threshold
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(assumed 2 in this example). This initiates an idle period that lasts until a publisher
reappears at time t5. Extant peers at the end of an active period as well as peers
arriving during the idle period nd the content unavailable (represented by dotted
lines). Because of the time spent waiting, these peers experience longer download
times dened as the times since a peer arrives until it completes the download.
Next, we introduce a denition of content availability, which allows us to build a
tractable model for the system content availability (see Denition 2.2.1).
Denition 2.3.1 (Model Denition of Content Availability). Content availability is
the fraction of time at which 1) there is at least one publisher online or 2) after all
publishers leave the system, the population size contiguously remains above a xed
threshold m.
Note that assuming that content is unavailable, i.e., there are missings blocks,
when the number of peers in the network decreases to some threshold m is a simpli-
cation. In practice, content might become unavailable even when there are more than
m peers in the system. Nevertheless, in x2.4 we will show the predictive power of
our model in scenarios of practical interest, parameterizing the threshold coverage m
using results to be presented in the upcoming chapter.
Our goal is to understand how content availability and the download times expe-
rienced by peers in a swarm depend upon 1) content popularity or the peer arrival
rate ; 2) the mean service time s=; and 3) the publisher arrival rate r and the
mean time u that a publisher stays online. For simplicity, we also assume that peers
are selsh and leave as soon as they complete their downloads; x2.3.3.4 extends the
model to incorporate altruistic lingering.
To appreciate why bundling improves content availability, consider the special
case of a highly unavailable publisher, i.e., its arrival rate r and mean residence time
u are small. Then, the length of an active period is determined primarily by peers.
Assuming a Poisson peer arrival process and a coverage threshold of one, the length of
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an active period equals the busy period of an M/G/1 queue, (es=   1)=. Bundling
K les increases the peer arrival rate for the bundle to K as each peer desiring any
of the constituent les requests the entire bundle, and increases the time spent by
each peer in the swarm to Ks=. As a result, the length of the active period for the
bundled swarm is (eK
2s=   1)=(K). Let P be the unavailability of the individual
swarm and P (b) the unavailability of the bundle. Then, P (b)=P = e(K
2). For highly
unavailable publishers, the availability gains of bundling can outweigh the cost of the
increased time to download K times as much content resulting in a reduction in the
download time, i.e., peers obtain more content in less time.
The rest of this section formalizes the above claims and derives closed-form ex-
pressions for the mean total download time experienced by peers with and without
bundling.
2.3.2 Bounds on content availability and average download time
Next, we derive bounds for content availability and download time. To this goal,
in x2.3.2.1 we equate content availability to seed availability, i.e., we set the threshold
coverage to innity, which yields a lower bound on content availability (see Deni-
tion 2.3.1) and an upper bound on average download time. In x2.3.2.2 we assume
that the download of a content does not span more than one active period, i.e., we set
the threshold coverage to zero, which yields an upper bound on content availability
and a lower bound on download time.
2.3.2.1 Download time upper bound and content availability lower bound
Next we establish an upper bound on the download time and a lower bound on
content availability. To this goal, we set the threshold coverage to innity. Content
is available if and only if there is at least one publisher online. A peer arriving during
an idle period nds the content unavailable and immediately leaves, i.e., it does not
queue up until a publisher arrives.
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Variable Description (units)
k peer arrival rate (1/s)
 =
PK
i=1 k bundled peer arrival rate (1/s)
sk le size (bits)
S =
PK
i=1 sk bundle size (bits)
 mean download rate of peers (bits/s)
rk arrival rate of publishers (1/s)
R arrival rate of publishers for the bundle (1/s)
uk mean publisher residence time (s)
U mean bundled publisher residence time (s)
Metric Description (units)
Pk unavailability
P (b) unavailability of bundle
Tk download time (s)
T (b) bundle download time (s)
Table 2.1. Table of notation. Variables denoted by lower case characterize swarm
k 2 f1; 2;    ; Kg in isolation, while variables denoted by capital letters characterize
the bundle of K les. Subscripts are dropped when homogeneous les are considered.
In swarm k (k = 1; : : : ; K), let rk and uk denote the arrival rate and mean residence
time of publishers (refer to Table 2.1 for notation). Swarm k cycles through active
and idle periods, with mean length E[Bk] and 1=rk, respectively. The probability Pk
that a peer arrives to swarm k and nds the content unavailable is
Pk =
1=rk
E[Bk] + 1=rk
; k = 1; : : : ; K (2.1)
and
E[Bk] =
erkuk   1
rk
(2.2)
The above follows from classical results for the busy period of an M/G/1 queue [87].
Let R and U denote the arrival rate and residence time of publishers for the bundle,
respectively. The probability P (b) that a peer arrives to nd the content unavailable
in the bundled swarm is
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P (b) =
1=R
E[B(b)] + 1=R
(2.3)
where the mean active period length for a bundle of K les is
E[B(b)] =
eRU   1
R
(2.4)
Replacing (2.2) into (2.1) and (2.4) into (2.3) yield a lower bounded on content
availability for swarm k and for the bundled swarm, respectively.
To derive an upper bound on the download time, we use arguments similar to those
in [24, x3] regarding birth-death systems with catastrophes. Let k = rkuk. Noting
that birth, deaths and catastrophes in [24, Proposition 3.1] correspond to publisher
arrivals, publisher departures and peer download completions in our setting, yields
Theorem 2.3.1. The average download time for swarm k, k = 1; : : : ; K, is upper
bounded by
1
=sk
 
1 +
1X
j=0
e k=k
P1
i=j+1 
i
k=i!
ek   (=sk)uk
P1
l=0 
l
k=(l!(l + uk=sk))
!
(2.5)
The content availability is lower bounded by 1  e rkuk .
The corresponding bounds for the bundled swarm are obtained by replacing sk, rk
and uk by maxk(sk), R and U , respectively, in the expressions above.
The reader can nd the derivation of Theorem 2.3.1, as well as of the other results
that follow, in Appendix A.
2.3.2.2 Download time lower bound and content availability upper bound
Next, we aim at establishing a lower bound on the average download time and an
upper bound on content availability. To this goal, we consider a threshold coverage
equal to zero, i.e., a peer arriving during an active period always nishes the download
during that active period and the last peer to nish ends the active period. In order
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to obtain our bounds, we also assume that publishers can introduce the content in
the system before leaving.
Let the aggregate arrival rate of peers and publishers to the individual swarm and
to the bundle be k + rk and  + R, respectively. For simplicity, we rst consider
the special scenario in which uk = sk= (we relax this assumption in the following
section). Then
E[Bk] =
e(rk+k)sk=   1
rk + k
; k = 1; : : : ; K (2.6)
and
E[B(b)] =
e(R+)S=   1
 +R
(2.7)
If, for all K les, k =  and sk = s then  = K and S = Ks. The bundled active
period is E[B(b)] = e(K
2). Thus, accounting for the availability gains brought by
peers, the unavailability of the bundled swarm is P (b) = e (K
2)Pk.
The next theorem uses the observations above to establish bounds on the average
download time and content availability.
Theorem 2.3.2. The average download time for swarm k, k = 1; : : : ; K, is lower
bounded by
(1  Ak)=rk + sk= (2.8)
where
Ak =
E[Bk]
1=rk + E[Bk]
=
(e(rk+k)(sk=)   1)=(rk + k)
1=rk + (e(rk+k)(sk=)   1)=(rk + k) (2.9)
The corresponding bounds for the bundled swarm are obtained by replacing sk, rk and
k by mink(sk), R and , respectively, in (2.8) and (2.9).
2.3.3 A model for content availability and download time
Next, we quantify content availability and the mean download time experienced
by peers when 1) the mean residence time of the publisher may dier from the service
time of peers and 2) the coverage threshold may be nite and greater than zero.
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We begin by presenting the theoretical background required by our model. Our
results rely on the busy period analysis of the M/G/1 queue [15], where the customer
initiating the busy period has an exceptional residence time.
The workload consists of customers arriving according to a Poisson process with
rate . The residence time of the customer initiating a busy period is drawn from
an exponential distribution with mean . The residence time of all other customers,
X, takes the form of one of two exponentially distributed random variables, X1 or
X2, corresponding to peers and publishers, with averages 1 and 2, respectively;
X = X1 with probability q1 and X = X2 with probability q2 = 1  q1. The expected
busy period is
E[B] =  +
1X
i=1
i
i!
iX
j=0

i
j

qj1q
i j
2 
1+j
1 
1 j+i
2 
12 + j2 + 1i  1j (2.10)
In the rest of this section, unless otherwise stated, we assume that all les have the
same size and request rates, and that the publisher arrival rates and residence times
are the same across all swarms. Assuming homogeneous swarms allows us to drop
the subscripts of variables referring to individual swarms. In Appendix A we show
that most of our results extend to the case where dierent swarms have dierent le
sizes and peer arrival rates.
2.3.3.1 Availability with impatient peers
We are now interested in determining the probability that a request leaves without
being served. To this goal, we consider impatient peers that leave immediately the
system if content is unavailable at their arrival.
Assumptions: Publishers arrive to individual swarms at rate r and stay in the
system for a mean time u. For the bundled swarm, publishers arrive with rate R and
stay for a mean time U . Peers that arrive during an idle period leave immediately
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without being received service. The threshold coverage is assumed to be equal to
zero, therefore active periods are referred to as busy periods.
Denote the probability that a request leaves without being served as P and P (b)
for the individual and bundled systems, respectively. Then
P =
1=r
E[B] + 1=r
P (b) =
1=R
E[B(b)] + 1=R
(2.11)
The average busy period for each individual swarm, E[B], is obtained from (2.10)
by setting the parameters as follows:  =  + r,  = u , 1 = s=, q1 = =(+ r),
2 = u.
For the bundled swarm, the aggregate peer arrival rate is  = K and the size
is S = Ks. The average busy period, E[B(b)], is obtained from (2.10) as follows:
 =  +R,  = U , 1 = S=, q1 = =( +R), 2 = U .
The following lemma concerns the number of peers served in a busy period. As-
suming that both the bundle publisher arrival rate, R, and mean publisher residence
time, U , are functionally independent of K, we have
Lemma 2.3.1. Bundling K les together yields a mean number of peers served in a
busy period that is E[N (b)] = e(K
2).
Note that this result is qualitatively similar to the case when publishers and peers
stay online for the same mean time (see paragraph following (2.7) in x2.3.2).
We now consider the scenario where peers have skewed preferences. Given K
contents, let pk denote the probability that a request is for content k, k = 1; : : : ; K.
Assume that pk = c=k
,  > 0 (Zipf's law). Let  denote the aggregate peer arrival
rate for all K swarms. Then, the arrival rate for swarm k is k = pk. Under the
assumption that the mean time to download the bundle scales as K=, one can show
that the lemma above still holds (details in Appendix A).
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In the theorem below we relate the asymptotics of the busy period to the proba-
bility that a request is not served. Under the same assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1 we
have,
Theorem 2.3.3 (Availability theorem). Bundling K les together yields unavail-
ability P (b) = Pe (K
2).
Although the above result assumes the publisher arrival rate for the bundle, R, is
constant and independent of K, we show in Appendix A that even if R = 
(e cK
2
),
c > 0, the unavailability of the bundled swarm, P (b), is such that P (b) = Pe (K
2).
2.3.3.2 Mean download time with patient peers
We wish to compare the mean peer download time with and without bundling.
Assumptions: Peers that arrive during an idle period wait for a publisher to
become available. The other assumptions are the same as in x2.3.3.1.
We rst compute the average busy period length in an individual swarm, E[B].
When content is unavailable and a publisher arrives to start a busy period, the group
of waiting peers immediately begins to be served. In the Appendix A we provide
an expression for E[B] accounting for the possible impact of this group of peers on
the duration of the busy period. We also show that the theorem presented in the
previous section holds under this setting. However, to simplify presentation, in what
follows we neglect the possible impact of this group of peers on the duration of the
busy period.
Approximation 2.3.1. The impact of the group of waiting peers on the duration of
the busy period is negligible.
The above approximation is reasonable, for instance, if publishers reside in the
swarm long enough to mitigate such impact. In this case, the average busy period
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E[B] is obtained from (2.10) by setting  =  + r, 1 = s=, q1 = =(+ r),
2 =  = u.
The mean download time of a le when peers are patient, E[T ], is constituted by
the mean active download time and mean idle waiting,
E[T ]  s

+
1
r
P (2.12)
where P = 1=(1 + rE[B]).
For the bundled swarm, the mean busy period length, E[B(b)], can be obtained
from (2.10) by setting  =  + R, 1 = S=, q1 = =( +R), 2 =  = U . Once
E[B(b)] is obtained, the mean download time for the bundle, E[T (b)], can be derived
from (2.12) replacing s, r and E[B] by their bundle counterparts S, R and E[B(b)].
Bundling K les yields an averge download time of
E[T (b)]  Ks

+
1
R
P (b) (2.13)
where P (b) = 1=(1 +RE[B(b)]) and E[B(b)] = e(K
2).
When service times dominate download times, bundling can increase the download
time by up to a factor of K as peers download K times as much content. When wait
times dominate download times, though, in Appendix A we show that after bundling
K =
p
log(1=R) les the mean download time of the individual les, E[T ], is such
that E[T ] = E[T (b)](R cK b) (b  0; c > 0). Note that the factor R cK b grows
unbounded as R ! 0. This means that, when wait times dominate download times
as is the case with highly unavailable publishers, peers may experience arbitrarily
smaller download times when downloading bundles.
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2.3.3.3 Threshold coverage
If a peer leaves the system carrying the last copy of a block of a le, content may
become unavailable even if the number of peers online, i.e., the coverage, is greater
than one. Our aim now is to determine the availability and the mean download time
experienced by peers in the general case where content becomes unavailable when no
publisher is online and the coverage reaches a threshold m.
Assumptions: Same as those described in x2.3.1.
Let B(n;m) be the expected length of a period that begins with n peers and ends
as soon as the population size reaches m (m < n). In the queueing theory literature,
such a period is known as a congestion period [79]. For all n, B(n; 0) is given by
B(n; 0) =
nX
i=1
s
i
+
s

1X
i=1
s

i (n+ i)!  n!i!
i!(n+ i)!i
(2.14)
For m < n, B(n;m) is obtained using the recursion B(n;m) = B(n; 0) B(m; 0).
We use the expression above to estimate the unavailability probability and the
expected download time of peers in the scenario described in x2.3.1 and depicted
in Figure 2.2. Let B(m) be the mean congestion period starting when the system
transitions to Phase 2. Assuming that at this point the system is in steady state,
B(m) =
1X
i=0
e 
s
 (s

)
i
i!
B(i;m) (2.15)
The following two approximations allow us to solve the proposed model.
Approximation 2.3.2. The duration of the congestion period is modeled through its
mean.
Approximation 2.3.3. Publishers stay long enough in the system so that, when
Phase 2 begins, i.e., when the number of publishers goes from one to zero, the popu-
lation of peers is in steady state.
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Modeling the duration of the congestion period through its mean and assuming
the system in steady state when Phase 2 begins are clearly strong simplications.
Nevertheless, in x2.4.3.1 we show that the eect of such assumptions on mean down-
load times is negligible in many interesting scenarios. Therefore, we proceed with our
analysis under such assumptions.
Under such assumptions, the number of times that the system cycles through
Phases 1 and 2 before transitioning to Phase 3 is described by a geometric random
variable with mean erB(m): It follows that, for a threshold coverage of m, the mean
download time of a le when peers are patient is
E[T ] = s=+ P=r; where P  exp( r(u+B(m))) (2.16)
The corresponding expression for bundled swarms is obtained by replacing s, ,
r and u by their bundled counterparts, S, , R and U . In particular, if R = Kr and
U = Ku the availability theorem (Theorem 2.3.3) still holds. In x2.4.3.1, we validate
the mean download time estimated using our model against experiments and give
recommendations on how to set the threshold coverage m.
2.3.3.4 Altruistic lingering
Peers may remain online as seeds after completing their downloads, either because
they are altruistic or because publishers provide them incentives to do so. We now
aim to analyze the impact of altruistic lingering on the mean download time of peers.
Assumptions: Peers remain in the system for an average amount of time 1=
after completing their downloads. The other assumptions are the same as in x2.3.3.3.
In the Appendix A we show how to parameterize a general version of equa-
tion (2.10) to derive the availability probability and the mean download time of peers
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that stay online as seeds after completing their downloads. Furthermore, we show
that the availability theorem still holds.
To illustrate the consequences of peers staying longer in the system, consider two
swarms with le sizes s1 and s2 and popularities 1 and 2. Peers remain in the
swarm after completing their downloads in individual swarms, but not in the bundled
swarm. We consider the scenario in which the mean number of users in swarm 1 and
the bundle are equal, [s11=+ 1= = (1 + 2)(s1 + s2)=].
Let the mean residence time be dened as the download time plus altruistic lin-
gering time. The mean residence time for requestors of content 1 equals
s1

+
1

=
(1 + 2)(s1 + s2)
1
=
s1 + s2


1 +
2
1

(2.17)
For the bundled swarm, the mean residence time of peers is given by (s1 + s2)=.
Assume the swarm 1 content is small and unpopular while the swarm 2 content
is large and popular, s1  s2, 1  1 2. Since content 1 is very unpopular (peer
interarrival time very large), high availability depends on peers staying for a long time
in the system after concluding their downloads (in equation (2.17), 1 + 2=1 ! 1
as 1 ! 0). If swarm 1 is bundled with swarm 2, on the other hand, the overhead
incurred by the peers only interested in content 2 is marginal (since s1  s2) but the
gains for peers interested in content 1 is remarkable, since requestors for content 1
experience the same availability and performance as those requesting le 2.
2.3.4 When does bundling reduce download time?
In this section we use the proposed model to illustrate when bundling reduces
mean download time. We numerically evaluate equations (2.12) and (2.10) using
the parameters described in the legend of Figure 2.3. Figure 2.3 shows the expected
download time as a function of the bundle size. For seven of the scenarios (1=R 2
[500; 1100]), increasing K to its optimal value, K = 3, leads to a decrease in the
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Figure 2.3. Bundles may reduce download time.
expected download time, while setting K = 1 is the best strategy for the remaining
four. In each curve, as K increases the mean download time rst increases, then
decreases and nally increases again. The initial performance degradation occurs
because small bundles may increase service times without suciently increasing the
busy period. Figure 2.3 also shows that the benets of bundling increase as the
value of R decreases.
2.4 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we report on controlled experiments using real BitTorrent clients
to validate the two main conclusions of our study: 1) bundling improves availability,
and 2) bundling reduces download times when publishers are highly unavailable. We
use an instrumented version of the Mainline BitTorrent client [50] and experiment
with private torrents deployed on Planetlab. Our experimental setup thus emulates
realistic wide-area network conditions, client implementation artifacts, and the impact
of realistic upload capacity distributions and arrival patterns that are dicult to
capture in an analytic model.
2.4.1 Experimental setup
Our experiments were conducted using approximately 150 Planetlab hosts and
two hosts at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst one of which is designated
as the controller of the experiment and another as a Bittorrent tracker. The controller
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generates peer arrivals, publisher arrivals, and publisher departures by dispatching
via ssh a command to start or stop BitTorrent clients on randomly chosen unused
Planetlab hosts. At the end of the experiment, the controller collects the remote
traces logged by the instrumented BitTorrent clients. We use the traces to determine
when each download started and completed.
Experimental parameters Our experiments consist of torrents that publish either
a single le of size S = 4 MB or a bundle of K les of aggregate size KS. The peer
arrival rate for a bundle is assumed to be the sum of the arrival rates of its constituent
les. The uplink capacity of each peer is  = 33 KBps ( = 50 KBps in x2.4.3). The
publisher's upload capacity is 50KBps for individual as well as bundled torrents.
There is one publisher that alternates between being on and o. The peer arrival
rate  and on/o behavior of the publisher (R and U) are varied according to the
experimental goals as described below.
Note that, whereas in our model we assume that the le is innitely divisible,
in our experiments we consider les divided into blocks of 256KB. Therefore, when
publishers are intermittent the system is not guaranteed to be stable for all range of
parameters, i.e., for large periods of time the population may grow unbounded. In
particular, the stability condition in [40], which states that the average capacity of
the publisher (measured in blocks per second) is larger than the average arrival rate
of peers  (measured in peers per second) is not satised for K  6 in Figure 2.6
([40] is further discussed in x4.5). Nonetheless, throughout our experiments with
intermittent publishers the number of peers in the system oscillated around its mean,
i.e., the steady state system stability does not aect our results for the parameters
and time spans considered below.
34
2.4.2 Bundling improves availability
Our model suggests that bundling increases availability by increasing busy period
lengths and thereby reducing the need for a stable publisher. As an extreme case, we
consider a publisher that initiates a swarm and then goes oine never to come back.
We examine how long the swarm remains available after the publisher goes oine.
We ensure that the publisher stays online long enough for at least one peer to fully
download the le. Each peer leaves the system immediately after downloading the
le.
We set  = 1=150 peers/second for each le and all other parameters to their
default values, and study how the availability of the publisher-less swarm varies with
the level of bundling K.
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Figure 2.4. Availability of seedless swarms and the tradeo in the choice of the
bundle size.
Figure 2.4 shows the number of peers served between 0 and 1500 seconds of the
experiment for K = 1; 2; 4; 6; 8 and 10. No peer completes its download in the rst
300 seconds of the experiment: the publisher is either waiting for the rst peer to
arrive or is serving the rst peer in each case. However, when the rst peer completes
its download and the publisher goes oine, the curves for K = 1; 2; 4 exhibit a very
dierent trend compared to K = 6; 8; 10. For K = 1; 2; 4, only a small number
of additional peers are able to complete their download before parts of the content
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become unavailable. On the other hand, for K = 6; 8; 10, the number of completed
downloads increases linearly even in the abscence of a publisher, i.e., the swarm is
self-sustaining (self-sustainability is formally dened and further discussed in the next
chapter).
At steady state, the length of time the swarm remains self-sustaining after the
publisher goes oine is given, by denition, by the mean congestion period, B(m).
To compute B(m) we use eq. (2.15) with  = 33KBps, s = 4MB and  = 1=150
peers/s.
To set the threshold coverage we use results derived in the next chapter, on the
mean number of peers necessary to attain a self-sustainability of 0.9 (see Figure 3.5
and Appendix A.3). For K varying between 1 and 8, the threshold coverage m is (10,
11, 12, 13, 13, 13, 14, 14). This leads to the following values of B(m) for K = 1 to 8,
(0, 0, 6, 115, 1110, 3796, 8484, 21264). These values capture the fact that for K  6
the swarms remained self-sustaining throughout our measurement.
Although the system goes from being unavailable to being available asK increases
from 4 to 6, further increasing K only increases download times. The mean peer
download time when K = 10 is roughly 66% larger than that for K = 6 (not shown
in Figure 2.4). This suggests a delicate tradeo in choosing K|it should be large
enough to bridge gaps in publisher unavailability, but beyond that point bundling
only increases download times. We study this tradeo in more detail next.
2.4.3 Bundling can improve download time
In this section, we consider an intermittently available publisher with capacity
100KBps that alternately remains on and o. The duration of on and o intervals
are drawn from exponential distributions, with means of 300s and 900s respectively.
The peer arrival rate for each le is  = 1=60 peers/second and the capacity of each
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Figure 2.6. Download time versus bundling strategy. (a) exponential up and
down times; (b) heterogeneous upload rates; (c) heterogeneous demand (i =
1
8i
,
i = 1; : : : ; 4), les bundled in experiment 5.
peer is =50 KBps. We study how the mean peer download time varies with the level
of bundling.
Figures 2.5(a){(c) show peer arrivals and departures over time. Each line segment
starts at the instant that the peer arrives and terminates when the peer departs. For
each value of K the experiment lasts for 10 runs of 1200s each. Figure 2.5(a) shows
that for K = 2, many peers complete their downloads at roughly the same time.
These bulk departures indicate that the swarm is not self-sustaining. They occur
because extant as well as newly arriving peers get stuck soon after the publisher goes
o, and must wait until the publisher reappears to serve the missing blocks allowing
them to complete their downloads. On the other hand, setting K=3 (Figure 2.5(b))
reduces the likelihood of peers being blocked, and setting K = 4 (Figure 2.5(c))
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nearly eliminates blocking as the swarm sustains itself during periods of publisher
unavailability.
Figure 2.6(a) shows the mean download time as a function of K. For K = 1
and 2, the mean download time remains large as it is dominated by the times peers
spend waiting for the publisher. When K = 3, the mean download time reduces
signicantly, however the distance between the 5th and 95th percentiles remains large
as the download times are still partly determined by peers waiting for the publisher
to reappear. The optimal bundle size is K = 4. The mean and the median download
time are the lowest for this value of K as bundling eliminates gaps in publisher
availability. For the same reason, the distance between the 5th and 95th percentiles
is smaller when K = 4 than when K  3. For values of K > 4 the download time
increases linearly with respect to K as the download time is dominated by the time
to actively download increasingly bigger bundles.
2.4.3.1 Evaluation of the analytical model
Next, we validate our analytical model (Section 2.3.3.3) against the experimental
results above. We compute the mean download time adapting (2.16) to account for
the fact that there is only one publisher in the system to obtain
E[T (b)] = Ks=+ P (b)=R;where P (b) =
exp

 RP1i=0 exp( K2s )(K2s )ii! B(b)(i;m)
UR + 1
(2.18)
The derivation of (2.18) is in Appendix A. Setting s= = 80s,  = 1=60 peer-
s/s, 1=r = 900 arrivals/s, u = 300s and setting the threshold coverage as described
in x2.4.2, our model predicts the results observed in Figure 2.6(a) well. The model
leads to an optimal bundle size of K = 5, whereas the optimal observed in the ex-
periments was K = 4. The model correctly captures the trend of the download time
curve.
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2.4.3.2 Heterogeneous upload rates
Next, we repeat the above experiment with heterogeneous peer upload capacities.
The upload rate distribution was taken from the measured data used to generate
Figure 1 in the BitTyrant study [70]. The average upload rate is 280KBps and the
median is 50KBps. Using realistic peer upload capacities does not qualitatively change
the behavior of the system (compare Figures 2.6(a) and Figures 2.6(b)). However,
the optimal bundle size is now K = 5. This is consistent with the increase in the
average upload capacity compared to the values obtained from the experiments with
homogeneous capacities (=50 KBps). The larger upload capacity implies that a
larger bundle is needed to increase the length of its busy periods so as to make the
swarm self-sustaining during periods of publisher unavailability|a conclusion that
agrees with our model.
2.4.3.3 Heterogeneous le popularites
Next, we study the impact of bundling when dierent les have dierent popu-
larities. We consider a bundle of four les. We assume that the popularities of the
les inside the bundle are distributed as follows: 1 = 1=8, 2 = 1=16, 3 = 1=24 and
4 = 1=32. We run 5 experiments, the rst four correspond to swarms with individual
les (experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4) and the last one to a bundle including all four les
(experiment 5). In experiment i (1  i  4) we set i as described above, and in
experiment 5 we set  =
P4
i=1 i = 1=3:84. All other parameters are set to their
default values.
The mean download times are illustrated in Figure 2.6(c). The boxplots and
lines show the distribution quartiles and 5th and 95th percentiles. For the individual
les, as we move to the right in Figure 2.6(c) (i.e., as the popularity of the les
decreases) the mean download time increases. When we consider a bundle of four
les (experiment 5, extreme right in 2.6(c)) the mean download time is 405s, and the
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distance between the 5th and 95th percentiles is smaller than the one observed for
any of the individual les. The mean download time of the bundle is larger than the
mean download time of 329s experienced for le 1 in isolation but smaller than the
mean download times for les 2, 3 and 4 in isolation. These results are explained as
follows. File 1 is the most popular, so the cost of downloading more content outweighs
the availability benet of bundling. However, for the less popular les 2, 3, and
4, bundling reduces the download time by keeping the swarm self-sustaining during
periods of publisher unavailability. In summary, if contents have dierent popularities,
bundling may increase the download times of peers downloading the most popular
contents but can benet those downloading unpopular les. In this example, bundling
slightly increases the download times of 48% of peers who download the most popular
content but signicantly benets the majority of the population.
2.4.3.4 Arrival patterns
Our model as well as experiments so far assume that peers arrive according to
a time invariant Poisson process. To evaluate the sensitivity of our conclusions to
the Poisson assumption, we repeated experiments similar to those in Figure 2.6 using
scaled versions of real arrival patterns observed in our measurement traces collected
in x2.2. We found that using trace-driven arrivals does not qualitatively change our
conclusions (refer to Appendix A.3 for details).
However, we believe our model's conclusions may not hold if the mean arrival
rate is not steady for a long enough duration of time. In particular, our model
will overestimate the length of the busy period and consequently availability if the
arrival rate decreases signicantly before the end of the busy period determined by
the current arrival rate. Nevertheless, we found a signicant number of swarms with
relatively steady arrival rates in our measurement traces. For example, out of the
1,155 swarms associated with the TV show \Lost", 911 were published more than
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Figure 2.7. Typical peer arrival patterns of short-lived and long-lived swarms.
one month before we started our measurement. Figure 2.7(a) shows a typical new
swarm in its rst month and a typical swarm two years after its creation. The arrival
rates of old swarms show much less variation compared to the arrival rates of new
swarms. Our model can be used to predict the availability, download times, and the
impact of bundling for such swarms.
2.5 Related work
To our knowledge, this chapter presents the rst analytical model for content
availability in BitTorrent-like swarming systems. In addition, we address the avail-
ability and performance implications of bundling, which received little attention in
the realm of BitTorrent [89, 52, 41].
Ramachandran et al. [74] study the blocked leecher problem, where extant as well
as arriving peers may have to wait for a long period of time for some blocks of the
le that are no longer available. To address the problem, they propose BitStore, a
token-based incentive architecture to obtain the missing blocks cached at other peers
that had previously downloaded the le.
Qiu and Srikant [73] building upon earlier work by Veciana et al. [95] present
a uid model to analyze the download time performance of BitTorrent in steady-
state. In contrast, our model accounts for both performance and availability similar
in spirit to performability [43]. A naive adaptation of the uid model in [73] to
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bundles suggests strictly longer download times under bundling [89], whereas our
model shows that bundling can decrease download times by improving availability,
i.e., peers can download more content in less time. This idea was further pursued
by Lev-tov et al. [52] and Carlsson et al. [17]. In these two works, the authors have
proposed bandwidth allocation schemes, in the realm of unmanaged and managed
swarms, respectively, such that if peers exchange content that they did not request,
mean download times can decrease due to availability gains.
Hajek and Zhu [40, 108] studied the stability of peer-to-peer systems. They have
shown that in a system in which peers adopt random peer selection and rarest rst
block selection, there is a non-negligible probability that one block of the le might
become very rare, and in this case the server needs to send that block to every peer
that arrives to the system. Although some experiments conducted in this chapter
correspond to unstable systems, the steady state stability did not aect our results
for the parameters and time spans considered (see x2.4.1 for details).
Many recent works have studied performance and fairness of a single swarm [50,
56, 12, 31]. Collaboration across swarms was studied by Guo et al. [39] suggesting
many unexplored inter-torrent opportunities for block exchanges. Yang et al. [104]
propose subtle modications to the Mainline BitTorrent client so as to leverage such
opportunities. Their mechanism provides incentives for peers to remain online as
seeds after completing downloads. Piatek et al. [71] suggest that propagating peer
reputations limited to one hop can incent exchanges across swarms. Sirivianos et al.
[85] propose an architecture where a commercial content provider provides \credits"
to incent more cooperation between peers. Bundling is complementary to inter-swarm
collaboration based on micropayment schemes to improve content availability. Mi-
cropayment schemes require a central bank to enable transactions and a tracking
mechanism across swarms for peers to locate each other. In contrast, bundles are
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easy to set up and require no change to existing trackers or clients and is already in
widespread use.
Our work opens up several avenues of future work. First, bundling may increase
the trac in the network, which motivates studying the implications of bundling for
ISP pricing as well as its impact on content locality. Second, although our work sheds
some light on what les make good candidates for bundling, more work is needed to
understand how a content provider should optimally bundle les to meet performance
or cost objectives, especially when the demand for a bundle may be dierent from
the aggregate demand for its constituent les.
2.6 Discussion
In this section we discuss our key modeling assumptions as well as alternatives to
bundling.
2.6.1 Assumptions and Their Validation
Next, we discuss the assumptions adopted to yield a tractable model.
Steady state assumption: Our model assumes a Poisson arrival of peers at
a xed rate. It has been shown in x2.4.3.4 that long-lived swarms have relatively
stable mean arrival rates over periods of months. Our model can be used to analyze
the impacts of bundling on content availability and mean download times for such
swarms. More generally, note that our model qualitatively predicts one of the ndings
observed in the wild, namely that bundled content is more available. The quantitative
validation of the model was done using controlled PlanetLab experiments (see x2.4).
Fixed threshold coverage: Our model assumes a xed threshold coverage. In
practice, content might become unavailable even when there are more than m peers
in the system, i.e., the threshold coverage is a random variable. Nevertheless, in
x2.4 we showed the predictive power of our model in scenarios of practical interest,
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parameterizing the threshold coveragem using results to be presented in the upcoming
chapter.
2.6.2 Alternatives to Bundling
Altruistic lingering and exogenous incentive mechanisms for peers to linger in the
system are alternatives to bundling. Both altruistic lingering and exogenous incentives
yield increased peer residence times, which increases content availability. However,
as pointed out in x2.3.3.4, if small and unpopular les are bundled with large and
popular ones, bundling leads to signicant availability gains for the requesters of the
unpopular les with negligible impact to the requesters of the popular ones. Such
gains are due to the increased replication of the unpopular content, and might be
dicult to attain through altruistic lingering alone (see x2.3.3.4).
2.7 Conclusions
Peer-to-peer swarming in BitTorrent scales impressively to tolerate massive ash
crowds, but falls short on availability. For instance, our measurements indicate that
half of the swarms are unavailable half of the time|an observation that does not bode
well for the increasing commercial interest in integrating swarming with server-based
content dissemination. Our work is a rst step towards developing a foundational
understanding of content availability in swarming systems.
By viewing BitTorrent as a queueing system, we were able to model content avail-
ability. The model suggests two important implications for bundling of content, a
common practice among swarm publishers today. First, bundling improves content
availability. Second, when the publisher is highly unavailable, bundling reduces the
download time experienced by peers to obtain unpopular content. The latter impli-
cation is particularly intriguing as peers take less time to download more content.
Although the model makes several simplifying assumptions, we were able to em-
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pirically validate its conclusions through large-scale controlled experiments with the
Mainline BitTorrent client over Planetlab.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING SWARM SELF-SUSTAINABILITY: THE
STABLE PUBLISHERS CASE
By leveraging resources provided by clients, peer-to-peer swarming decreases costs
to publishers, and provides scalability and system robustness. However, there is a
limit on how much savings can be gained from swarming techniques. For example, in
the case of unpopular content, peers must rely on the publisher in order to complete
their downloads. In this chapter, we investigate such a dependence of peers on a
publisher. To this goal, we dene swarm self-sustainability as the fraction of time in
which all blocks are available among peers (excluding the publisher).
Both this chapter and the previous one are focused on the problem of content
availability. Whereas in the previous chapter we considered a scenario with intermit-
tent publishers, in this chapter we consider a stable publisher and quantify swarm
self-sustainability. In addition, whereas in the previous chapter we assumed that the
le was ininitesimally divisible, in this chapter we consider a le divided into nite
size blocks.
3.1 Introduction
We consider a scenario where each swarm includes one stable publisher that is
always online and ready to serve content. The corresponding system is henceforth re-
ferred to as a hybrid peer-to-peer system, since peers can always rely on the publisher
if they cannot nd blocks of the les among themselves. If all blocks are available
among the peers, the swarm is referred to as self-sustaining. Quantifying swarm
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self-sustainability, dened as the fraction of time during which the swarm can sustain
itself without a publisher, is useful for provisioning purposes. The larger the swarm's
self-sustainability, the less the dependency of peers on the publisher, and the lower
the bandwidth needed by the publisher to serve the peers.
The primary contribution of this chapter is a model to study swarm self-sustainability.
We use a two-layer model to quantify swarm self-sustainability as a function of the
number of blocks in the le, the mean upload capacity of peers and the popularity of a
le. The upper layer of our model captures how user dynamics evolve over time, while
the lower layer captures the conditional probability of a given number of blocks being
available among the peers given a xed upper layer population state. Our model is
exible enough to account for large or small numbers of blocks in the le, hetero-
geneous download times for dierent blocks, and peers residing in the system after
completing their downloads. We derive closed-form expressions for the distribution
of the number of blocks available among the peers and apply them to show that
self-sustainability increases as a function of the number of blocks in the le. The
derived expressions involve sums and dierences of large numbers, and are amenable
to numerical errors. Hence, we present an ecient algorithm to compute the swarm
self-sustainability that avoids these problems. We then numerically investigate the
minimum popularity needed to attain a given self-sustainability level. Finally, we
validate the estimates made by the model against detailed simulations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In x3.2 we propose our model
and in x3.3 we present an ecient algorithm to solve the proposed model followed
by analytical results in x3.4. In x3.5 we evaluate our model against experiments. In
x4.5 we present related work, in x3.7 we discuss some limitations and caveats of our
model and x4.7 concludes.
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. . .
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γ nB
nBnh
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µh+1 nh
Figure 3.1. User dynamics. In stage h, there are nh users, each user owning h
blocks, 0  h  B.
3.2 Model
In this section, we present our model to estimate swarm self-sustainability. Our
model is hierarchical. The upper layer characterizes user dynamics, and the lower
layer comprises a performance model used to quantify the distribution of blocks avail-
able among the peers, for a given state of the upper layer model.1 We present each of
the layers, in x3.2.1 and x3.2.2, respectively, and then introduce the metric of interest
in x3.2.3.
3.2.1 User Dynamics Model
A le consists of B blocks. Requests for a le arrive according to a Poisson process
with rate . We further assume that the time required for a user to download its
jth block is a random variable with mean 1=j, 1  j  B. After completing their
downloads, peers remain in the system for a time with mean 1=.
We model user dynamics with (B + 1) M/G/1 queues in series. Each of the
rst B M/G/1 queues models the download of a block, and capture the self-scaling
property of BitTorrent swarms, i.e., each peer brings one unit of service capacity to
the system. The last queue captures the residence time of seeds (see Figure 3.1).
The system state is characterized by a (B + 1)-tuple, n = (n0; n1; n2; : : : ; nB),
where nh represents the number of customers in queue h, i.e., the number of users that
1Each layer of the model is self-containted. In Appendix B.11 we provide an alternate description
of our model, integrating the user dynamics into the lower layer and explicitly capturing the evolution
of the blocks owned by each user (users signatures) in time.
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have downloaded h blocks of the le, 0  h  B. We denote byN the random variable
characterizing the current state of the upper layer model and by n its realization. The
number of peers in the system is referred to as n, n =
PB
i=0 ni.
Peers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate  to queue 0 and transit
from queue h, also referred to as stage h, to queue h + 1 (0  h  B   1) with rate
h+1, the download rate of the (h + 1)
th block downloaded by a peer. The mean
residence time in queue B captures the mean time that peers remain in the system
after completing their downloads, 1=. Setting  = 1 models the case where all
peers immediately leave the system after completing the download. Throughout this
chapter, unless otherwise stated, we assume that the mean download times of all
blocks are the same, 1=j = 1=, 1  j  B. Nevertheless, all results are easily
extended to the case where the mean time it takes for a user to download its jth
block is 1=j.
Let (n0; : : : ; nB) be the joint steady state population probability distribution,
(n0; : : : ; nB) = P (N = (n0; : : : ; nB)), of nding nh users in the h
th queue, 0  h  B,
and let h(nh) = P (Nh = nh), h = 0; : : : ; B, be the corresponding marginal popula-
tion probability distributions of the individual queues. The steady state distribution
of the queueing system has the following product form,
(n0; : : : ; nB 1; nB) =
BY
h=0
h(nh) =
(=)nB
nB!
e =
B 1Y
h=0

nh
nh!
e 

(3.1)
where  = = is the load of the system (refer to Table 3.1 for notation).
3.2.2 Performance Model For a Given Population State
We now describe the lower layer of the model. Given the current population state,
n = (n0; : : : ; nB), our goal is to determine the distribution of the number of blocks
available among the peers. We begin by stating our key modeling assumption.
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parameters
 mean arrival rate of peers (peers/s)
1= mean time to download a block (s)
 = = mean load of the system (per stage)
B number of blocks in le
1= mean residence time of seeds
variables
nh number of users that own h blocks
n=(n0;: : :; nB) upper layer state
(n) steady state probability of state n
n =
PB
i=0 ni number of peers in the system
V number of blocks available among the peers
metrics
p(v) = P (V = v) probability of v blocks being available among peers
A=p(B) swarm self-sustainability
Table 3.1. Table of notation. Vectors are denoted by bold face symbols. Unless
otherwise stated,  =1 in which case nB = 0. When referring to block availability,
it is subsumed availability among peers (excluding publisher).
Uniform and independent block allocation: In steady state, the set of
blocks owned by a randomly selected user in stage h is chosen uniformly at random
among the
 
B
h

possibilities and independently among users.
A user u in stage h, 0  h  B, has a signature sh;u 2 f0; 1gB, dened as a B bit
vector where the ith bit is set to 1 if the user has block i and 0 otherwise. Each user
in stage h owns h blocks and has one of
 
B
h

possible signatures.
Under the uniform and independent block allocation assumption, signatures are
chosen uniformly at random and independently among users; the latter is clearly a
strong assumption since in any peer-to-peer swarming system the signatures of users
are correlated. Nevertheless, in x3.5 we show that the eect of such correlations
on our metric of interest, swarm self-sustainability, is negligible in many interesting
scenarios. Therefore, we proceed with our analysis under such an assumption.
Let Sh;u be the random variable denoting the signature of the u
th user in stage
h, and sh;u its realization, 1  u  n. The sample space of the lower layer model,
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n, for a given state of the upper layer, n, is the set of all f0; 1gBn bit vectors in
which element B(u  1)+ i equals one if the uth user has block i, and zero otherwise,
1  u  n, 1  i  B. An element in 
n is the concatenation of n bit vectors of
size B each. 
n has cardinality j
nj =
QB
h=0
 
B
h
nh
. Then, under the uniform and
independent block allocation assumption,
P (S1;1=s1;1; : : : ;SB;nB=sB;nB jN = n)=
1
j
nj (3.2)
In the next section, we relate the upper and lower layer models, showing how (3.1)
and (3.2) yield the key metric of interest, namely, swarm self-sustainability.
3.2.3 Self-Sustainability
We now dene the key metric of interest, swarm self-sustainability. Let V denote
the steady state number of blocks available among the peers. Denote by p(v)
the steady state probability that v blocks are available among the peers,
p(v) = P (V = v) =
X
n2NB+1
P (V = vjN = n)(n) (3.3)
Denition 3.2.1. Swarm self-sustainability, A, is the steady-state probability that
the peers have the entire le,
A = p(B) (3.4)
Denition 3.2.1 together with equation (3.3) yields,
A =
X
n2NB+1
P (V = BjN = n)(n)= (3.5)
=
X
n2NB+1
P (V = BjN = n)(=)
nB
nB!
e =
B 1Y
h=0

nh
nh!
e 

(3.6)
The second equality in (3.5) follows from (3.1). P (V = BjN = n) is obtained
from (3.2) (see Appendix B.1).
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If peers leave the system immediately after concluding their downloads, we refer
to the swarm self-sustainability as A1. Swarm self-sustainability, A, when  < 1,
is obtained from A1 as follows,
A = 1  (1  A1) exp( =);  <1 (3.7)
The above follows because a block is unavailable among the peers if it is unavailable
among the leechers and there are no seeds in the system.
Note that A is expressed through (3.5) as an innite sum. In what follows, we
approximate A by its truncated version, A(N), considering only population states in
which there are no more than N users in the system,
A(N) =
X
n2NBs:t:nN
P (V = BjN = n)(n) (3.8)
The value of N is based on the desired error tolerance , and is chosen as described at
the end of x3.3. A naive use of (3.8) yields an inecient algorithm to compute A(N)
by exploring a number of states that grows exponentially with respect to the le size.
This problem is addressed in the next section, where we provide an ecient algorithm
to evaluate A(N).
In the rest of this chapter, we refer to the truncated self-sustainability, A(N),
simply as self-sustainability, the distinction between A(N) and A being clear from
the context. In addition, since A is readily obtained from A1 using (3.7), henceforth
we focus on the case  =1 and make the dependence of p(v) on  explicit, denoting
it by p(v; ), whenever  <1.
3.3 An Ecient Solution Algorithm to Evaluate Self-Sustainability
In this section we present an ecient algorithm to compute swarm self-sustainability
in polynomial time. The key insight consists of aggregating the states in the upper
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 B - k  k 
 v 
 B - v 
 h 
v - k  h - v + k 
blocks initially available among peers
blocks initially unavailable among peers
contributed blocks
Figure 3.2. Recursion to compute probability of v blocks being unavailable among
the peers. There are initially k blocks unavailable among the peers, and v after a user
contributes h blocks.
layer of the model in such a way that the lower layer metrics are computed once
per aggregate rather than once per state. The algorithm relies on three observations
about our model, the rst related to the performance model for a given population
state (lower layer model) and the last two related to the user dynamics (upper layer
model).
Let  h(k; v) be the probability that, in a system in which k blocks are initially
available among peers, v blocks become available among the peers after an additional
user contributes h blocks. Then,  h(k; v) is characterized by a hypergeometric
distribution,
 h(k; v) =
 
k
h (v k)
 
B k
v k
 
B
h
 ; k = 0; 1; : : : ; B   1; B; v = max(k; h); : : : ; B   1; B
(3.9)
Equation (3.9) follows because there are
 
B k
v k

ways in which v   k blocks of the
additional user do not overlap with the k previously available blocks, and there are 
k
h (v k)

ways in which the other h  v + k blocks can overlap with previously avail-
able blocks (see Figure 3.2). A recursion to compute  h(k; v) is presented in Ap-
pendix B.2.
Our second observation regards the steady state probability that a randomly se-
lected user is in stage h, denoted by (h) (0  h  B   1). It can be shown that
(h) = 1=B, 0  h  B   1. This is a consequence of the assumption that the
download times of all blocks have the same mean, 1=. Note that, in general, if a
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user downloads its (h + 1)th block at rate h+1, 0  h  B   1, the model can be
easily parameterized by setting (h) = (1=h+1)=(
PB
i=1 1=i).
Our third and last observation concerns the total number of users in the system.
The total population is characterized by a Poisson random variable with mean B=.
This follows from the fact that the sum of B independent Poisson random variables,
with mean =, is a Poisson random variable with mean B=.
Denote by pn(v) the probability that v blocks are available among the peers con-
ditioned on the presence of n users in the system,
pn(v) = P (V = v
jnj = n) (3.10)
It follows from the discussion in the previous paragraph that
p(v) =
1X
n=0
pn(v)e
 B(B)n=n!
The truncated version of p(v), p(N)(v), is
p(N)(v) =
NX
n=0
pn(v)e
 B(B)n=n! (3.11)
It remains to show how to compute pn(v). This is accomplished by making use of our
rst two observations, as summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.1. The probability of v available blocks, conditioned on n users in the
system, pn(v), satises the following recursion,
pn(v)=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
min(v;B 1)X
h=0
vX
k=v h
pn 1(k) h(k; v)=B; n  1
1; n = 0; v = 0
0; n = 0; v 6= 0
(3.12)
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In Appendix B.3, we show that (3.12) correctly computes (3.10). Next, we further
simplify recursion (3.12). Changing the order of the summations and adapting their
limits accordingly yields
pn(v)=
vX
k=0
pn 1(k)
B 1X
h=v k
 h(k; v)=B; n  1 (3.13)
The base cases are p0(v)=1 if v = 0 and p0(v)=0 if m 6= 0. In Appendix B.4 we
derive the following result,
B 1X
h=m k
 h(k; v) =
8><>: (B + 1)=(B   k + 1); 0  m  B   1k=(B   k + 1); v = B (3.14)
Equation (3.14) is key to further simplifying (3.13). Replacing (3.14) into (3.13)
yields, after algebraic manipulation,
Theorem 3.3.1. The probability of v blocks being available among the peers, p(v),
equals
p(v) =
1X
n=0
pn(v)e
 B(B)n=n! (3.15)
where pn(v) satises the following recursion, 0  v < B,
pn(v)=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1=Bn; n  1; v = 0
pn(v   1) + pn 1(v)((B + 1)=(B(B   v + 1))); n  1; B > v > 0
1; n = 0; v = 0
0; n = 0; v 6= 0
(3.16)
and pn(B) = 1  
PB 1
v=0 pn(v). The approximation p
(N)(v) for (3.15) is obtained by
truncating the innite sum at N and is computed in time O(NB).
Theorem 3.3.1 yields an ecient algorithm to evaluate swarm self-sustainability.
The algorithm has complexity O(NB), since pn(v) is computed for 0  n  N and
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0  m  B. Note also that once the elements pn(v) are computed for a xed B, one
can obtain the self-sustainability for dierent values of  in time O(B).
Let "(N) be the truncation error, "(N) = p(B) p(N)(B). The maximum number
of users in the system, N , can be chosen as a function of "(N),
"(N) =
1X
n=N+1
p(v)e B(B)n=n! 
1X
n=N+1
e B(B)n=n! = 1 
NX
n=0
e B(B)n=n!
(3.17)
If B is large (B > 1000), the Poisson distribution is well approximated by a normal
distribution. In this case, N can be chosen so that 1 ((N  B)=pB)  , where
 is the desired error tolerance and () is the standard normal cdf.
Theorem 3.3.1 assumes h = , 0  h  B   1. If that is not the case, self-
sustainability can be computed in time O(NB logB) using an alternative recursion.
We refer the reader to Appendix B.12 for details.
3.4 Model Analysis
We derive closed-form expressions for the probability that v blocks are available
among the peers in the system and for the mean number of available blocks, in x3.4.1
and x3.4.2, respectively. The closed-form expressions are useful in order to gain
insight on how dierent system parameters impact self-sustainability. In x3.4.2 we
use the closed-form expressions to compute the minimum popularity to attain a given
self-sustainability level. In x3.4.3 we show that self-sustainability increases with le
size. However, the closed-form expressions may lead to numerical problems, if used
to compute the self-sustainability for large les (e.g., B > 500), since they involve
sums and subtractions of large numbers. This is why the recursion presented in x3.3
is useful.
In order to simplify the closed-form expressions, in the remainder of this section
we assume that  = , i.e., peers, after completing their downloads, linger in the
56
system as seeds for an interval with duration drawn from an exponential distribution
with mean 1=. Recall that when  is nite, we make the dependence of pn(v) on 
explicit, and denote it by pn(v; ).
3.4.1 Self-Sustainability Closed-Form Expression
Similar arguments to those in x3.3 (Theorem 3.3.1) yield, for  =  and 0  n 
N; 0  v  B,
pn(v;)=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1=(B + 1)n; n  1; v = 0
pn(v   1;) + pn 1(v;)(1=(B   v + 1)); n  1; 0 < v  B
1; n = 0; v = 0
0; n = 0; v 6= 0
(3.18)
This recursion can be solved (see Appendix B.8), to obtain 2
pn(v;)=

B
v
 vX
l=0

v
l

( 1)l(B   v + l + 1) n; 1  n; 0  v  B (3.19)
In particular, the probability that all blocks are available among the peers, condi-
tioned on the number of users in the system, is pn(B;) =
PB
l=0
 
B
l

( 1)l(l + 1) n.
Using this expression we derive, in Appendix B.9 the corresponding unconditional
probability, namely, the swarm self-sustainability,
p(B;) =
BX
l=0

B
l

( 1)le (B+1)l=(l+1) = 1 
BX
l=1

B
l

( 1)l+1e (B+1)l=(l+1) (3.20)
We now interpret (3.20) using the inclusion/exclusion principle, which allows us to ap-
ply the Bonferroni inequalities in x3.4.2 and x3.4.3. The term exp( (B + 1)l=(l + 1))
is the probability that l specic (tagged) blocks are unavailable among the peers (refer
2The expression corresponding to equation (3.19) for the case  =1 is found in Appendix B.6.
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to Appendix B.10 for the derivation). So,
 
B
l

exp( (B + 1)l=(l + 1)) is the sum of
the probabilities that any l blocks are unavailable among the peers. Therefore, as
a consequence of the inclusion/exclusion principle, the probability that at least one
block is unavailable among the peers equals the rightmost summation in (3.20), and
p(B;) is its complement.
In what follows, we use the above closed-form expression to analyze the mean
number of blocks unavailable among the peers as well as the impact of the le size
on the self-sustainability.
3.4.2 Minimum Load to Attain Self-Sustainability
We now provide a simple expression to estimate the minimum load necessary
to attain high self-sustainability. The result relies on approximating swarm self-
sustainability using the mean number of available blocks among the peers. The
mean number of available blocks among the peers, E[V ], is E[V ] = B(1  q), where
q is the probability that a tagged block is unavailable among the peers,
q = exp( (B + 1)=2) (3.21)
The expression of q is readily obtained from (3.20). Note that the mean number of
unavailable blocks, Bq, equals the rst term (l = 1) in the rightmost summation in
(3.20). This observation coupled with an application of the Bonferroni inequality [96]
to (3.20) implies that 1   p(B;)  B   E[V ]. When E[V ]  B, the upper bound
B   E[V ] provides an approximation to the fraction of time that the swarm is not
self-sustaining, 1  p(B;).
Next, we present a simple alternative derivation of (3.21). Let q1 be the prob-
ability that a tagged block is unavailable among leechers (excluding seeds). In order
to compute q1, note that the mean time that a leecher holds a tagged block isPB 1
l=0 l=(B) = (B 1)=(2) and the rate at which leechers acquire a tagged block is
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given by a Poisson process with mean rate . Therefore, q1 = exp( (B   1)=2).
In general, a tagged block is unavailable among the peers if no leecher owns the
block and there are no seeds in the system. The probabilities of these two events are
exp( (B   1)=2) and exp( ), respectively. Their product yields (3.21).
We now use the above results to provide a simple expression to estimate the min-
imum load, ?, necessary to attain a given self-sustainability level, A?, when  =1.
It follows from the discussion in the previous paragraph that if  =1 the probability
that a tagged block is unavailable among the peers is q1 = exp( (B   1)=2). For
values of q1 close to 0 (q1  0:01), p(B)  1 + E[V ]   B = 1   Bq1, as indicated
in the beginning of this section. This approximation, in turn, can be used to select
the load ? to attain self-sustainability level A?,
?  [2 log (B=(1  A?))] =(B   1);  =1 (3.22)
We further study (3.22) in x3.5.2.2, where we compare the results obtained with
this approximation against those obtained with recursion (3.16), that provides exact
results.
3.4.3 The Impact of File Size on Self-Sustainability
Increasing le size, B, increases the mean download time of peers, B=. In
this section, we show that such an increase in the residence time of peers yields larger
swarm self-sustainability. Theorem 3.4.1 states the result for  = , B  4 and
  1:6 and in x3.5 we provide evidence that it also holds when  =1 and for small
values of .
Theorem 3.4.1 (File Size Impact). If B  4,   1:6 and  = , self-sustainability
increases with the le size, B.
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Proof. We denote the swarm self-sustainability for a given value of B and  as p^(B; ).
The Bonferroni inequalities [96], which generalize the inclusion/exclusion principle,
applied to (3.20), yield upper and lower bounds on p^(B; ),
1 Be (B+1)=2  p^(B; )  1 Be (B+1)=2 + (B(B   1)=2)e 2(B+1)=3 (3.23)
It is easy to show that if   1:6 and B  4 then
1 Be (B+1)=2 + (B(B   1)=2)e (B+1)2=3  1  (B + 1)e (B+2)=2 (3.24)
from which the result follows by comparing p^(B; ) and p^(B + 1; ).
The key insight of Theorem 3.4.1 can be easily explained in terms of the busy
periods of the proposed model. The busy period is dened as an uninterrupted
interval during which the swarm is self-sustaining. As the le size increases, the
number of blocks that need to be maintained increases linearly but the busy period
of the system increases exponentially (see Chapter 2). Indeed, as the le size increases,
the availability gain compensates the overhead to maintain a larger number of blocks,
and self-sustainability increases.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section we (a) validate the proposed model, against detailed simulations,
showing that despite the simplifying assumptions considered in our model, it captures
how self-sustainability depends on dierent system parameters and (b) report results
on the minimum popularity to attain a given self-sustainability level.
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
Our simulation experiments were conducted using the Tangram-II modeling envi-
ronment [28]. Tangram-II is an event-driven, object oriented modeling tool. The
60
three main objects in our simulations are the tracker, the peer and the seed. Their
implementations are based on the ocial BitTorrent protocol description [20, 50].
Every time a peer enters the system, receives a block or leaves, we record the event
in our logs, the current timestamp, peer id, and signature (see x3.2.2).
3.5.1.1 Simulator and Protocol Descriptions
When a peer P joins the system, it receives a random list of fty other peers from
the tracker, which constitutes its peer set. Throughout the simulation, as peers leave
the system the size of the peer set of P may dwindle to less than twenty. Once the
peer set size is less than twenty, P requests additional neighbors from the tracker.
The set of peers to whom P oers content blocks is a subset of its peer set, referred
to as the active peer set.
BitTorrent proceeds in rounds of ten seconds. By the end of each round, peer P
runs the tit-for-tat incentive mechanism. According to this mechanism, P recipro-
cates contents with those neighbors that contributed in the previous round. P selects
r of those peers that contributed in the last round to add to its active peer set (r  4).
In the next round, the active peer set of P will consist of the r aforementioned peers
plus 5   r additional peers selected uniformly at random out of its peer set. This
random selection of peers is referred to as optimistic unchoke, performed to allow
peers to get bootstrapped as well as to let them learn about new neighbors. Finally,
peers select blocks to download using the rarest rst algorithm, except for the rst
four blocks, which are chosen uniformly. Each block of the le is divided into sixteen
sub-blocks. After selecting the blocks to download, peers can get dierent sub-blocks
(of the same block) from dierent neighbors concurrently. A block can be uploaded
after all its sub-blocks are downloaded, assembled and checked using the block hash
key.
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In our experiments we observe that self-sustainability decreases with the size of
the active peer sets. That is because, if the active peer sets are large, each peer splits
its bandwidth across many other peers and blocks take longer to get replicated in
the network. As mentioned above, we select an active peer set of size ve, which is
adopted by many BitTorrent implementations.
In our experiments the seed behaves as a standard peer, except that it (i) initially
owns all blocks and (ii) is altruistic, hence does not execute the tit-for-tat algorithm.
We did not implement the mechanism used by peers to download their last block, also
known as end game mode [20]. This is inconsequential, though, since the end game
mode does not signicantly aect the steady state behavior of the system (see x3.5.2.1
and [11]).
3.5.1.2 Experimental Parameters
The conguration of our experiments consists of torrents that publish a le of size
S divided into B blocks of size s, s = 256KB, a typical block size in BitTorrent. The
number of blocks in the le, B, takes values 16, 50, 100 and 200, which corresponds
to les of size 4MB, 12MB, 25MB and 51MB, respectively. Note that if a swarm is
constituted of multiple les, which can be separately downloaded, we are interested in
analyzing the self-sustainability of each individual le. A le of size 51MB already
yields self-sustainability larger than 0.9 for  > 0:05 peers/min (see Figure 3.4).
Simulations to analyze such a steep increase in self-sustainability (see Figure 3.4)
quickly requires prohibitively large execution times and signicant variability in the
metrics of interest across runs. For this reason, we focused on quantitatively validating
our model for les with up to 200 blocks, but also use the model to analyze les of
size greater than 200 blocks.
The uplink capacity of each peer is 39KBps, which corresponds to  = 39=256 =
0:15 blocks/s, a typical eective capacity for BitTorrent peers [70, Figure 1]. The
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publisher maximum upload capacity is the same as that of a peer. A publisher
that contributes the same capacity as an ordinary peer might correspond to either a
domestic user or a commercial publisher that supports a large catalog of titles and
only provides enough capacity for each swarm so as to allow peers to complete their
downloads at rate . The peer arrival rate is varied according to the experimental
goals between (:25; :5; 1; 2; : : : ; 9) peers/min, as described next.
3.5.2 Model Validation
Our analytical model makes a number of simplifying assumptions as described
in x3.2. In what follows, our goal is to show that even with those simplifying
assumptions, discussed in x3.5.2.1, our model still captures swarm self-sustainability
in a realistic setting, as shown in x3.5.2.2.
3.5.2.1 Validating Model Assumptions
Our aim in this section is to validate (a) that the mean download times of blocks
are roughly the same (an exception being the rst block downloaded by the peers),
i.e., h = , 2  h  B (see x3.2.1) and (b) that the signatures of the users are
uniformly distributed (see x3.2.2).
Figure 3.3(a) shows the download time of the hth block downloaded by a peer.
The boxplots and lines show the distribution quartiles and minimum and maximum
values. Crosses indicate means download times of blocks, which are approximately the
same, except for the rst and last blocks. In particular, even though our simulator
ignores the end game mode [11], in general peers do not experience diculty nding
a neighbor from whom to download their last block. The median of the last block
is roughly the same as the one observed for the other blocks, and the mean is only
slightly larger. The rst block requested by a peer, however, takes longer to be
downloaded. This happens because a peer can only download its rst block after
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Figure 3.3. (a) Download times of hth block downloaded by a peer. The boxplots
show the four quartiles and crosses indicate means. (b) Top: shaded (resp., light)
rectangles are fractions of peers that download block x as their rst (resp., last)
block. Bottom: fraction of peers that download block-pair (x1; x2) as their last two
blocks. (c) Mean number of replicas of each block with 95% condence intervals. (d)
Coecient of variation of number of replicas of blocks versus time.
being optimistically unchoked (see x3.5.1.1). Although this aects the time spent
by peers in stage zero of our model and as a consequence the total download time, it
is inconsequential to our self-sustainability estimates (the time that peers remain in
stage zero of the upper layer model has no inuence in our results). While BitTorrent
peers download their rst block, they cannot contribute to self-sustainability as they
have no content to provide (see x3.5.1.1).
Our second goal is to study the users' signatures distribution (x3.2.2). For this
purpose, we validated that the rst two and last two blocks downloaded by a user
are indeed uniform and then studied one of the consequences of the uniform and
independence assumption, namely, that the number of replicas of each block in the
system is well balanced.
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Figure 3.3(b) (top) shows, for each block, the fraction of peers that downloaded
that block as their rst block (shaded bars). The gure was generated from indepen-
dent samples: every 500 seconds, one user owning one block was randomly selected,
and the identity of its block was recorded (the same procedure was repeated for users
owning all but one block of the le (light bars)). Similarly, Figure 3.3(b) (bottom)
shows, for every B(B   1) block-pair, the fraction of peers that downloaded that
pair as their rst two blocks. Figure 3.3(b) indicates that the rst and last blocks
downloaded by users, as well as the rst downloaded block-pair, are approximately
uniformly distributed (the same procedure was repeated for users owning all but two
blocks, with similar results).
Figure 3.3(c) shows the mean number of replicas of each block (including the one
stored at the publisher) for  = 1 peer/min, 4 peers/min and 7 peers/min. The
mean number of replicas of each block is around (B   1)=2 + 1, which corresponds
to a well balanced system (see x3.4.2). Figure 3.3(d) corroborates this claim by
showing the coecient of variation of the number of replicas of blocks as a function
of time. Let ri;t be the number of replicas of block i at time t. The mean number of
replicas of blocks at time t is t =
PB
i=1 ri;t=B and the coecient of variation is ct =q
(
PB
i=1(ri;t   t)2=B)=t. Figure 3.3(d) indicates that throughout the simulation,
the coecient of variation is usually smaller than 0.8, which means that the number of
replicas of blocks has a low variance. In a system where users signatures are uniform
and independent we would observe similar behavior.
3.5.2.2 Validating Model Estimate of Self-Sustainability
To study how content popularity impacts self-sustainability, we simulated BitTor-
rent in the setting described in x3.5.1.2, varying the arrival rate of peers, , from 1
peer/minute to 8 peers/minute, in increments of 1 peer/minute, while maintaining
all other parameters xed. Equivalently, this corresponds to an increase in the load,
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Figure 3.4. Model validation. Swarm self sustainability as a function of the system
load. Results obtained with recursive algorithm and simulations (with 95% condence
intervals) are plotted with dotted and solid lines, respectively.
 = s=, from 0.1 to 0.8. Each simulation lasted for 10,000s. Twenty one inde-
pendent simulations were executed for each value of , and used to compute 95%
condence intervals. The same experiment is repeated for B = 16, 50, 100 and 200.
Figure 3.4 shows self-sustainability, A, as a function of the content popularity,
, for B = 16; 50; 100 and 200. For unpopular contents,  = 1 peer/min, and
small les, B = 16, swarm self-sustainability is around 0.1 and the publisher needs to
frequently provide blocks that are unavailable among the peers. As the popularity
of the les increases, swarm self-sustainability increases and content is available even
in the absence of the publisher. For  = 8 peers/min, the fraction of time at which
the publisher needs to provide blocks to peers is close to zero.
Figure 3.4 indicates that the results obtained with our model are close to those
obtained through simulation. Even assuming that the mean download times of all
blocks are the same (h = , for 1  h  B), the model was able to capture the
self-sustainability observed in our simulations. We also repeated the simulations with
heterogeneous peer upload capacities, for B = 16 (the upload rate distribution taken
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from the measured data used to generate Figure 1 in the BitTyrant study [70]) and
our results did not qualitatively change (details in Appendix B.12).
Consider now the impact of le size on swarm self-sustainability. Figure 3.4 shows
that for a xed content popularity, as le size increases, self-sustainability increases.
This is in accordance with Theorem 3.4.1, and reects the fact that, as le size
increases, peers stay longer in the system and the coverage, dened as the mean
number of users in the system, increases. The higher the coverage, the greater the
self-sustainability of the swarm. In fact, as le size increases, the number of blocks
that needs to be maintained by the publisher increases linearly but the availability
gain increases exponentially, as discussed in Chapter 2.
3.5.3 Popularity to Attain High Self-Sustainability
We now address the following question: what is the minimum le popularity (or
load) needed to attain a given self-sustainability? Answering this question is useful
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not only for publisher dimensioning but also for other strategic decisions such as how
to distribute and bundle les across multiple swarms.
Recall that the load is dened as  = =. Figure 3.5 shows the minimum load,
?, necessary to achieve high self-sustainability, A? (A? = 0:9; 0:999), for le sizes
varying between 2MB and 256MB (B = 8; : : : ; 1; 000). This gure illustrates self-
sustainability as predicted by the recursions contained in Theorem 3.3.1, eq. (3.16)
and the approximation (3.22). Figure 3.5(a) suggests that when the goal is to nd the
minimum popularity to attain a high self-sustainability level, equation (3.22) can be
used to approximate ?. However, if the goal is to compute self-sustainability under
dierent loads and for dierent les sizes, as illustrated by Figure 3.4, the recursion
provided by Theorem 3.3.1 needs to be used.
Figure 3.5(a) indicates that the popularity, ?, needed to attain a high degree of
self-sustainability increases as the le size, B, decreases. In particular, the zoom in
the gure shows that log ? is linear in logB. The comments made at the end of
x3.5.2 to explain Figure 3.4 also apply here. Peers take longer to download larger
les, which increases block availability. Nevertheless, the benets of leveraging peer-
to-peer swarming can be noted even for small les. Figure 3.5(a) shows that for a le
of 4MB (B = 16), an arrival rate of 8 peers/min (which corresponds to a load of 0.8)
already yields a very high self-sustainability.
More insights on how le size impacts self-sustainability are obtained from Fig-
ure 3.5(b). Figure 3.5(b) plots the mean number of users in the system, also referred
to as the mean coverage (see Chapter 2), necessary to attain a high level of self-
sustainability. The curves in Figure 3.5(b) correspond to the the respective ones
in Figure 3.5(a) multiplied by B. The main insight shown in this example is that
the coverage necessary to attain a given self-sustainability level slowly increases as a
function of B. As the le size increases, a slightly larger population suces to attain
a given self-sustainability level. For instance, for a le of size 10 a coverage of 20 is
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necessary to attain self-sustainability of 0.999, whereas a coverage of 29 suces to
achieve the same self-sustainability if the le has 1,000 blocks.
3.6 Related Work
3.6.0.1 Modeling of Peer-to-Peer Swarming Systems
This chapter presents the rst analytical model for publisher dependency esti-
mation. We are unaware of related analytical work that analyzed swarm self-
sustainability taking into account the fact that les are divided into multiple blocks,
a very fundamental characteristic of these systems.
For large populations, Massoulie and Vojnovic [56] used a coupon collector model
to show that asymptotically the distribution of blocks across the population is well
balanced, and does not critically depend on the block selection algorithm used by the
peers. Qiu and Srikant [73] and Fan et al. [32] also considered the large population
regime, and used uid approximations and dierential equations to model the system
assuming that the eciency is always high.
In this chapter we are particularly interested in the small population regime. For
small populations, Markov Chain (MC) models have been proposed by Yang and
Veciana [95], providing insights on the performance of the system but not dealing
with the problem of block availability among peers. Norros and Reittu [76], using
a dierent model, studied the dissemination of a two-block le in a closed network
accounting for the availability of the blocks. In this chapter, we consider an open
network and propose a model which can be used to estimate self-sustainability of les
of arbitrary size.
Here we studied the implications of the content popularity on the self-sustainability
of swarms. In a real time setting, Leskela et al. [51] pointed out a phase transition
in the stability of the peer-to-peer system as a function of the content popularity. In
contrast, our system is always stable. Norros et al. [65] imply a phase transition of
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the mean broadcast times as a function of the departure rate of seeds. In this chapter
we are concerned with self-sustainability.
3.6.0.2 Hybrid Peer-to-Peer Swarming Systems
The literature on the use of peer-to-peer swarming systems for enterprise content
delivery is rapidly growing [69, 27, 78]. The methodology usually consists of dening
an optimization problem to be solved by the publishers and then showing how dierent
system parameters aect the optimal bandwidth allocation strategy. The approach
we take in this chapter is dierent. We are interested in the minimum fraction of
time that the publisher must be active so as to guarantee that all blocks are always
available.
Ioannidis and Marbach [44] study how quickly the bandwidth available at the
server has to grow as the number of users increases. For this purpose they consider
two query propagation mechanisms, the random walk and the expanding ring. Here,
on the other hand, we assume that peers can always nd the blocks they need in
case they are available. While [44] focuses on the control plane and it's asymptotic
analysis, here we focus on the data plane and account also for small les.
Hajek and Zhu [40] study the stability of hybrid peer-to-peer systems. In Ap-
pendix B.11 we show how the system described in this section relates to the one
in [40]. Whereas Hajek and Zhu [40] show that if the publisher capacity is smaller
than the arrival rate of peers the system is unstable, in the model presented in this
chapter it is assumed that the publisher capacity is large enough to guarantee stability
(see x3.7), and we are interested in swarm self-sustainability.
Wong et al. [100] and Susitaival et al. [86] propose models for content availability
in BitTorrent without accounting for the fact that les are divided into blocks. Our
model diers from [100, 86] in that we (a) consider a hybrid peer-to-peer system,
in which a publisher is always available and (b) account for the fact that the le is
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divided into blocks. Finally, explicit scheduling of blocks exchanges to minimize
peer download times was studied by Mundinger et al. [63]. In this chapter we assume
that peers exchange blocks using only local information, as in BitTorrent.
3.6.0.3 Balls and Bins
The derivation of some of our results t into the balls and bins framework. Each
user is allocated a set of blocks (balls) each of which must correspond to a dierent
identier (bin). In the context of balls and bins, a set of balls each of which must
be allocated in a dierent bin is referred to as complex [48]. Previous work on the
allocation of complexes into bins appears in Mirakhmedov and Mirakhmedov [62],
Kolchin et al. [48, Chapter VII], and references therein. In particular, the denition
of  h(i;m) was inspired by [16, Figure 1].
In a peer-to-peer setting, balls and bins were used by Simatos et al. [84] to study
the duration of the regime during which the system is saturated because capacity is
smaller than demand. The scenario studied in this chapter diers from [84] in several
aspects. For instance, [84] considers a nite population of peers.
3.7 Discussion
Next, we discuss the assumptions adopted to yield a tractable model.
Uniformity and independence assumptions: In the performance model
presented in x3.2.2 we assume that the signatures of users are drawn uniformly and
independently at random. In particular, we do not account for correlations among
users' signatures. Although such correlations are present in practice, our simulations
have indicated that the independence assumption is appropriate in order to capture
the self-sustainability of swarms.
In the user dynamic model presented in x3.2.1 we make the following assump-
tions: (i) peers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate  (steady state as-
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sumption), (ii) the download times of all blocks have the same mean, 1= (smooth
download assumption) and (iii) users leave the system immediately after completing
their downloads,  = 1 (self-regarding users assumption). We discuss each of these
in turn.
Steady state assumption: It has been shown in x2.4.3.4 that a vast number
of long-lived swarms have relatively stable mean arrival rates over periods of months.
Our model can be used to predict the self-sustainability of such swarms.
Smooth download assumption: Under this assumption, the capacity of the
system scales perfectly with the number of users. Our simulations indicate that the
mean download time of the rst and last blocks are slightly larger than the others.
Although our model has the exibility to capture such asymmetries (see observation
two in x3.3), we show that their implications in the estimates of self-sustainability
are not signicant (see x3.5.2.1).
Self-regarding users assumption: Our model has the exibility to account
for users that stay in the network after completing their downloads. However, in
today's BitTorrent users have no incentive to stay in the system after obtaining the
les of their interest. Therefore, we focus on the worst case scenario in which users,
not having incentives to linger in the system after completing their downloads, depart
immediately.
Finally, in our simulations we consider a publisher that is always online and that
behaves like a typical peer.
Typical peer-like publisher: Our simulations indicate that if the publisher
has the same capacity as a typical peer, the smooth download assumption holds and
the swarm self-sustainability estimates of our model are accurate given the parameters
and time spans considered in this chapter. Coping with intermittent publishers and
devising dynamic bandwidth allocation strategies according to which the smooth
download assumption holds is non trivial [40], and is subject of future work.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the dependency of peers on a publisher that lever-
ages peer-to-peer techniques for the dissemination of both popular and unpopular
content. In particular, the latter deserve special attention, since unpopular content
can represent a signicant fraction of demand and revenue [5]. We believe that de-
vising strategies for disseminating large catalogs of les leveraging peer-to-peer tech-
niques is an important and interesting research area, and we see our model as a rst
attempt to shed light into the intrinsic advantages and limitations of peer-to-peer
swarming systems for the dissemination of such catalogs.
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CHAPTER 4
RECIPROCITY
Reciprocity is one of the fundamental pillars supporting peer-to-peer systems.
In essence, the principle of reciprocity states that participants must contribute to
the system with resources such as bandwidth or memory in order to accomplish
their tasks. The primary goals of this chapter are to present a new foundational
understanding of reciprocity in peer-to-peer systems, and to show how practical design
decisions used to incentivize reciprocity impact performance.
We are motivated by systems in which users exchanging contents incur almost
zero costs to replicate those contents. Examples are peer-to-peer swarming systems
such as BitTorrent [20] and content trading systems such as TitleTrader [90]. In the
former, users demand les and exchange blocks, while in the latter users demand
and exchange non splittable commodities such as DVDs. Henceforth, we focus on
peer-to-peer swarming systems such as BitTorrent.
4.1 Introduction
In BitTorrent, reciprocity happens naturally between users interested in the same
content at the same time. Those users join a swarm and exchange blocks of les among
themselves. Swarming systems also support reciprocity between users interested in
dierent contents. That is because a swarm may be associated with a bundle of les,
as discussed in Chapter 2. In this case, users joining a swarm can download only a
subset of the les in the swarm and may already own some les when arriving to the
system. In addition, as discussed in x1.2, users may download more content than they
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originally sought, for bartering purposes or just for curiosity's sake, possibly guided
by a recommendation system.
Reciprocity mechanisms broadly classify into two types. In the case of direct
reciprocity, users follow the principle of I scratch your back and you scratch mine.
In the case of indirect reciprocity, the return may come from a peer other than the
recipient, i.e., peer A provides content to B at a rate equal to that at which content
is being provided to it by peer C, regardless of whether or not B and C are the same
individual. Users follow the principle of give and you shall be given [66]. Both direct
and indirect reciprocity are used in peer-to-peer systems.
BitTorrent implements a direct reciprocity tit-for-tat incentive mechanism. The
mechanism maintains a long term exchange between two peers only if they both
benet from it. Even though BitTorrent does not strictly require that the two peers
exactly match each other's ows rates, it has been suggested that imposing this
requirement leads to greater robustness [53] and FairTorrent [82] already employs
it.
Indirect reciprocity is implemented in peer-to-peer systems such as eMule [30]
and PACE [6] that rely on credits to accomplish fair exchanges. Other systems
such as PeerTrust [103] take advantage of indirect reciprocity through reputation
mechanisms. In some cases indirect reciprocity may be the only feasible solution [1].
Nevertheless, in the realm of peer-to-peer content distribution, direct reciprocity has
its own advantages.
Direct reciprocity systems are simpler to implement than their credit based coun-
terparts. In credit based systems users need to either rely on a bank (single point
of failure) or store information in local les about credits received or given (prone to
hacking). Inspired by the simplicity of direct reciprocity, we ask the following two
questions,
 what is the loss of eciency for enforcing direct rather than indirect reciprocity?
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 how can trackers help users achieve ecient direct reciprocity schedules?
To answer the rst question, we formulate a model of users with content and
content demands. Using this model, we show that a class of indirect reciprocity
schedules can be replaced by direct reciprocity schedules, provided that (1) users are
willing to obtain undemanded content for the purpose of barter and (2) they are
willing to use up to twice the bandwidth resources that they would have used under
indirect reciprocity.
To address the second question, we propose a broker-based architecture (consider
a broker to be a sophisticated BitTorrent tracker) and study, through simulation,
several schemes where the broker provides greater amounts of information to users
for the purpose of understanding the value of this information.
Our key contributions are the following.
Bound on loss of eciency: We show that the loss of eciency due to
direct reciprocity, measured in terms of number of transmissions made by each user,
is at most two for a class of indirect reciprocity schedules in which nodes do not relay
content.
System design: We propose mechanisms based on brokers to perform match-
making between users and to issue recommendations on content value for bartering.
We validate experimentally how they enable ecient direct reciprocity exchanges.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we establish
our main result concerning the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity. Sections 4.3
and 4.4 provide the system design and experimental results. Section 4.5 discusses the
related literature and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Loss of Eciency due to Direct Reciprocity
In this section we prove that the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity is at
most two for a class of relayless systems. To appreciate the nature of our result in
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Figure 4.1. (a) Indirect reciprocity cycle (all nodes transmit 1 content) is converted
into direct reciprocity network incurring loss of eciency of (b) 2 (node C relays black
and transmits blue); (c) 4/3 (all nodes transmit 4/3 of content).
a simple setting, consider the cycle shown in Figure 4.1(a), in which node v owns
content cv and requests content cv 1, 0  v  2, with subtraction done modulo 3.
Under an indirect reciprocity constraint, every node transmits one content so as to
have all demands satised. Beginning with the same workload, we now seek a direct
reciprocity schedule. If (a) nodes are willing to receive one additional content for
bartering purposes and (b) at least one node can transmit two contents simultane-
ously, one such schedule is shown in Figure 4.1(b). The loss of eciency, measured as
the maximum ratio of number of transmissions by a node in the direct and indirect
reciprocity schedules, is two. That is because node C transmits content blue and
black, the latter being received from B, for bartering purposes, and relayed to A. In
the schedule of Figure 4.1(c) the loss of eciency is 4/3.
Clearly, the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity is no more than two for
any cycle. The direct reciprocity schedule consists of transmitting all contents in
clockwise direction, except for one content, used for bartering purposes, that ows
counterclockwise. In what follows, we show that the bound of two on the loss of
eciency extends from cycles to a more general class of networks.
4.2.1 Model
We dene a network to be N = (V;C; S;D;E) where V is a nite vertex set, C is
a set of contents and S identies the set of sources for each content, S : C ! 2V . Sc is
the set of sources for content c and Cv is the set of contents that node v initially has,
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variable description
V set of users
C set of contents
Cv contents initially owned by v (v's endowment)
S : C ! 2V set of sources for each content
D : C ! 2V set of users that demand each content
E  V 2CR+ set of labeled edges; each edge e transmits
fe = (v1; v2; c; r)g content c from v1 to v2 at rate r
N(V;C; S;D;E) dissemination network
pN(j) incoming edges to user j in network N
sN(j) outgoing edges from user j in network N
L loss of eciency (eq. (4.1))
L system loss of eciency (eq. (4.2))
Table 4.1. Table of notation.
i.e., Cv = fc : v 2 Scg. Cv is also referred to as node v's endowment. Dc identies
the set of users that demand content c, D : C ! 2V .
Content ows are characterized by E  V 2  C  R+. If e = (v1; v2; c; r) 2 E,
then there exists a ow of content c from v1 = t(e) to v2 = h(e) at rate r. We use the
notation (t(e); h(e); c(e); r(e)) 2 E to represent such an element. Note that unlike
a directed graph, there may be several edges carrying dierent ows at dierent
rates from one node to another. In this chapter, we use the terms node and user
interchangeably. Table 4.1 contains the notation.
Throughout the proofs, it is assumed that all les are of the same size and users can
exchange fractions of les. When v1 transmits a fraction f of le c to v2, represented
by edge e = (v1; v2; c; r), it is assumed that rate r(e) = f les/slot is adopted.
Therefore, all le transfers can occur in parallel, in one time slot (these assumptions
are removed in simulations).
Let pN(j) denote the set of incoming edge ows to j 2 V in network N , pN(j) =
fe 2 E : h(e) = jg. Similarly, sN(i) is the set of outgoing edge ows from i 2 V .
The number of transmissions from node i to node j is i;j,
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i;j =
X
e2E
r(e)1ft(e)=i; h(e)=jg;
where 1fPg is an indicator variable equal to 1 if P is true. The number of trans-
missions by node i is i;?, where i;? =
P
e2sN (i) r(e). The number of transmissions to
node j is ?;j, where ?;j =
P
e2pN (j) r(e).
We say that a network is a dissemination network if
1) content ows: for every node-demand pair (v; c), v 2 Dc, there exist paths
from sources of content c to v consisting of edge ows, which jointly carry all content
c;
2) no redundancy: nodes don't receive redundant content over dierent edges
(but might receive dierent parts of a content over dierent edges).
A dissemination network is an indirect reciprocity network if, for all i 2 V , i;? =
?;i, and a direct reciprocity network if, for all i; j 2 V , i;j = j;i.
4.2.2 Main Result
Let the loss of eciency at node v, Lv, be dened as the ratio of number of
transmissions made by v in a direct reciprocity schedule,  dv;?, over the number of
transmissions in an indirect reciprocity schedule,  iv;?. The loss of eciency due to
direct rather than indirect reciprocity, L, is the maximum of Lv across all nodes,
L = max
v2V
 dv;?=
i
v;? (4.1)
A node that transmits content which is not in its endowment is also referred to as a
relay. A relayless network is one which does not have any such nodes. In a relayless
network, c(e) 2 Ct(e) for every edge e 2 E. Next, we prove that given a relayless
indirect reciprocity network, there is always a direct reciprocity one such that L  2,
Theorem 4.2.1. The loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity in relayless networks
is at most 2.
79
4.2.3 Proof Overview
The proof of the main result is based on repeatedly transforming cycles in an
indirect reciprocity dissemination network N that do not satisfy direct reciprocity
into sets of direct reciprocity cycles without doubling the ow rate in/out of a node.
For this purpose, we execute Algorithm 1.
To simplify presentation, we assume that, in the indirect reciprocity network that
is input to Algorithm 1, each content might ow into a node only over one edge. Still,
fractional allocations are allowed in the direct reciprocity network that is output by
the algorithm. If nodes can't split their trac among multiple paths, the loss of
eciency may be more than two (see Appendix C.2).
Algorithm 1 is constructed to satisfy two properties,
1) eciency: the number of transmissions by each node in the direct reciprocity
network is at most twice the number in the relayless indirect reciprocity network;
2) correctness: the direct reciprocity network is valid. For every node-demand
pair (v; c) there exists a set of edges from sources of c to v. Node v receives all content
c through these edges, each of which carries non-redundant fractions of c.
While studying the latter we will show that when reducing each cycle from indirect
to direct reciprocity all nodes (a) receive the commodities that they request in the
Algorithm 1 IndirectToDirectReciprocity
Input: indirect reciprocity network without relays, N
Output: direct reciprocity network N 0
1: i 0
2: while E 6= ; do
3: i i+ 1
4: construct cycle Ci from N [N might be rewired] (x4.2.4.1)
5: reduce Ci to a direct reciprocity network Ni (x4.2.4.2)
6: in network N , 1) remove edges in Ci, 2) add to the endowment of nodes in Ci the
contents that they received in step 5
7: end while
8: output N 0 is the combination of N1; : : : ; Ni
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Figure 4.2. Illustrating the proof: (a) Input: indirect reciprocity network with no
relays. Sources are implicitly identied by the tail of edges. (b) First identied cycle
and (c) the corresponding short circuited cycle. Note that B receives a commodity
involved in cycle (c), blue, via edge E-B that is not in (c). This prevents A from
selecting blue as bartering commodity to be sent to B. To avoid such restriction,
the indirect reciprocity network is reconstructed, as shown in (d). (e) First direct
reciprocity network constructed from (d). (f) Second direct reciprocity network [from
D-C-F in (d), using red as bartering commodity]. (g) Third direct reciprocity network
[from D-E-B-C in (d), using dark green as bartering commodity]. The output consists
of (e), (f) and (g).
cycle plus (b) possibly additional bartering commodities that they did not originally
request in the input network.
Illustrative Example: Let us now present a simple example to illustrate how Al-
gorithm 1 (detailed in the next section) works and why it satises the two desired
properties. The example has only six nodes and ve contents (Figure 4.2) but brings
out the key insights in the conversion from indirect to direct reciprocity.
The rst step consists of constructing a cycle C from the indirect reciprocity
network (line 4 in Algorithm 1). Cycle C is constructed so as to satisfy the following
decoupling property. If a node receives a given commodity through C, say c, no other
nodes in C can receive c via edges of N that do not appear in C. In x4.2.4.1 we show
that it is always possible to construct such cycle. Once the cycle is constructed, one
81
or more of the commodities involved in the cycle can be used for bartering purposes.
As a consequence of this fact, the correctness property holds throughout the proof.
In our simple example, the intermediary steps to construct the rst cycle, C1 (see
Figure 4.2(e)), are illustrated in Figures 4.2(b)-(e). First, a cycle is identied (see
Figure 4.2(b)). If there are edges joining two nodes that are not adjacent in the
cycle, referred to as chords, use them to short-circuit the cycle. In our example,
chord D-C is used to short-circuit cycle A-D-F-C-B into A-D-C-B (see Figure 4.2(c)).
The remaining cycle still does not satisfy the decoupling property described above.
Note that B receives blue from E, the latter not being present in the cycle. This
prevents A from selecting blue as bartering commodity to be sent to B. To avoid
such restriction, the indirect reciprocity network is reconstructed, as shown in (d) (see
details in x4.2.4.1). In the reconstructed network, cycle A-B satises the decoupling
property.
Our purpose now is to convert the remaining indirect reciprocity cycle into a direct
reciprocity network. In our simple example, the indirect reciprocity cycle A-B (see
Figure 4.2(e)) is already a direct reciprocity cycle. In x4.2.4.2 we show that it is
always possible to reduce the former into the latter while satisfying the eciency
property (line 5). Such reduction is referred to as CycleReduce (see Algorithm 2).
We then repeat the steps above to obtain the network in Figure 4.2(f).
Note that after reducing each indirect reciprocity cycle into a direct reciprocity
network, we end up nding a direct reciprocity network in which all cycle nodes receive
their required commodity, plus eventually some amount of the other commodities
involved in the cycle. However, this never causes problems of double-reception of
content, because of the decoupling property on the original cycle. Thus, the residual
schedule, where 1) the edges in the original cycle have been removed, and 2) nodes
are assumed to be sources of whatever they received thanks to CycleReduce, plus
what they previously were sources of (line 6), is still a valid indirect reciprocity
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schedule. The procedure can then be repeated on such schedule. Finally, combining
the resulting direct reciprocity networks together (Figures 4.2(e), 4.2(f) and 4.2(g))
yields the desired direct reciprocity network (line 8).
4.2.4 Proof Details
Next, we provide the remaining details of the proof.
4.2.4.1 Constructing an Indirect Reciprocity Cycle From the Indirect
Reciprocity Network
Starting from the indirect reciprocity network, we construct a cycle as follows.
First, (i) pick a source v1 and (ii) choose a content c2 that v1 is a leaf of. Then, (iii)
traversing the edge corresponding to c2 backwards, again (i) nd a source v2 of c2.
Repeat (i), (ii) and (iii) until nding, at step (i), a source that has already been
incorporated into the cycle. Identify the cycle of sources, vi
ci! vi 1 ci 1! : : : vi m ci m!
vi, where vi is source of content ci. The set of sources is S, S = fvi; : : : ; vi mg.
Given the cycle of sources, we proceed by removing its chords. If there exists a
source vj 2 S that is also a receiver of ck with ck distinct from cj+1, and vl 2 S that is
also a source of ck, short-circuit the cycle by introducing the edge vl
ck! vj. Repeating
this procedure, we obtain a cycle which cannot be further reduced, also referred to
as a minimal cycle.
Next we proceed to remove violations of the decoupling property due to nodes
within S receiving some commodity, say cj, from a node outside of S. To this
aim, given a minimal cycle we search for a node vj 1, that receives cj, and violates
the decoupling property. If there is no such node, we can proceed to the next step.
Otherwise, vj 1 is also a receiver of ck distinct from cj. Content ck is provided to
vj 1 by vm =2 S and to vk 1 by vk, where vk; vk 1 2 S. Now replace edges (vm; vj 1)
and (vk; vk 1) by (vm; vk 1) and (vk; vj 1), respectively. Since this replacement strictly
reduces the length of the cycle, which now involves all nodes in S but vk, repeated ap-
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plication of the procedure results in a minimal cycle verifying the decoupling property.
Next, we reduce minimal indirect reciprocity cycles into direct reciprocity dissemina-
tion networks.
4.2.4.2 Reducing Indirect Reciprocity Cycles to Direct Reciprocity Net-
works
We now focus on reducing an indirect reciprocity cycle to a set of direct reciprocity
cycles without more than doubling the bandwidth requirement, as described in the
proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.1. Any indirect reciprocity cycle can be converted into a direct reciprocity
network incurring a loss of eciency of at most two.
Proof. We consider two cases.
Case i) There exists at least one content that can only be provided by one node.
This content can be used for bartering purposes and it is easy to see that in this case
the lemma holds (see Figure 4.1(a) and Figure 4.1(b)).
Case ii) Every content can be provided by at least two nodes. We describe a
transformation that shifts the amount of content delivered over indirect reciprocity
cycles to direct reciprocity cycles (see Figure 4.3).
A
C
B A
C
B
dotted lines
transmit 1/2
of content
Figure 4.3. Indirect to direct reciprocity. Every content is oered by 2 nodes.
The key insight of our transformation is to relate cycles to perfect matchings in
bipartite graphs. Let G = (V;C; S;D;E) be a cycle in a dissemination network N .
Let cvj be the content demanded by vj in G. Now suppose that U is a copy of V and
let B = (V; U;EB  V  U) denote a bipartite graph representing possible content
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exchanges between nodes in the cycle. Edge (vi; vj) 2 EB if vi is a potential source
for vj in the dissemination network G. With a slight abuse of notation, (vi; vj) 2 EB
if cvj 2 sG(vi).
A matching on B consists of a subset M  EB such that each node in V [ U
is incident to at most one edge in M . A perfect matching is a matching where each
node in V is incident to exactly one edge in M . Given a cycle G we can construct a
corresponding perfect matching on B. Conversely, given a perfect matching M on B
we can construct a set of cycles G (vj is a successor of vi in G if (vi; vj) 2M).
Our cycle reductions rely on the following result about perfect matchings, the
proof of which is based on Hall's theorem [13, Thm. III.7] (see Appendix C.3). In
what follows jsB(u)j denotes the number of incident edges to vertex u in a bipartite
graph B.
Lemma 4.2.2. Consider a bipartite graph B = (V; U;EB) where jV j = jU j = n,
n  3, that satises the following: (i) (vi; ui) 2 EB, i = 1; : : :; n, (ii) (vi+1; ui) =2 EB,
i = 1; : : :; n and (iii) jsB(u)j  2, for all u 2 U . Then, there exists at least two
distinct perfect matchings M1 and M2 on B.
We now use Lemma 4.2.2 to reduce cycles to direct reciprocity networks. This is
accomplished through Algorithm 2. The input to Algorithm 2 is a cycle as well as two
matchings, M1 and M2. The existence of the two matchings is guaranteed by Lemma
4.2.2. Sample inputs and outputs to Algorithm 2 are illustrated in Figure 4.4.
In the input to Algorithm 2, each node vi transmits content cvi at rate r. Algo-
rithm 2 outputs a set of cycles. Each node vi is a member of two of these cycles and
transmits half of content cvi , at rate r=2, through one of the cycles and the other half,
at rate r=2, through the other cycle (see Figure 4.4).
The rst cycle generated by Algorithm 2, A1, contains fewer than n nodes, where
n is the number of nodes in the input cycle. If A1 is either a direct reciprocity cycle
or satises Case i), we are done with this cycle. Otherwise, apply Algorithm 2 to
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Algorithm 2 CycleReduce
Input: indirect reciprocity cycle A = (Va; Ca; Sa; Da; Ea) and matchings M1 and M2
Output: set of indirect reciprocity cycles A1; : : : ; Ak
1: choose an arbitrary edge e 2M2 such that e 62M1
2: M2  M2 n feg; V1  ft(e)g; E1  feg; i 1
3: while M1 [M2 6= ; do
4: fconstruct cycle Ai = (Vi; Ca; Sa; Da; Ei) as followsg
5: while h(e) 62 Vi do
6: remove e0 from M1 [M2 such that t(e0) = h(e)
7: insert t(e0) into Vi and e0 into Ei
8: e e0
9: end while
10: identify cycle Ai
11: re-add edges in Ei not in Ai into original matchings
12: if M1 [M2 6= ; then
13: remove arbitrary edge e from M1 [M2
14: i i+ 1; Vi  ft(e)g; Ei  feg
15: end if
16: end while
A1. Repeated applications of Algorithm 2 produces a cycle of size three within n  2
steps. It is trivial to reduce this three node cycle to direct reciprocity cycles. This
increases the amount of ow carried by direct reciprocity cycles by at least 3r=2n 2.
At the end of this repeated application of the CycleReduce algorithm, we are
left with a set of cycles. We can now apply Case i) and Case ii) (see page 84) to
these cycles with the consequence that ow will continue to be shifted over to direct
reciprocity cycles. This can be repeated until all ow is being carried over direct
reciprocity cycles.
Two questions remain: (1) Do these transformations result in all content ows
being shifted from indirect reciprocity cycles to direct reciprocity cycles? (2) Is the
bandwidth required by the direct reciprocity ows no more than double that required
by the original cycle? The answer to (1) is yes as any indirect reciprocity cycle can
be reduced by repeated application of the above algorithm resulting in a positive
decrease in indirect reciprocity ow. The answer to (2) is also yes as the algorithm
above replaces cycles by a set of smaller cycles; bandwidth requirements are only
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
v1 v2
v4 v3
v1 v2
v4 v3
v2
v4 v3
v1
v4 v3
v1 v2
Figure 4.4. Illustration of the CycleReduce algorithm: the input is a cycle C
and two matchings, (a) M1 and (b) M2; the rst edge selected by the algorithm,
e = (v4; v2) 2 M2 n M1, is marked in bold; (c) the rst cycle constructed by the
algorithm, A1, has fewer nodes than C; e is the only edge from M2 in this cycle;
(d) the second cycle, A2, and (e) the third cycle, A3. Every node is in two cycles
constructed by the algorithm. Hence, if each cycle transfers half of the contents in
C, nodes receive the same amount of content in C as in the superposition of A1, A2
and A3.
doubled (and in only some cases) at the last step when a direct reciprocity cycle is
created.
4.2.5 Tightness of the Bound
To show that the bound of two on the loss of eciency is tight, consider a cycle
of size jV j. Each node v owns content cv and demands cv 1, with subtraction done
modulo jV j. Let TjV j be the minimum aggregate number of transmissions in a direct
reciprocity schedule for a cycle of size jV j. The argument presented at the beginning
of this section implies that TjV j  2(jV j   1) (Figure 4.1(b)). It can also be shown
using linear programming and duality that TjV j  2(jV j   1) (see Appendix C.1).
Therefore, there is at least one node, v, that transmits at least 2(jV j   1)=jV j =
2  (2=jV j) contents (when jV j = 3, Figure 4.1(c) illustrates a scheme where all nodes
transmit exactly 4/3 contents). As jV j!1 the number of transmissions from v tends
to two, which yields the result.
4.2.6 General Network Topologies
The extension of our main result for general network topologies is left open.
Conjecture 4.2.1. The loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity is at most 2.
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In Appendix C.4 we present a battery of networks that must be handled by any
proof of the conjecture, indicating when and where some tentative approaches fail.
4.3 System Design
Our purpose in this and the upcoming sections is to study the impact of design
choices, such as how peers are matched, on the eciency of the system. Our key
metric for eciency is the number of transmissions executed by each user before
leaving the network. We rst assume that users have only local information to make
their decisions, and later consider brokers to facilitate exchanges.
4.3.1 Overview
We study a time slotted system. At every time slot, users are paired and content
exchanges take place between paired users. Each user has the capacity to send one
content per time slot. A content may correspond to a le or a block of a le. If
le F is chopped into a set SF of nF blocks, SF=fcF;1; : : : ; cF;nF g, users interested in
F , when arriving, demand all contents in SF . For the purposes of the following two
sections in most cases it suces to let nF = 1 for all les. In Section 4.4.2 we discuss
a scenario requiring nF > 1.
All users follow a direct reciprocity tit-for-tat strategy, according to which one
content is sent only if another one, not yet owned, is received. We consider networks
where all members are of the same type, either selective, semi-selective, or non-
selective. An exchange between selective users must involve the transmission of
demanded content in both directions whereas non-selective users exchange content
even if what they receive was not demanded. An exchange between semi-selective
users occurs if at least one of the users in the pair receives demanded content.
We now relate semi-selective exchanges to our main result on the loss of eciency
due to direct reciprocity being two. Let the system loss of eciency, L, be de-
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ned as the ratio of the aggregate number of transmissions in the direct and indirect
reciprocity schedules,
L = (
X
v2V
 dv;?)=(
X
v2V
 iv;?) (4.2)
Starting from a workload that can be satised using indirect reciprocity, we haveP
v2V 
i
v;? =
P
c2C jDcj. If, under direct reciprocity, all users adopt semi-selective
exchanges, for every two transmissions by paired users, at least one delivers demanded
content,
P
c2C jDcj 
P
v2V 
d
v;?=2. Therefore, L  2. Note however, that due to the
lack of a central controller some users may still transmit more than twice the number
of contents than they would in an indirect reciprocity scheme (i.e., L may be greater
than two) and/or the system may deadlock before all users receive all the desired
contents. One of our goals in the following section is to identify scenarios under
which semi-selective exchanges suce to allow almost all users to have their demands
satised, even when users have incomplete information about the system.
4.3.2 Workloads
We consider two types of workloads in our experiments, cycle and Zipan work-
loads.
4.3.2.1 Cycle Workload
In a cycle with jV j users and non-overlapping demands, each user v owns content
cv and demands content cv 1, where subtraction is done modulo jV j. Unless otherwise
stated, the number of contents is jCj = jV j = 200 and the number of contents initially
owned and demanded by each user equals one.
In a cycle with overlapping demands, multiple users may request the same content
and some users, referred to as contentless, arrive to the network without bringing any
contents. In particular, we assume that user v demands content cdv=5e 1 mod dV=5e
and, if v mod 5 = 0, owns content cv=5. The number of contents in the network is
jCj = jV j=5 = 40. In a network supporting indirect reciprocity, contentless users
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may work as relays. In a network enforcing direct reciprocity, one needs to build
mechanisms to bootstrap such users, as described in Section 4.4.2.
4.3.2.2 Zipan Workload
In a Zipan workload, each user demands content k with probability pk = 1=k,
and owns content C   k   1 with probability pk, k = 0; : : : ; C   1. Note that the
most demanded content is also the scarcest one. Unless otherwise stated, we set the
number of contents jCj = 100, number of users jV j = 200 and endowment jCvj = 10,
0  u  jV j   1.
4.3.3 Brokers: the Public Board and the Matchmaker
While analyzing each workload we begin by assuming that users are randomly
paired and, if multiple contents are available for exchange, ties are broken arbitrarily.
We then progressively add complexity to the system, by letting users decide which
contents to send based on a public board and allowing a matchmaker to decide how
users are paired, as described next.
4.3.3.1 The Public Board
When users have multiple contents to oer, a public board may help them decide
which content to transmit. We consider a public board that informs, for each content,
at each time slot, the number of users that own and demand it. If a user has multiple
contents to oer to its neighbor, the candidate with highest ratio of number of copies
demanded to the number of replicas available is selected. Conversely, if a user needs
to evict a content from its cache, it evicts the one with the lowest ratio.
4.3.3.2 The Matchmaker
A matchmaker may pair users based on the contents that they own and demand.
We assume the matchmaker uses a maximum weight matching algorithm to pair
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users with weights set as follows. Users are randomly divided into two subsets V1 and
V2 of equal size (if the network has an odd number of users, one user is randomly
discarded). There is an edge from a user v1 2 V1 to v2 2 V2 with weight 2, 1 and
 = 0:1 if v1 and v2 can establish a selective, semi-selective and non-selective exchange,
respectively. There is no edge between pairs of users that cannot exchange contents.
By prioritizing matches between users that can exchange contents, the matchmaker
increases the throughput of the system, measured by the number of useful exchanges
per slot.
4.4 Bartering and Brokers
Our goal now is to illustrate (a) the system benets from users prefetching contents
even when the contents are not of immediate interest and (b) the impact of brokers
on the performance of users. For this purpose, we analyze both the cycle and the
Zipan workloads.
4.4.1 Bartering: The Benets of Content Prefetching
We now evaluate the implications of users downloading undemanded contents, for
bartering purposes. In the cycle workload, bartering is essential. If users are selective,
no exchanges can occur and the system remains deadlocked forever. On the other
hand, our experiments indicate that if users are not selective they can have their
demands satised in an average of 83.63 time slots, even without a broker.
In a Zipan workload, bartering decreases the chance that a content becomes
unavailable before all requestors are able to download it, simply because more contents
get replicated if users take advantage of their exchange opportunities. Note, however,
that in the face of lack of information about which content to barter or which user to
contact, bartering may lead to an increase in the number of transmissions without a
signicant increase in the availability of the contents or in the download times.
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Figure 4.5. Zipan workload. Users benet from prefetched content and semi-
selective exchanges present a good compromise between performance and overhead:
(a) fraction of users that satised all demands; (b) elements cached when leaving the
network (equals transmissions plus endowment); (c) download times.
To illustrate the above observations, we consider a Zipan workload where the
number of contents initially demanded and owned by each user is 10 (last column of
Table 4.2), users don't have constraints on their cache sizes or the time they spend
in the system, and the public board is available. We repeat our experiments
1000 times, each experiment ending when either all users satisfy their demands or
a deadlock is reached. Figure 4.5(a) shows the fraction of users that were able to
complete the download, Figure 4.5(b) shows the number of contents in the cache
when the user left the network and Figure 4.5(c) shows the time that each user took
to download all the demanded contents. The x-axis of Figures 4.5(a)-(c) list the users
in order of download times to satisfy all demand. For instance, in Figure 4.5(a), the
10th user to leave the system was always able to have its demand satised, the 120th
user was able to have its demand satised in roughly 30% of the simulation runs with
selective users, while the 200th was never able to download all the requested contents.
Note that some curves in Figures 4.5(b) and 4.5(c) are not monotonically increasing
because the metrics showed are conditioned on the peers concluding their downloads.
The higher the peer rank, the smaller are the chances that the peer satises all its
demands and the smaller the number of samples collected.
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workload
graph cycle cycle Zipan Zipan
leave network? no no yes yes
contentless users no yes no no
overlapped demand no overlapping overlapping overlapping
demand per user 1 1 2 10
exchange strategy outcome
selective generally unfeasible
matchmaker deadlock deadlock deadlock in few iterations L  0
no matchmaker deadlock deadlock deadlock in few iterations frequent deadlocks
semi-selective generally feasible, incurring small loss of eciency
matchmaker L  2 LS  2 L  2 L  0
frequent deadlocks infrequent deadlocks
no matchmaker L  2 LS  2 L  2 L  2
frequent deadlocks infrequent deadlocks
non-selective generally feasible, incurring large loss of eciency
matchmaker L  2 LS  2 L  2 L  0
no matchmaker L  2 LS  2 L  2 L  2
Table 4.2. Direct reciprocity design space: exchange strategies, workloads and re-
spective outcomes. L: user loss of eciency; L: system loss of eciency; LS: user
loss of eciency of sources; LS: system loss of eciency of sources.
The performance of non-selective and semi-selective users is better than the per-
formance of the selective ones. The fraction of completed downloads is higher (Fig-
ure 4.5(a)) and the download times are smaller (Figure 4.5(c)) when users are non-
selective or semi-selective as opposed to selective. To achieve high performance, the
overhead incurred by non-selective users is the additional number of contents cached
before leaving the system (Figure 4.5(b)). Semi-selective users present the best out-
come, high performance (small download times and large number of conclusions) and
low overhead (small number of contents cached before leaving the system).
Even though with selective exchanges a signicant fraction of users are not able to
satisfy their demands, most users download a considerable amount of the requested
contents. We observed that across our simulations 90% of selective and semi-
selective users were able to conclude all their downloads. This fraction drops to 50%
for selective users. Nevertheless, even with selective exchanges more than 90% of the
users were able to download at least eight out of the ten demanded contents.
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4.4.2 Brokers: The Role of Information on the Loss of Eciency
We now analyze the role of brokers to recommend contents to users (public board)
and pair them eciently (matchmaker). As in the previous section, we begin by
analyzing the simple cycle workload. In cycles with semi-selective exchanges, the
system loss of eciency, L, is at most two. However, without a matchmaker some
users may need to transmit more than two contents to their neighbors. This happens,
for instance, if in the rst three time slots user v2, with endowment c2, is matched with
v3, v4 and v1, in that order, transmitting three contents, c2, c3 and c1, respectively.
In contrast, with a matchmaker each user transmits at most two contents. In the rst
(resp., second) time slot users with even (resp., odd) index transmit useful content
to users with odd (resp., even) index, and the loss of eciency incurred by each user
is exactly two. Finally, if users are not selective, the system loss of eciency may be
higher than two, which happens, for instance, if in the rst time slot user vi mod V is
matched with user vi+2 mod V , 0  i  jV j   1.
If the cycle involves contentless users (second column of Table 4.2) the observations
made in the paragraph above still apply to the network involving only the sources.
However, if all users are to receive all demanded contents, a mechanism to bootstrap
the contentless users is essential. One solution consists of giving them credits that
can then be swapped for other contents.
A second solution, more in line with optimistic unchoke in BitTorrent, consists in
allowing some users to send a small number of blocks to their contentless neighbors,
without being immediately reciprocated. If the contentless neighbors are able to
complete their downloads only after oering blocks back to the original donor (such
schedule being enforced by the matchmaker), direct reciprocity will still hold.
In Zipan networks brokers are particularly important when users have limited
cache sizes and delay constraints. Consider a system in which each user can cache 10
les and departs the network either when it has satised its demand or after 40 time
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slots have elapsed, whichever comes rst. As soon as a user leaves the system, it is
replaced by a new one. The other parameters are those described in the last column
of Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.6. Benets of a public board and a matchmaker with a Zipan workload
are signicant. Maximum residence time of users is 40 and cache size 10.
Figure 4.6(a) shows the download times experienced by the users with non-selective,
semi-selective, and selective exchanges. The more selective users are, the larger the
delays they incur. Figure 4.6(b) shows the fraction of unsatised demand, which also
increases as users become more selective. As one might expect, the use of the public
board, both to decide which content to send as well as to decide which content to
evict, plays a key role in this scenario. The public board reduces the delay as well as
the fraction of unsatised demand, as observed comparing the blue and white bars,
corresponding to the system with and without the public board.
More surprising is the eect of the matchmaker (bars on the right of Figure 4.6).
The use of a matchmaker coupled with a public board yields an optimal delay of 10
time slots with all users having their demands satised. The rationale behind this
outcome is as follows. While the public board helps unpopular contents replicate
early on, the matchmaker guarantees that all users are matched in such a way that
every time slot is used to transmit demanded contents.
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The scenario above drastically changes if users request only 2 contents when join-
ing the network (third column of Table 4.2). In this case, even with brokers semi-
selective exchanges no longer suce to guarantee that all users get all demanded
contents. Non-selective exchanges must be employed, and the system loss of e-
ciency may be greater than two.
4.5 Related Work
The literature on incentives in peer-to-peer systems focusing on its relation to
freeriding [82], clustering [49] and system design [71] is vast. Nevertheless, there
appears to be no previous study on the fundamental pros and cons of direct and
indirect reciprocity for the dissemination of digital goods.
In the economics literature, direct reciprocity bartering schemes are considered
precursors of more sophisticated economies involving money and indirect reciprocity.
Arpejis et al. [6] argue that prices can also play an important role in peer-to-peer sys-
tems. The authors compare implicit prices in bilateral exchanges (direct reciprocity)
with explicit prices in multilateral exchanges (indirect reciprocity) and propose a sys-
tem that implements the latter. Our work, in contrast, suggests that in the context of
peer-to-peer le sharing, direct reciprocity has its own advantages and might suce
to implement an ecient and incentive-compatible system.
In the economics terminology, identifying an indirect reciprocity schedule is re-
ferred to as market clearing [1]. In this chapter, we assumed that an indirect reci-
procity schedule is provided. Future work consists of eciently nding such schedule,
perhaps using distributed deadlock detection algorithms [19].
Our work is related to those on scheduling in single swarm peer-to-peer sys-
tems [63]. Reciprocity constraints were rst incorporated in peer to peer schedules
by Figueiredo et al. [34]. While [34] focus on cooperative versus non cooperative
systems, we focus on direct versus indirect reciprocity. In addition, we address
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multi-commodity scheduling, which has received little attention in the realm of peer-
to-peer systems (one exception being [55]).
4.6 Discussion
In this section we discuss the key simplications adopted in our model and simu-
lations.
Homogeneous le sizes assumption: Under this assumption, all les have
identical sizes. Alternatively, one can interpret the units of exchange as blocks of the
les. In this case, users that arrive to the system demanding a le are mapped into
requesters for all blocks of that le.
Perfect information assumption: Our model assumes that users have perfect
information about the demands and ownerships of every other user. We have shown
through simulations that even if users have local information, the bound of two on
the loss of eciency can still be attained in scenarios of practical interest.
Time slotted system and pairwise contacts assumption: In our simula-
tions we assumed a time slotted system in which users are paired every time slot. In
BitTorrent, users exchange content simultaneously with up to ve neighbors. Con-
sidering this and other more complicated topologies in our simulations is subject of
future work.
Static network assumption: Our model assumes a static network. In partic-
ular, users reside in the network until all demands are satised. In our simulations
we considered the dynamic network case, in which users depart the network as soon
as they conclude their downloads.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we provided new foundational results on reciprocity mechanisms.
In the context of our proposed model, we showed that the loss of eciency due to
97
direct reciprocity is at most two in networks without relays. Then, using simulations,
we indicated that in many situations direct reciprocity can lead to high performance
with marginal overhead. In particular, we identied that in cycles and Zipan work-
loads it is crucial that users download contents for the purpose of bartering, and a
low loss of eciency may be achieved if brokers are available to perform matchmaking
between users and to issue recommendations on content value. Although our model
is based on a number of simplifying assumptions, such as all contents having the same
size and all peers following the same set of rules, we believe that it sheds important
insights on the fundamental limitations and potentials of direct reciprocity. Future
work consists of nding a proof or a counter-example for the conjecture on the loss
of eciency due to direct reciprocity being two in general networks.
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CHAPTER 5
ALGORITHMIC ASPECTS, EQUILIBRIA AND
COMPETITION
In Chapter 2 we studied how bundling aects availability and in Chapter 3 we
considered the dependence of peers on a stable publisher, introducing the notion of
self-sustainability. What if such stable publishers are run by enterprises? And what
if enterprises take advantage of bundling in order to increase the self-sustainability
of their swarms? These are two of the questions addressed in this chapter, in which
we consider algorithmic and economic issues in the realm of enterprise peer-to-peer
swarming.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider the use of swarming systems by enterprises. For
that purpose, the swarming system needs to be coupled with credit and copyright
mechanisms (e.g., DRM [97]), which ensure that users gain access to a le only after
paying for its access. In this case, users download bundles but have limited access to
the les. In order to obtain full access, they need a passcode, which is made available
only after payment.
The idea of using bundling to promote unpopular content is not new. In the
economics literature bundling was proposed decades ago as a mechanism to increase
sales and extend monopoly power. For information goods, bundling has been shown
to be advantageous because it permits rms to smooth demand for multiple goods.
Traditionally it has been assumed that information goods have zero marginal cost for
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production and dissemination. In this chapter, however, we are particularly interested
in the impact of these costs on the publishers, which may be non-negligible if, for
instance, we consider publishers of a large number of unpopular contents.
In this chapter we show how and when bundling, coupled with a swarming mech-
anism, helps a publisher increase utility, dened as its revenue minus costs (see x5.3).
We are interested both in the monopoly and the duopoly cases. When there is only
one enterprise involved, we consider both algorithmic as well as economic issues faced
by the enterprise when deciding how to bundle and set prices. When multiple en-
terprises are involved in the market, the bundling strategy of one enterprise impacts
the outcome of the others. Note that dierent rms may oer overlapping, partially
overlapping (or weak substitutable), or non-overlapping contents. In this multi-rm
scenario, game theory emerges as a natural tool to study the possible market out-
comes.
We ask the following four questions, the rst from an algorithmic standpoint and
the other three from an economic one:
1. if there is only one enterprise involved, how to bundle the les so as to attain a
given self-sustainability level for each swarm?
2. still in the case of a monopoly, for a given bundling strategy does there exist an
equilibrium and, if so, what is it?
3. how does the monopoly equilibrium change as functions of the bundling strat-
egy?
4. in the case of a duopoly, what is the impact of the parameters of the system on
the Nash Equilibrium?
In this work we assume that users have uniform valuations over les and that
each user, when accessing the system, is interested in a single le. Users are reluctant
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to download bundles since the download of a bundle may lead to increased delays.
Publishers, on the other hand, are willing to push bundles to the users since this
increases the availability of the contents. We propose a model that captures the util-
ities of users and publishers as functions of the prices and bundling strategies. Using
this model, we derive properties of the system equilibrium and perform a sensitivity
analysis of the publishers' utility as a function of the bundling strategy.
For the duopoly, we consider a special parameterization of the utility functions
for users and publishers and plug them into normal form game matrices (for which
the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist). Using these matrices, we show how
dierent system parameters such as willingness of users to download bundles and
level of overlap of contents between publishers aect the Nash equilibrium.
We provide the following answers to our initial questions:
 in its most general form, the problem of determining the optimal bundling
strategy is NP hard. However, if users express how much they are willing to
wait in order to download each le, the problem can be solved using a greedy
strategy;
 for the monopoly, we establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium;
 we present scenarios under which the optimal bundling level can be easily deter-
mined. In particular, if the cost to the publisher is proportional to the number
of bundles it oers and does not depend on demand, the publisher's utility as a
function of the bundling level has a unique local maximum which can be easily
determined using a gradient descent strategy;
 for the duopoly, we show that dierent games emerge as a function of the system
parameters. This multitude of possible games may be regarded as a sign of the
complexity of the problem in hand.
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5.2 Algorithmic Aspects Concerning Bundling In The Monopoly
How to combine les into bundles? In this section, we consider two dierent
formulations of this problem. The rst assumes static bundles while the second
encompasses dynamic bundles and embraces individual users preferences over les.
Whereas the rst yields an NP hard problem, a greedy strategy suces to solve the
second.
5.2.1 Minimization of Download Time with Constraint on Availability is
NP Hard
We consider a set S of F les, jSj = F . File i has size si blocks, si 2 Z. Requests
arrive for le i at rate i, and peers download content at rate .
LetM be the maximum number of bundles that can be managed by the publisher.
We assume that each le must be included in one and only one bundle. The decision
variables are:
 B; the number of bundles;
 xib; for 1  i  F , 1  b M ,
xib=
8><>: 1; if content i is assigned to bundle b0; otherwise
Note that the download time for bundle b is
X
i2S
xibsi=
Let Sb(i) be the size of the bundle that contains le i is in, and sb(i);j be the size
of the jth le in the bundle that contains le i is in. The goal of the publisher is to
minimize the expected bundle download time. The objective function is
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min(1=)
FX
i=1
iSb(i) = (5.1)
= min(1=)
FX
i=1
i(sb(i);1 + sb(i);2 + : : :+ sb(i);N(i)) = (5.2)
= min(1=)
BX
b=1
(
X
i2S
xibi)(
X
i2S
xibsi) (5.3)
Let s(b) and (b) be the size and request rate for bundle b.
s(b) =
X
i2S
xibsi; (b) =
X
i2S
xibi (5.4)
It follows from (3.22) that, for large values of self-sustainability A,
A  1  s(b)e (b)(s(b) 1)=2; 1  b  B (5.5)
(5.5) is obtained from (3.22) replacing ?, B and A? by (b)=, s(b) and A, respectively.
Therefore, the publisher problem is stated as follows.
Publisher Problem: Obtain B and fxibg so as to
minimize
FX
i=1
iSb(i) (5.6)
where
xib 2 f0; 1g; 1  i  F; 1  b  B (5.7)
BX
b=1
xib = 1; 1  i  F (5.8)
B  M (5.9)
s(b) =
X
i2S
xibsi; 1  b  B (5.10)
(b) =
X
i2S
xibi; 1  b  B (5.11)
1  s(b)e (b)(s(b) 1)=2  b; 1  b  B (5.12)
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In the Publisher Problem, each le is in one and only one bundle (5.8), the
number of bundles is bounded by its maximum (5.9), the size and request rate for
each bundle are dened in (5.10) and (5.11), and the self-sustainability of bundle b is
lower bounded by b (5.12).
Proposition 5.2.1. The Publisher Problem is NP hard.
Proof: Let us consider the problem of deciding if the set of feasible solutions of the
Publisher Problem is empty. Equivalently, the problem consists of deciding if the
optimal download time is bounded (assuming that if the problem is not feasible, the
download time is innite). We refer to such decision problem as Bundle. Note that
the problem of nding the optimal bundling, i.e. the Publisher Problem, must
be harder than Bundle, since solving the optimization problem leads to a solution
to Bundle.
We reduce Partition to Bundle. An instance of the Partition problem con-
sists on a nite set A and size z(a) 2 Z+ for each a 2 A. The question is: is there a
subset A0  A such that Pa2A0 z(a) = Pa2A A0 z(a)? This problem is known to be
NP hard [37].
Given an instance x = (A; (z(a))) of the partition problem we transform it into
an instance f(x) = (S; (i); (si);M; (b); ) of the Bundle problem as follows. Let
jSj = jAj and i = si = z(i) for all i. Let  = 0:1. Let z =
P
i z(i)=2. Set M = 2
and
1 = 2 = 1  ze z(z 1)=2 (5.13)
Then, x 2 Partition i f(x) 2 Bundle.
()) If x 2 Partition there is a way to split the contents in subsets A0 and A A0
such that
P
a2A0 z(a) =
P
a2A A0 z(a).
X
a2A0
z(a) =
X
a2A A0
z(a) = z =
X
i2S
xi1si| {z }
=s(1)
=
X
i2S
xi2si| {z }
=s(2)
(5.14)
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But si = i = z(i) for all i, hence 1  s(b)e (b)(s(b) 1)=2 = 1  ze z(z 1)=2 for b = 1; 2.
Therefore the feasible set of solutions to the Bundle problem is non empty.
(() If f(x) 2 Bundle then the set of feasible solutions is non empty. Note that,
since  = 0:1 and (b); s(b) 2 Z, then 1   s(b)e (b)(s(b) 1)=2 is strictly increasing in
both (b) and s(b). Hence, the only way to satisfy the constraints imposed by f(x),
1  s(1)e (1)(s(1) 1)=2  1  ze z(z 1)=2 (5.15)
1  s(2)e (2)(s(2) 1)=2  1  ze z(z 1)=2 (5.16)
is to divide the contents into two subsets, each with equal sum of le sizes. Therefore,
x 2 Partition. 
5.2.2 Reservation Download Times Yield Greedy Solution
In the economics literature, reservation prices are used to express what the cus-
tomer is willing to pay for a product. The consumer surplus is the dierence between
the reservation price and what he actually has to pay. To illustrate the potential of
bundling in this context, we borrow an example from [35, page 13]. Assume that
a restaurant oers wine and pizza. There are four consumers with the reservation
prices given in Table 5.1.
Consumer Price Willing To Pay Price Willing To Pay Price Willing to Pay
For Wine For Pizza For Bundle
1 9.0 1.5 10.5
2 8.0 5.0 13.0
3 4.5 8.5 13.0
4 2.5 9.0 11.5
Table 5.1. Individual reservation prices for wine, pizza and bundle.
Note the negative correlation between the reservation prices for wine and pizza.
If separate pricing is used, the best that the rm providing these goods can do is to
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set the price of the wine as 8.0, the price of the pizza as 8.5 (see Table 5.2), and get a
revenue of 8 2 + 8:5 2 = 33, since two units of each product would be sold. Now
consider pure bundling: if the price of the bundle is set as 10.5, all four consumers
would buy the bundle, and the revenue is now 42. This is 27.3 percent higher than
the revenue with separate pricing.
Wine Pizza
Price # of Consumers Revenue Price # of Consumers Revenue
9.0 1 9.0 1.5 4 6.0
8.0 2 16.0 5.0 3 15.0
4.5 3 13.5 8.5 2 17.0
2.5 4 10.0 9.0 1 9.0
Table 5.2. Revenue as a function of prices of wine and pizza. Bold entries correspond
to optimal pricing strategies.
5.2.2.1 Reservation Download Times and Dynamic Bundles
Let us now consider the scenario where a user expresses his willingness for a le
in terms of the download time that he is willing to tolerate in order to download it.
Similar to the idea of reservation prices in the economics literature, we introduce the
idea of a reservation download time. Assuming that a user has a download capacity
of C Mbps, the reservation download time could be expressed, for instance, as a
multiplicative factor f > 1 meaning that the user is willing to wait for fS=C seconds
in order to download a le of size S Mb.
If reservation prices are used jointly with reservation download times, users would
have exibility to express both the relevance (through the reservation price) and the
urgency at which they need a le (through the reservation download time).
We focus on a population of users that have large reservation download times.
Their residence time in the system consists of a service time spent in downloading
the requested content and a spare time which can be used to download content they
did not originally sought. How should they use their spare time, i.e., what content
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should they download after they complete downloading the requested le? To address
this question, publishers need to trade-o between
1. \pushing" unpopular content to users, so that whenever any other user requests
that content, it is available among peers;
2. sending to each user content that is of interest to that user, since the user may
eventually decide to buy one of the contents that it owns.
Next, we show that a greedy strategy can be used by the server to decide on how
to propose les to users. We reduce the problem to fractional knapsack. Assume that
each le f is associated to a value vf which takes into account the tradeo presented
in bullets 1 and 2 above. Then,
Proposition 5.2.2. Consider a set of F les with sizes s1; s2; : : : ; sF and with values
v1; : : : ; vF to a given user U . Then, the problem of deciding which les to send to user
U with reservation download time T can be solved using a greedy strategy where the
ith le to be sent is the one with the ith largest ratio vkDk=sk where Dk is an estimate
of the download rate at which le k can be downloaded by user U .
Proof: Follows immediately from the discussion above and the fact that a greedy
strategy is optimal to solve the fractional knapsack problem [21]. The fraction
vkDk=sk corresponds to the utility per second of sending le k to user U . The knap-
sack capacity is T . 
Note that if users are not allowed to download fractions of les, the problem
reduces to 0-1 knapsack, which is NP hard even though good approximation heuristics
are known [37].
5.3 The Economic Model
We now introduce the economic model which will be used in the analysis of equi-
libria between peers and publishers to be presented in the upcoming sections. We
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consider H publishers that oer C contents (les) to an innite population of users.
Each publisher, h, provides a set Nh of les, jNhj = Nh, through Th torrents, in
bundles of size Kh = Nh=Th. Each le provided by a publisher is a member of exactly
one of its bundles.
We do not restrict Kh to take integer values. If the optimal value K
? is not an
integer, one way to implement it is to let the publisher's bundling strategy change
over time. The optimal value K? can be used to decide the fraction of time that dK?e
and bK?c are adopted.
Each user accessing the system is interested in a single le. Users requesting
content i arrive at rate (i) but only a fraction x(i) of the users download the desired
content.
Let ih(l) be the index of the l
th content provided by h, 1  l  Nh and ih(l) 2 C.
If two publishers p and q oer the same content, ip(m) = iq(n) for some 1  m  Np
and 1  n  Nq. Let x(i)h be the fraction of users requesting content i that download
it from publisher h. Publisher h experiences demand 
(ih(l))
h = 
(ih(l))x
(ih(l))
h for its l
th
content. Note that
PH
h=1 x
(i)
h = x
(i).
The vector h = (
(ih(1))x
(ih(1))
h ; : : : ;
(ih(Nh))x
(ih(Nh))
h ) is referred to as the pub-
lisher h demand vector.  = (1; : : : ; h) is the population demand vector and
 = ((1); : : : ;(C)) is the vector of popularities. The vector of bundling strategies is
given by K = (K1; : : : ; Kh).
Our key assumptions are the following:
 (A1) (reluctance to bundling) users are reluctant to download unrequested con-
tent;
 (A2) (minimize download time) users want to minimize the time to download
requested content;
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 (A3) (self sustaining swarms) users that download the same le or bundle from
the same publisher help each other; if enough users collaborate with each other,
the swarm sustains itself even in the absence of the publisher;
 (A4) (bandwidth costs) if the swarm is not able to sustain itself, the publisher
needs to allocate a minimum bandwidth to each user;
 (A5) (rewards for serving users) the publisher receives a reward (which may be
monetary) for each user served;
 (A6) (innite capacity) the publisher bandwidth capacity is innite.
5.3.1 Users' Utility
To capture assumptions (A1) and (A2), we model the cost function of a typical
user as the sum of its download and monetary costs. For a user that receives content
at rate  bps, the download cost of a bundle of Kh les from publisher h, D(Kh), is
given by
D(Kh) = Kh= (5.17)
Here the term Kh= captures the average download time and  the download cost
to a user in units of currency per second.  accounts for the reluctance of users to
download bundles. The smaller the value of  the longer the users are willing to wait
in order to download the desired les. Note that both  and  can in principle vary
across users, but here we assume a homogeneous population.
Publishers charge a at price for each le that they provide, i.e., prices are inde-
pendent of content. Publisher h sets price ph for each of its contents and the vector
of prices is p = (p1; : : : ; ph).
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The user's utility function for the download of a bundle of Kh les (one of them
being the le requested) from publisher h, Uc(h), is
Uc(h) = V  D(Kh)  ph (5.18)
Here V is a random variable uniformly distributed in the range [vmin, vmax], 0 
vmin < vmax <1, which characterizes valuations of les by users. The valuations are
assumed to be independent across users.
Users download the desired content from h if (a) that publisher has the content, (b)
Uc(h) > 0 and (c) Uc(h)  Uc(h0) for all h0 6= h. In case of a tie, demand is equally split
among publishers. Clearly, the pricing and bundling strategies of a publisher impacts
the demand (hence utility) experienced by the others. This naturally characterizes a
game between publishers, who are coupled through users demands. To describe this
game, we introduce the function q
(ih(l))
h () which determines the demand experienced
by publisher h for its lth content as a function of all publishers' strategies
q
(ih(l))
h (p;K) = 
(ih(l))
h = 
(ih(l))x
(ih(l))
h (5.19)
We present two possible denitions of q
(ih(l))
h () in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 (equations (5.24)
and (5.47)).
Note that even though users download bundles, they only have access to the
requested le. Hence, the download cost in (5.18) is proportional to Kh but the price
charged by the publisher is for the single le.
5.3.2 Publishers' Utility
The aggregate costs incurred by publisher h to make all of its Nh=Kh bundles
available must capture assumptions (A3) and (A4) and are given by Gh(h; Kh). In
some cases it may be convenient to make explicit the cost for publisher h to make
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its jth bundle available, C
(j)
h (h; Kh). The denition of C
(j)
h (h; Kh) is postponed to
Section 5.4.
The publishers' revenue, Fh(h; Kh), related to assumption (A5), is the standard
one used in the economics literature:
Fh(h; Kh) = ph
NhX
l=1
(ih(l))x
(ih(l))
h = ph
NhX
l=1

(ih(l))
h (5.20)
The publisher's utility, Uh(ph; Kh), is given by the dierence between its revenue and
its costs
Uh(ph; Kh) = ph
NhX
l=1

(ih(l))
h  Gh(h; Kh) (5.21)
= ph
NhX
l=1

(ih(l))
h  
ThX
j=1
C
(j)
h (h; Kh) (5.22)
5.3.3 Problem statement
The objective of publisher h is to maximize its utility,
max
Kh;ph
Uh(ph; Kh) = max
Kh;ph
Fh(h; Kh) Gh(h; Kh) (5.23)
subject to the constraints posed by (5.19).
5.4 Monopoly
In this section we study the single publisher case. We are interested in understand-
ing the impact of the publisher pricing strategy on the equilibrium, dened as the
point where the publisher's prot is maximized. Henceforth, the index s is dropped
for notational convenience.
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Variable Description
Client Parameters
V value of a le, uniform random variable [0,1]
D(K) cost of download for the user
 download rate
Publisher Parameters
U(;K) utility (prot)
C(;K) cost per bundle
p(;K) price
K number of les per bundle
N number of les
Population Parameters
 total arrival rate per le
x fraction of users that buy a le
x0 = 1  (K=) fraction of users that buy a le when p = 0
 = x demand per le
Table 5.3. Table of notation.
5.4.1 Optimization Problem
Our goal is to pose a simplied version of the general problem (5.23). For that
purpose, we assume that the popularities of all the les are the same ((i) =  for
all i).
A user downloads a bundle and purchases a le if v  D(;K)  p > 0 (equation
(5.18)), where v is a realization of the random variable V . Letting vmin = 0 and
vmax = 1, V is uniformly distributed in [0,1] (x5.3.1). Hence, the fraction x of the
population for which v > D(K) + p is 1  g where g = D(K) + p = (K=) + p. The
demand as a function of the price is given by
x(p;K) =
q(p;K)

= [1  K=]  p = x0   p (5.24)
where q() was introduced in (5.19). We have dropped all the superscripts present
in (5.19) because the popularities of all the les are now assumed to be the same.
Also, we explicitly account for the dependence of x on p and K. Note that when the
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price is zero demand is maximized and x0 = 1  K=. Alternatively, the price as a
function of the demand is
p(x;K) = (1  K=)  x; (5.25)
which implies that the maximum feasible bundle size is =. Since demand x and
price p are coupled through (5.24) and (5.25) we take K and x as control variables
rather than K and p. Substituting (5.25) into (5.23) yields the following objective
function for the publisher
max
K;x
U(x;K) (5.26)
where (5.27)
U(x;K) = Np(x;K)x  N
K
C(;K) (5.28)
To solve the problem, we must determine the cost function C(;K). To illustrate,
in the following section we consider three possible functions, the rst being the most
realistic but also the most complex.
5.4.2 Cost Functions
The goal of this section is to determine the cost function C(;K). For this pur-
pose we rely on a simple version of the model proposed and analyzed in Chapter 2.
Assuming that peers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate K and remain
online for an exponentially distributed period of time equal to K=, and denoting by
X the number of peers in the system,
PfX = ng = (K
2=)ne K
2=
n!
(5.29)
We now briey present the three cost functions studied in this chapter.
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Figure 5.1. Cost for the publisher as a function of the arrival rate. (a) and (b)
varying K [ = 1]; (c) and (d) varying  [K = 1].
Active publisher: The publisher must be active when the number of peers in
the system is small so as to provide missing blocks. In particular, assuming that
the publisher is active only when there is one peer in the system, the probability of
nding an active publisher is obtained by setting n = 1 in (5.29). The publisher's
cost function per swarm is given by
C(;K) = cK2


e K
2= (5.30)
where c represents the cost per time unit incurred by an active publisher.
Busy period : The previous cost function is applicable if the server is active when
there is exactly one customer in the system. For a second cost function, we assume
that the publisher is active whenever there is at least one leecher in the system.
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C(;K) = cPfX > 0g = c

1  e K2=

(5.31)
Note that this cost function is concave in .
Number of torrents: Finally, the last cost function we consider is where the per
swarm cost to the publisher is constant
C(;K) = c (5.32)
5.4.2.1 Numerical Evaluation
In Figure 5.1 we illustrate the rst two cost functions described above. In all cases
c = , which means that the costs are proportional to the allocated bandwidth, which
in turns equals that of a typical peer. We start with the conguration with 10 les
(N = 10), 1 bundle (K = 1) and download rate  = 8 Mbps. Figure 5.1(a) shows the
active publisher cost (x5.4.2) as a function of , as K varies from 1 to 4. For a xed
value ofK, the costs for the publisher rst increases but then sharply decreases, which
captures the fact that when the mean population size is above a certain threshold the
self-sustainability level is high. Note that the cost decreases as K increases: bundling
leads to an increase in the arrival rate and in the residence time of peers, which maps
into reduced publisher costs. The same rationale applies to Figure 5.1(b) where we
consider the busy period cost function (x5.4.2). However, in Figure 5.1(b) costs are
bounded away from zero as  increases. Finally, in Figure 5.1(c) and (d) we observe
that as  increases server costs also increase. That's because the server contributes
with a capacity equal to that of a typical peer (c = ).
5.4.3 Equilibrium for Fixed Bundling Strategy
We now establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the monopoly
case. Since in this section we consider a xed value of K, we don't make explicit the
dependency of any of the functions on K.
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Denition: An equilibrium is a point x that maximizes the utility (5.26), i.e.,
x = argmax
x2[0;x0]
U(x) = argmax
x2[0;x0]
fNp(x)x  N
K
C(x)g (5.33)
In this section we assume that C(x), as well as its rst three derivatives, are contin-
uous, C(0) = 0 and C(x) > 0 for x > 0. Moreover we assume that there exists at
least one value y 2 [0; x0] such that U(y) > 0 and that U(x) is not constant in any
subinterval of [0; x0].
Proposition 5.4.1. The monopoly has an equilibrium with positive utility in (0; x0).
Proof. U(x) is continuous in the interval [0; x0], so it has a global maximum x
. At
the global maximum x, the utility is positive (U(x) > 0). As a consequence x
belongs to (0; x0) because U(0) = 0 and U(x0) < 0.
The publisher's revenue, F (x), is given by (5.20), F (x) = Np(x)x = N[(1  
K=) x]x and the publisher's marginal revenue is dF (x)
dx
= N[ 2x+1 K

]. The
publisher's cost per swarm, C(x), is given by one of the equations (5.30)-(5.32), the
publisher's cost is N
K
C(x) and the publisher's marginal cost is N
K
dC(x)
dx
.
We observe that a necessary condition for y to be an equilibrium is that U 0(y) = 0
since the equilibrium falls inside [0; x0]. This means that at the equilibrium the
marginal revenue has to equal the marginal cost:
dF (x)
dx

x=x
= N

 2x? + 1  K


=
dC(x)
dx
N
K

x=x
(5.34)
Among the roots of U(x) = 0 there are local minima and local maxima that are not
equilibria. In what follows we provide sucient conditions for the existence of a single
local maximum and then of a unique equilibrium1.
1Note that even in presence of multiple local maxima, there can be a unique global maximum
point and so a unique equilibrium.
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Proposition 5.4.2. If U 0(x) = 0 has at most two roots in [0; x0] then there is a
unique equilibrium.
Proof. If U 0(x) = 0 has exactly one root within [0; x0] then this root is the equilibrium
(and the unique maximum). If U 0(x) = 0 has exactly two roots within [0; x0], they
cannot be both local maxima points of U(x). For the sake of contradiction, assume
that both roots are local maxima. Then, there would have to exist a third root that
\locally" minimizes U(x) within [0; x0]. U
0(x) = 0 would have to have three roots
within [0; x0] (contradiction). So, if U
0(x) = 0 has exactly two roots within [0; x0],
one of them is a maximum and the other is a minimum.
Proposition 5.4.3. If the publisher marginal cost function N
K
C 0(x) is convex in x
then there is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. The publisher marginal cost function N
K
C 0(x) being convex in x corresponds
to C 000(x)  0. Since U 000(x) =  N
K
C 000(x) it follows that U 000(x)  0. Hence U 00(x)
is non increasing and U 0(x) can change sign at most twice. As we assumed that U(x)
is not constant in any interval, U 0(x) = 0 has at most two roots and the result follows
from Proposition 5.4.2.
We observe that the hypothesis of Proposition 5.4.3 is satised by the cost func-
tion (5.31), as proven in Appendix D.1, but not by function (5.30) which increases
and then decreases. For this case the following result can be applied (hypotheses
check for the function (5.30) in Appendix D.1).
Proposition 5.4.4. If the publisher cost N
K
C(x) is concave in [0; x] and convex in
(x; x0] and the corresponding marginal cost
N
K
C 0(x) is convex in [0; x] then there is
a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Due to Proposition 5.4.3, U 0(x) = 0 has at most two roots in [0; x]. Cost
convexity in (x; x0] (i.e., marginal cost being non decreasing in the interval (x; x0])
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and the fact that the utility cannot be constant in any interval implies that U 0(x) = 0
has at most one root in (x; x0].
We now prove that if U 0(x) = 0 has two roots in [0; x] it has no roots in (x; x0].
By assumption, C 0(x) is decreasing and convex in [0; x]. Also, F 0(x) = N[ 2x +
1   K

]. Therefore, if U 0(x) = F 0(x)   C 0(x) = 0 has two roots in [0; x] it follows
that C 0(x) > F 0(x). Since in (x; x0] the marginal cost is non decreasing, C 0(x) 
C 0(x) 8x 2 (x; x0]. The marginal revenue F 0(x) is always decreasing. Therefore,
U 0(x) = 0 has no roots in (x; x0].
Note that if U 0(x) = 0 has at most one root in [0; x] it could have another root in
(x; x0].
It has been shown that U 0(x) = 0 has at most two roots in [0; x0]. The rest of the
proof then follows from Proposition 5.4.2.
5.4.4 The Impact of Bundling
We now study the impact of bundling on the publisher's utility in equilibrium.
The three cost functions introduced in x5.4.2 are considered.
5.4.4.1 Active Publisher
Given the active publisher cost function (5.30),
@
@x
F (x;K)

x=x?
= N
h
  x+ [(1  K=)  x]
i
x=x?
(5.35)
and
@
@x
N
K
C(x;K)

x=x?
= cNK


h
1  xK
2

i
e K
2x=

x=x?
(5.36)
Substituting the two equations above into (5.34) yields
h
  2x? + 1  K=
i
  cK

h
1  x
?K2

i
e K
2x?= = 0 (5.37)
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The roots of (5.37), which correspond to candidate values for the demand in
equilibrium, x?, can be obtained using the following x point equation:
x(i+1) =
1
2

(
K2x(i)

  1)cKe K
2x(i) 
 +   K

(5.38)
Now we derive insights on how  aects the system equilibrium through a nu-
merical experiment. We set the parameters of the model as follows:  = 1,  = 1,
c = 12 and N = 100. We set  equal to 0.02, 0.01, 0.0002 and 2 10 7. Table 5.4
displays the utility values presented in the table were normalized and are given by
U(x?; K)  24, where U(x?; K) is obtained through (5.26).
The same trend is observed in all columns of Table 5.4. For small values of
K, an increase in the bundling level leads to a signicant reduction in the costs for
the publisher and a corresponding utility increase. However, for larger values of K
increasing the bundling level leads to a decrease in demand which negatively impacts
the utility.
Table 5.4 also shows the equilibrium value of x. When K is small, the publisher
sets high prices to cope with its costs, hence demand is small. As K increases, prices
decrease and demand increases. Finally, increasing K further leads to a demand
decrease due to the reluctance of users to download bundles.
For a xed value of K, as  decreases we note an increase in the utility perceived
by the publisher. This happens because a higher fraction of the population joins the
system. The optimal bundle size for  = 0:02; 0:01; 0:0002 and 2  10 7 is equal
to 5, 5, 6, 7, respectively (bold face elements in Table 5.4). Finally, note that we
haven't included in Table 5.4 the results for K = 1; 2 because the system admits no
equilibrium in those cases. For the results presented in the previous section regarding
the existence of the equilibrium, we assumed that there is at least one value of x in
the range [0; x0] for which U(x) > 0. This condition is not satised for K = 1; 2 in
this example.
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 0:02 0:001 0:0002 2 10 7
K x? U(x?;K) x? U(x?;K) x? U(x?;K) x? U(x?;K)
3 0.5007 -19.18514 0.502489 -18.80194 0.503847 -18.49608 0.504187 -18.41979
4 0.5321 -0.041375 0.533499 0.171757 0.534574 0.342649 0.534843 0.385383
5 0.4963 0.490159 0.498821 0.738963 0.500763 0.938880 0.501249 0.988931
6 0.4940 0.403533 0.497010 0.700839 0.499410 0.939980 0.500009 0.999885
7 0.4930 0.304900 0.496500 0.651225 0.499300 0.930049 0.499999 0.999930
8 0.4920 0.206400 0.496000 0.601600 0.499200 0.920064 0.499999 0.999920
9 0.4910 0.108100 0.495500 0.552025 0.499100 0.910081 0.499999 0.999910
10 0.4900 0.010000 0.495000 0.502500 0.499000 0.900100 0.499999 0.999900
Table 5.4. Equilibrium varying K and  (Active publisher cost).
5.4.4.2 Busy Period
When the cost function is given by the busy period, we can proceed as in the last
section and solve the problem using a x point algorithm. However, in this case we
can express the equilibrium demand, x?, as a function of K in terms of the Lambert
W () function. The Lambert W () function is dened as the inverse of f(w) = wew.
Since f(w) is not injective W () is multivalued; nevertheless, W () takes real values
only on two of its branches, referred to as W0() and W 1() [36].
The demand in equilibrium, x?, is dened implicitly as a function of K by substi-
tuting (5.31) into (5.34). First, we dene the function H(x;K) as follows
H(x;K) =
@
@x
F (x;K)  @
@x
N
K
C(x;K)
H(x;K) = N[ 2x+ 1  K

]  N
K
ce K
2x=K2


Then, solving H(x?; K) = 0 for x? yields
x? =
 
2W
 
  cK3e
1=2
K2( +K)
2
22
!
2
K2
+   K
!
2
(5.39)
We make three observations about this solution. First, the argument of the func-
tion W decreases if 2
3
 K  

. But W0(z) and W 1(z) take real values if and only
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if z 2 [ 1=e;+1) and z 2 [ 1=e; 0), respectively [36, Lemma 2.10]. Therefore, once
we nd (using W0(z)) a value K
0  2
3
for which x? is an imaginary number we don't
need to further search for solutions K? > K 0.
Second, substituting x? into (5.26) and taking the derivative of (5.26) with
respect to K yield
lim
K!0
dU
dK
=  (+ c)N
2
< 0 (5.40)
Third, we can compute dx
?
dK
using the implicit function theorem,
dx?
dK
=  @H=@K
@H=@x?
=
(c  2K2x?c) e K
2 x?
 + 
 22 + cK3 e K
2 x?

(5.41)
which leads to
lim
K!1
dx?
dK
=   
2
< 0 lim
K!1
lim
x?!0
dU
dK
=  1 (5.42)
In all the numerical experiments we conducted we found at most three roots for
dU
dK
= 0. Based on the second observation above, if dU
dK
= 0 has at most three roots in
[0; K 00), K 00  =, and x? takes only real values in that interval then U(x?; K) has
at most one local maximum in (0; K 00).
5.4.4.3 Number of Torrents
Motivated by the cost function (5.31) we consider the case where e K
2x= is
negligible (equation (5.32)). Therefore
@U
@x
=   K

  2x; x?(K) = 1  
K

2
;
dx?
dK
=
 
2
where the last expression agrees with (5.42). Also,
dU
dK
=
N ( x? + cK 2 )

(5.43)
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d2U
dK2
=
N
2

2
2
  4c
K3

;
d3U
dK3
 0 (5.44)
We conclude that, restricting to K > 0, dU
dK
is convex (note that dU
dK
is not dened
for K = 0), limK!0+ dUdK = +1 and limK!+1 dUdK = +1 (compare to (5.42)). The
convexity of dU
dK
implies that U has at most two critical points and at most one local
maximum in (1; =). To nd the optimal value of K, K?, one may search for (at
most two) roots of dU
dK
in the interval (1; =) and include them in set I. The optimal
value of K is given by K? = argmaxK2I[f1;=g U(x
?(K); K).
5.5 Competition
We now consider the case where multiple publishers compete in the market. The
publishers are coupled through the demand. The actions of one publisher aect the
demand perceived by the others.
We assume publishers are price-takers. The market price for each le is p >
0. The only strategic decision is the bundling level. In addition, we consider the
simplied scenario where each publisher has only two options: either to bundle all its
les or not to bundle at all.
Users' utilities are given by (5.18),
Uc(h) = V   K=  p (5.45)
We assume that each user requests a single content. Recall that in Section 5.3.1 we
dened V as uniformly distributed in the range [vmin,vmax], 0  vmin < vmax < 1.
Here, we let vmin = =+ p and vmax = M + N=+ p where M is a constant, and
N is the number of les oered by each publisher (Nh = N for all h). Note that each
user is willing to download the requested le and pay its market price. A fraction x
of users tolerates downloading bundles,
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x = 1 
N

  

M + N

  

=
M
M+ (N   1) (5.46)
If N > 1, for any M > 0 there is one single value of  which leads to demand x,
0  x  1. The demand x decreases as the reluctance of users to bundles  increases.
Let O(i) be the set of publishers that oer content i, O(i) = fh : i 2 Nhg.
The sets of publishers that oer bundled and unbundled versions of content i are
B(i) = ft 2 O(i) : Kt = Ng and N (i) = O(i) n B(i), respectively. We now dene q()
(equation (5.19)). When multiple publishers oer content i, demand is equally split
across those publishers that do not bundle. This happens because, if s; t 2 N (i) and
u 2 B(i), then Ks = Kt = 1, Ku = N and Uc(s) = Uc(t) > Uc(u) (equation (5.18)). If
all the publishers oering content i resort to bundling, demand splits equally among
them since Uc(s) = Uc(t) for all s; t 2 B(i). Therefore,
q
(i)
h (K) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(i)
jN (i)j ; h 2 N (i)
x(i)
jB(i)j ; h 2 B(i) and N (i) = ;
0; otherwise
(5.47)
where q() does not depend on p because all publishers are price takers and all users
are willing to pay the market price.
The utility of publisher h is given by (5.21). We now focus on publisher h costs.
If the average demand per swarm is smaller than a threshold  , the publisher incurs
an aggregate cost c for all swarms. Otherwise, the swarms provided by publisher h
are self sustaining, and costs are zero (analogous to standard information goods in
the economics literature).
Gh(h; Kh) =
8>><>>:
c;
PN
l=1 
ih(l)Kh=N < 
0; otherwise
(5.48)
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not bundle bundle
not bundle A;W B;X
bundle C; Y D;Z
Table 5.5. General rewards for the bundling game. Cell entries R;C represent the
revenues for the row and column players, respectively.
This cost function resembles the active server cost function presented in Sec-
tion 5.4.2. However, the continuous function introduced in (5.30) for each swarm is
now replaced by the above step function that captures costs aggregated across several
swarms.
5.5.1 Duopoly
From here on we consider the special case where there are only two publishers in
the market. Let C1 = fi : 1 2 O(i) and 2 =2 O(i)g, C2 = fi : 2 2 O(i) and 1 =2 O(i)g
and C1;2 = fi : 1 and 2 2 O(i)g be the sets of contents oered solely by publisher 1,
solely by publisher 2, and by both, respectively.
Each user seeks content that is provided either by publisher 1, publisher 2 or both.
Requests arrive with rate 1 =
P
j2C1 
(j), 2 =
P
j2C2 
(j) and B =
P
j2C1;2 
(j),
respectively.
The normal form game is shown in Table 5.5. We list publisher 1's strategies as
rows and publisher 2's as columns. For each of the four cells, we give a pair of payos
to the two publishers (in units of currency per second), rst to publisher 1 and then to
publisher 2, obtained using equations (5.21), (5.47) and (5.48). Given that Kh = N
if all the contents are bundled and Kh = 1 otherwise,
 A;W = [p(i + B=2)  c1(i+B=2)=N< ]+
 B; Y = [p(i + B)  c1(i+B)=N< ]+
 C;X = [pix  c1ix< ]+
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not bundle bundle
not p(1 +
B
2
)  c, p(1 + B)  c,
bundle p(2 +
B
2
)  c p(2x)  c
bundle p(1x)  c, p(1 + B2 )x,
p(2 + B)  c p(2 + B2 )x
(a)
not bundle bundle
not bundle 4; 4 14; 0
bundle 0; 14 5; 5
(b)
Table 5.6. Almost completely overlapping contents and the publisher's dilemma:
(a) general game structure; (b) numerical example where B = 20, i = 0, x = 0:5,
c = 6, p = 1, N = 10,  = 2:1.
 D;Z = [p(i + B=2)x  c1(i+B=2)x< ]+
where i = 1 in cells A, B, C and D and i = 2 otherwise. 1C is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if C is true and 0 otherwise. Note that all rewards are positive. Henceforth,
this should be assumed even when the + symbol is omitted.
5.5.2 Almost completely overlapping contents
We now consider the case where i  0 (i = 1; 2) and N  0. We assume that
the following conditions hold:
 (C1) (i + B)=N <  : not bundling leads to publishing costs;
 (C2) ix <  : bundling but relying on a small population of users still leads to
publishing costs;
 (C3) (i + B2 )x >  : bundling and relying on a population of users with size
greater than a critical threshold leads to negligible publishing costs.
Even though we write conditions (C2)-(C3) as a function of the variable x, they can be
as well rewritten as a function of the parameter  (see comments following equation
(5.46)). Given (C1)-(C3) the normal form game is depicted in Table 5.6(a).
For a numerical example, consider the following parameters: B = 20, i = 0,
x = 0:5, c = 6, p = 1, N = 10,  = 2:1. The normal form game in this case is
given in Table 5.6(b). Publishers are better o if both bundle. However, the Nash
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equilibrium of this game is (not bundle, not bundle), which is not Pareto optimal. A
Nash equilibrium which is not Pareto optimal is referred to as a social trap.
We refer to a game in which bundling consists of a dominant strategy for both
publishers and where the resulting equilibrium (not bundle, not bundle) is not Pareto
optimal as a publisher's dilemma. A publisher's dilemma happens whenB > D > A >
C and Y > Z > W > X (Table 5.5) and is an example of a prisoner's dilemma [83].
In what follows, we show that if in addition to (C1)-(C3) the arrival rate of
requestors B  0 and , the reluctance to bundling is close to 0 (hence x is close
to 1), then complete overlap (i = 0; i = 1; 2) favors a publisher's dilemma. For that
purpose, we add a condition on the arrival rate of clients,
 (C4) 2c
p
< B <
2c
p(1 x)
In particular, (C4) is valid for the example in Table 5.6.
Proposition 5.5.1. If conditions (C1)-(C4) hold then there exists an ?i such that if
0  i  ?i (i = 1; 2) the game in Table 5.6 is a publisher's dilemma.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the proposition, the condition for a publisher's
dilemma C < A < D < B maps into [p1x   c]+ < [p(1 + B2 )   c]+ < p(1 +
B
2
)x < [p(1 + B)   c]+. If ?1 = max(0;??1 ), ??1 = min( cpx ;
c p(1 x)B
2
p(1 x) ) and
0  1  ?1: (1) the rst term [p1x   c]+ = 0 because 1  cpx ; (2) the sec-
ond term [p(1 +
B
2
)   c]+ > 0 since (C4) implies pB
2
> c; (3) the relation
[p(1 +
B
2
)   c]+ < p(1 + B2 )x is satised since 1 < ??1 and (C4) implies
0 < pB
2
  c < p(B=2)x so that even if 1 = 0 still the relation holds; (4) (C4)
also leads to 0 < p(B=2)x < pB   c hence p(1 + B2 )x < [p(1 + B)  c]+.
The condition X < W < Z < Y follows similarly.
As a matter of fact, note that i = 0 favors (C1) and (C2) and B  0 favors
(C3). If N  0, (C1) holds even when B  0.
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not bundle bundle
not bundle 0, 0 p(1 + B), 0
bundle 0, p(2 + B) 0; 0
(a)
not bundle bundle
not bundle 0; 0 4; 0
bundle 0; 4 0; 0
(b)
Table 5.7. Partially overlapping contents and the bundle o game: (a) general game
structure; (b) numerical example where B = 1 = 2 = 10, x = 0, c = 16, p = 1,
N = 6,  = 5.
Key insight: If a publisher distinguishes itself by providing exclusive content (i >
0) it is less likely to end up in a social trap consisting of a non Pareto equilibrium
where no publisher bundles.
5.5.3 Partially overlapping contents
We now consider the case where content is only partially overlapping and users
are reluctant to download bundles (x  0). We replace (C1) by the following two
conditions and add condition (C5):
 (C10) (i+ B2 )=N <  : not bundling leads to publishing costs if the population
of requestors is small;
 (:C1) (i+B)=N >  : if the population of requestors is large, costs are zero;
 (C5) c > p(1 + 2 + B2 ): publishing costs, when incurred, are high.
Alternatively, (C10) and (:C1) can be interpreted as conditions over the number of
les oered by each publisher: the number of les (N) oered by each publisher falls
in the range (i +
B
2
)= < N < (i + B)= .
Conditions (C10), (:C1) and (C5) lead to the game shown in Table 5.7(a). The
reluctance of users to download bundles forces the publishers that bundle to go o
the market (the revenue of publishers that bundle is zero). For B = 1 = 2 = 10,
x = 0, c = 16, p = 1, N = 6,  = 5, we obtain the game shown in Table 5.7(b). This
game has three pure equilibria: (not bundle, not bundle), (bundle, not bundle) and
(not bundle, bundle).
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We refer to a game in which (1) there are at least two pure strategy equilibria, e1
and e2; (2) each publisher prefers a dierent pure strategy equilibrium and (3) both
e1 and e2 are Pareto optimal as a bundle o game.
Note that the bundle o game is an example of a degenerate hawk dove game [83].
The conditions for a bundle o game are (Table 5.5) B > D  C  A and Y > Z 
X  W . Next, we show that reluctance of users to download bundles favors a bundle
o game:
Proposition 5.5.2. If conditions [(C10), (:C1) and (C5)] hold then there is a
threshold  such that if x <  the game in Table 5.5 is a bundle o game.
Proof. If conditions (C10), (:C1) and (C5) are met and x < =(i + B2 ) then the
game in Table 5.5 reduces to the one shown in Table 5.7(a), which is a bundle o
game.
Key insight: If users are reluctant to download bundles and the costs to provide
unbundled les are high, we may expect that in the equilibrium only one publisher
oers an unbundled version of the contents it has.
5.6 Related Work
In their seminal work on bundling, Adams and Yellen [2] showed that a rm
that provides two products can take advantage of bundling by increasing the number
of customers that buy its products. Since then, there is a growing literature on
bundling (for a survey, see [35]). More recently, certain authors have also considered
strategic bundling [99, 64]. However, none of these works considered bundling of les
in a peer-to-peer network.
Salinger [80] was the rst to point out that bundling is a demand smoother in the
case of homogeneous demands. This is a consequence of the law of large numbers:
if all buyers draw their value for the goods from the same probability distribution,
average valuation converges to the mean as the number of goods increases. Therefore,
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if the rm sets the price of the bundle to the mean times the number of elements in the
bundle, virtually every customer will be willing to buy and prot is maximized. Later,
Bakos and Brynjolfsson [9] reached the same conclusion in the context of information
goods, i.e., goods that have almost zero cost to be replicated. This indicates that
rms that cannot price discriminate may still use bundling to increase its sales. The
same reasoning applies if demand is negatively correlated [68, Section 12.6].
Closely related to our work are those by Bakos and Brynjolfsson [10], Fay and
Mackie-Mason [33] and Croson and Sainders [25]. They were the rst to consider
bundling of information goods under competition. What distinguishes our work from
these is the fact that in a peer-to-peer system the replication costs depend on the
number of users that possess the content. In addition, we take into account per-
formance factors related to network metrics such as download time and availability
which were not considered in previous work.
5.7 Discussion
Next, we discuss the assumptions adopted to yield a tractable model.
Homogeneous request rates and le sizes assumption: We assume all
les have the same request rate and size. Although the general model presented in
the beginning of this chapter allows for heterogeneous request rates and le sizes, the
extension of the analytical results to this more general case is non-trivial.
Uniform price assumption: We assume that users pay a xed price for each
requested le. This is roughly the model adopted, for instance, by iTunes [7].
Price-takers assumption (in duopoly): In the duopoly, we assume publishers
are price-takers. Future work consists of studying the joint pricing and bundling
equilibrium.
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5.8 Conclusion
We considered enterprises that rely on swarming systems to disseminate les and
proposed a model to capture the tradeos in the choices of prices and bundling strate-
gies. Using the proposed model, we showed conditions for existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium and how this equilibrium changes as a function of the bundling
strategy. In the multi-rm case, we explained the eects of system parameters on
the Nash equilibrium. Future work consists on analyzing the Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium of the duopoly and using multi agent reinforcement learning to analyze the
multi-rm case.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis we have analyzed mechanisms, models and algorithms to leverage
the use of swarming for the dissemination of a catalog of les. We have quantied
how bundling impacts availability (Chapter 2), the dependence of peers on publishers
(Chapter 3) and the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity and the corresponding
download of unrequested content (Chapter 4). We have also studied algorithmic and
economic aspects faced by publishers (Chapter 5). Although in this thesis we have
posed and answered fundamental questions in the realm of peer-to-peer swarming
systems for the dissemination of catalogs of les, the problems addressed here are far
from exhausting all the questions related to that topic. In what follows, we point out
some of the many avenues for future work.
6.1 Future Work
6.1.1 Publisher Capacity Allocation and Stability
The model presented in Chapter 3 is useful to estimate the dependence of peers
on a publisher when the publisher allocates a xed bandwidth to the swarm. If
the bandwidth allocated by the publisher is too small, though, or if the publisher
allocates its bandwidth dynamically, then the last block problem, as described by
Hajek et al. [40], can occur.
The last block problem occurs when only one block is missing among peers. If the
publisher provides this block to a peer, the peer is likely to complete its download
and consequently depart the system immediately. That is because peers acquire all
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blocks except the missing one very quickly. If all peers rely on the publisher in order
to download their last block, the system goes into a client-server mode.
Question: How does bundling aect the stability of the swarms?
In addition, the bandwidth allocation strategies considered in the literature [69, 27]
do not account for dynamic replication of content in the network. The joint bandwidth
allocation-content placement problem is still open.
Question: How to optimally solve the joint bandwidth allocation-content place-
ment problem?
6.1.2 The Nature of the Content
The decisions of how to combine contents and which content to send to each users
depend on how contents relate one to another. In this thesis we have not taken into
account the correlations among contents in order to issue recommendations or to
bundle. Future work consists of taking such correlations, which can be captured, for
instance, using a correlation matrix, into account.
Question: How to bundle and issue recommendations to users based on content
correlations as well as on system metrics, such as availability?
6.1.3 Reciprocity and Barter
In Chapter 4 we pointed out that the loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity in
a special class of relay-less networks is bounded by a factor of two. We also discussed
matchmaking and content recommendations as a means to improve loss of eciency.
In what follows, we describe possible future work in this eld.
6.1.3.1 Loss of Eciency Due To Direct Reciprocity
Question: What is the (per-node) loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity?
The problem above in its more general setting is still open. A related problem
concerns showing that the system loss of eciency, measured as the collective number
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of transmissions required in the direct reciprocity schedule divided by the number of
transmissions in the indirect reciprocity schedule, is less than two.
Question: What is the system loss of eciency due to direct reciprocity?
6.1.3.2 Content Value for Bartering
In Chapter 4 we proposed the use of a public board to assist users in deciding
what and when to barter. The public board was used to break ties, and users were
assumed to transmit one entire le every time they switched contents. In general,
though, users might be able to exchange fractions of contents and the public board
might be used to decide how to weight the amount to be sent of each content.
Question: How to assist users in deciding what and when to barter?
Users might be willing to download content that they did not initially sought, for
bartering purposes, if such content turns out to be interesting to them or related to
contents that are of their interest. Therefore, recommendation systems that take into
account both users interests as well as system performance are needed.
6.1.4 The Universal Swarm and Wireless Swarming
In its full generality, the main question addressed in this thesis is how to take
advantage of collaborations across users interested in dierent les so as to satisfy
their demands, in a simple, ecient and incentive compatible way. This general idea
of allowing collaborations among users of dierent swarms has been referred to as
universal swarming [93, 106, 107]. The universal swarm might involve both wired
and wireless users, and the contact opportunities among the wireless users might
be dictated by their mobility patters. Although there has been recent progress on
dissemination and replication strategies for peer-to-peer wireless systems [45, 3, 18,
75], the following general question is open.
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Question: How to leverage swarming systems to disseminate content to users
that are intermittently connected in space (due to mobility) and time (due to their
online patterns)?
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APPENDIX A
CONTENT AVAILABILITY AND BUNDLING
Background
Our results rely on those reported by Browne and Steele [15] on the busy period of
an M/G/1 queue where the customer initiating the busy period has an exceptional
residence time.
Let customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate . If we allow
customers initiating a busy period to draw their residence times from a distribution
H() with Laplace transform h() and mean  while all other customers draw their
residence times from a distribution G(), the expected busy period length is given by
E[B] =  +
1X
i=1
i
i!
Z 1
0
(1 H(x))
h Z 1
x

1 G(u)

du
ii
dx (A.1)
When G(x) = 1   e x=, i.e., all customers except the rst draw their service times
from an exponential distribution with mean , the equation above reduces to
E[B] =  +
1X
i=1
()i[1  h(i=)]
i!i
(A.2)
If the customer initiating a busy period also draws its service time from an exponential
distribution,
E[B] =  + 
1X
i=1
()i
i!(+ i)
(A.3)
Finally, if  = ,
E[B] = (e   1)= (A.4)
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Figure A.1. Publishers only availability. Content download spans multiple busy
periods.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
Accounting for publishers only corresponds to setting the threshold coverage to
innity. A threshold coverage of innity yields a lower bound on availability and an
upper bound on average download time since content is assumed to be available only
if there is at least one publisher in the system.
A.1.1 Availability
The availability accounting for publishers only is given by the fraction of time in
which there is at least one publisher in the system,
(eru   1)=r
1=r + (eru   1)=r (A.5)
A.1.2 Download Time
In this section we quantify the mean download time assuming peers are patient
and content is available only when publishers are online. Note that the download
time may span multiple busy periods (see Figure A.1).
Let I be the initial number of online publishers when a peer starts its download.
We consider a Markov Chain with state space fXig(i   1). State Xi (i  1)
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Figure A.2. (a) Markov chain of original process; (b) Markov chain of modied
process.
corresponds to a system in which there are i publishers online and the download is in
progress. State X0 corresponds to no publishers online and the user is idle waiting,
and state X 1 corresponds to the download completion. The transition rates are as
follows
a) Xi
r! Xi+1, i  0
b) Xi
i=u! Xi 1, i  1
c) Xi
=s! X 1, i  1
Transitions a) and b) correspond to arrivals and departures of publishers. Tran-
sition c) corresponds to a download completion.
Let the mean download time, conditioned on j publishers being online in the
system when the peer arrives, be E[T jI = j]. The download time, C, has mean E[T ]
equal to
E[T ] =
1X
j=0
e j
j!
E[T jI = j] (A.6)
where  = ru.
Our results rely on those derived by Crescenzo et al. [24] on a birth-death system
with catastrophes. Transitions a), b) and c) correspond to the birth, death and
catastrophes in [24, Section 3], respectively.
To present our results it is useful to introduce the system consisting only of tran-
sitions a) and b), which corresponds to an M=M=1 queue. We refer to the state
space of the modied system as f bXig(i  0).
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a) bXi r! bXi+1, i  0
b) bXi i=u! bXi 1, i  1
It follows from [23, eq. (41)] that 1
E[T jI = j] = 1
=s

1 +
j!
j
qj
1  q0

(A.7)
where qj, j  0, is =s times the Laplace transform of the probability of there being
j publishers in the modied system at time t given that initially there are none,
evaluated at point =s.
Computing q0
We rst compute q0. The number of customers in an M=M=1 queue, n, at time
t, given that the queue is initially empty is given by a Poisson random variable with
rate (1   e t=u) (see [24, Section A4] and [22, 54]). Therefore, the probability of
the queue being empty at time t is
e (1 e
 t=u) (A.8)
The Laplace transform of (A.8) is
b0(&) = Z 1
0
e &t (1 e
 t=u)dt (A.9)
Using [38, eq. 3.331.1] and the series representation of the gamma function [38, eq.
8.354], together with (A.9), yields
q0 = (=s) b0(=s) = e (=s)u 1X
k=0
k
k!
1
k + u=s
(A.10)
1Note that in [24, Proposition 1] there is a typo: the term E[Tj;r] is missing in the right hand
side of eq. (30).
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Computing qj
Arguments similar to those used to derive the Laplace transform of the probability
of there being zero users in the system at time t can be used to derive the Laplace
transform of the probability of there being j users in the system at time t, j  0. For
details, refer to [24, Section A4].
qj=

s
j
j!
e 
=s
1=u
B

j + 1;
=s
1=u



=s
1=u
;
=s
1=u
+ j + 1; 

(A.11)
where B is the Beta function and  the Kummer function (see [24, Section A4]).
E[T jL = j] is obtained by substituting (A.10) and (A.11) into (A.7). Finally,
E[T jL = j] together with (A.6) yield E[T ],
E[T ] =
1
=s
 
1 +
1X
j=0
qj
e   (=s)uP1k=0 kk! 1k+u=s
!
(A.12)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3.2
We now consider a threshold coverage of zero. Note that whereas it is straightfor-
ward to verify that an innite threshold coverage yields a lower bound on availability
(see Denition 2.3.1), it is not as immediate to show that a threshold coverage of
zero yields a corresponding upper bound. Although increasing the threshold coverage
decreases the mean duration of the rst busy period, it also increases the number
of extant peers that request for service in the subsequent busy periods. In the next
section, we show that the decrease in the mean duration of the rst busy period out-
weights the increase of the mean duration of the subsequent periods, i.e., we show
that a threshold coverage of zero yields an upper bound on availability. This upper
bound, in turn, yields a lower bound on the mean download time.
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A.2.1 Availability
When the threshold coverage is zero, the availability accounting for publishers
and peers is given by the fraction of time in which there is at least one peer in the
system. For simplicity, we assume that the residence time of publishers is drawn from
an exponential distribution with mean s=, same as peers (otherwise, results from
[15] are applicable). Therefore, the availability, A, is
A =
(e(r+)(s=)   1)=(r + )
1=r + (e(r+)(s=)   1)=(r + ) (A.13)
We now show that the above expression indeed constitutes an upper bound on the
availability. If the threshold coverage is greater than zero, peers might get blocked
while downloading a content when the number of online peers reaches the threshold
coverage. In this case, peers need to wait for a publisher to return in order to resume
their downloads. Next, we show that in the system with blocking (i.e., with thresh-
old coverage greater than zero) peers experience decreased availability (i.e., decreased
average duration of busy periods) as compared to peers in the system without blocking.
We start from the system without blocking (threshold coverage of zero). Consider
the rst instant of time t at which there are no publishers online and the number of
peers reaches the value m > 0. All extant peers and peers that arrive after t, and
before a publisher returns, are referred to as exceptional peers. The time until the
system becomes empty after t is referred to as the residual busy period.
Now consider the system with blocking (threshold coverage m > 0). Exceptional
peers remain idle waiting from t until a publisher returns. When the publisher returns,
they immediately start to receive service. This constitutes a new busy period. The
rst customer of such a busy period is a virtual customer, whose residence time equals
the maximum of the residence times of all exceptional peers and the only publisher.
The mean residence time of the virtual customer is smaller than the mean residual
busy period (see Figure A.3). That is because arrivals which occur far apart from
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decrease of first
busy period duration
increase of second
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(a) system without blocking after download starts
(b) system with blocking after download starts
publisher
peer
Figure A.3. System with blocking yields a net decrease in mean busy period duration
and a corresponding decrease in availability.
each other (as in a residual busy period) yield increased makespan compared to that
obtained if all arrivals occur at the same instant (as in a virtual customer). Therefore,
the system without blocking (threshold coverage of zero and residual busy periods)
yields busy periods that have mean duration larger than the system without blocking
(threshold coverage m > 0 and virtual customers).
A.2.2 Download Time
The mean download time is given by,
(1  A)(1=r) + mean active download time
Note that the mean active download time may span multiple busy periods. However,
it is lower bounded by s=, therefore the mean download time is lower bounded by
(1  A)(1=r) + s=
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Other Proofs
Throughout the proofs, let ^ = maxfkg,  = minfkg, s^ = maxfskg, s =
minfskg.
Derivation of equation (2.10)
Proof. We use equation (A.1) to obtain (2.10). Let the download time of customers
that arrive during the busy period be given by
X =
8>><>>:
X1; with probability q1
X2; with probability q2 = 1  q1
where E[Xi] = i. Then,
G(u) = 1  q1e 
1
1
u   q2e 
1
2
u
(A.14)
and
E[B] =  +
1X
i=1
i
i!
Z 1
0
I(z; i)dz (A.15)
where
I(z; i) = (1 H(z))
iX
j=0

i
j
h
q1
e
  1
1
z
1
1
j
q2
e
  1
2
z
1
2
i ji
(A.16)
Substituting (A.16) into (A.15) and using integration by parts yields
E[B] =  +
1X
i=0
i
i!
iX
j=0

i
j

qj1
1
j1
qi j2
1
i j2
h1  h( j
1
+ i j
2
)
j
1
+ i j
2
i
(A.17)
and if customers initiating a busy period draw their service times from an exponential
distribution with mean , h(s) =  1=( 1 + s), which yields (2.10).
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Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
Proof. Since all the terms in Bk, k = 1; : : : ; K, are lower bounded and upper bounded
by terms that do not depend on K, E[Bk] is bounded hence E[Bk] = (1).
To show that logE[B(b)] = (K2) we consider a special process, with busy period
duration B?, where the following conditions hold,
 during the busy period, customers arrive with rate , where  = R+PKk=1 k,
 the residence times of all customers, excluding the rst, arriving in a busy period
are drawn from an exponentially distributed random variable with mean ,
 the residence time of the rst customer in a busy period is drawn from an
exponentially distributed random variable with mean ,
 ,  and  are upper bounded by
  Ks^=   K^+R   U +K2s^^=(R) (A.18)
 ,  and  are lower bounded by
  Ks=   K   U (A.19)
The average busy period, E[B?], of the special process is given by (A.3).
First, we show that logE[B?] = O(K2). Since 1=(+ i)  1= it follows from
(A.3) that
E[B?]   + 
1X
i=1
()i
i!
= 
1X
i=0
()i
i!
= e (A.20)
Given that   K2s^^=+ o(K2),
lim
K!1
logE[B?]
K2
 lim
K!1
log(eK
2s^^=)
K2
<1 (A.21)
implying that E[B?] = O(K2).
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Next, we show that logE[B?] = 
(K2). First, note that
1
+ i
 1
(i+ 1)max(; )
(A.22)
Putting (A.22) and (A.3) together yields
E[B?]   + 
KX
i=1
()i
i!(i+ 1)max(; )
(A.23)
 

KX
i=1
()i+1
(i+ 1)!max(; )
(A.24)
=


1
max(; )

e   1  

(A.25)
Since   K2s=,
lim
K!1
K2
logE[B?]
 lim
K!1
K2
log

 exp(K
2s^^=) 1 (K2s)=
K2s^^=+K^+o(K2)
 <1 (A.26)
Therefore, logE[B?] = (K2).
To extend the result above to the parameterization of E[B(b)] made in Sec-
tion 2.3.3.1 we proceed as follows. For the upper bound, logE[B(b)] = O(K2), consider
a modied process in which the residence times of all customers arriving during a busy
period are drawn from an exponential random variable with mean  = Ks^. Denote
the busy period of the modied process by bB. Noting that conditions (A.18)
hold it follows from (A.20)-(A.21) that logE[ bB] = O(K2). Since limK!1E[ bB] 
limK!1E[B(b)], logE[B(b)] = O(K2). The lower bound, logE[B(b)] = 
(K2), fol-
lows similarly.
Finally, given that E[N (b)] = E[B(b)] we also have
logE[N (b)] = (K2) (A.27)
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Accounting For the Impact of Peers That Are Served When Busy Period Starts
Consider the group of peers that wait for a publisher to arrive and immediately
begins to be served when the busy period starts. In the following proof, we account
for the possible impact of this group of peers on the duration of the busy period.
Proof. When a publisher arrives to start a busy period a group of peers that were
waiting for a publisher immediately begins to be served. This group is modeled using
a virtual customer, with residence time Y . Y is the maximum of all the residual
download times of the queued peers that enter simultaneously into service and the
residence time of the publisher,
Y = maxfX1; : : : ; XL; XL+1g
where X1; : : : ; XL are exponential random variables with mean s= and XL+1 is ex-
ponential with mean u. L is a geometric random variable with support f0; 1; : : :g
and parameter r=( + r), denoting the number of Poisson arrivals with rate  in
an exponentially distributed interval of average length 1=r. Let h(s) be the Laplace
transform of Y and  = E[Y ].
To fully parameterize equation (A.2) it remains to determine h(s). To this end,
let the random variable Yf be dened as
Yf = maxfX1; X2; : : : ; Xf ; Zg (A.28)
where X1; : : : ; Xf are exponential random variables with mean s= and Z is an ex-
ponential random variable with mean u.
145
Recall that  = E[Y ],
E[Y ] =
1X
f=0
E[Y jL = f ]P (L = f) (A.29)
=
1X
f=0
E[Yf ]P (L = f) (A.30)
Next, we compute E[Yf ]. The cdf of Yf is F (x) = P (Yf  x) = (1   e s x)f (1  
e (1=u)x), therefore
F (x) =
 
1 +
fX
j=1
( 1)jC(f; j)e s jx
!
(1  e (1=u)x) (A.31)
We also have that
E[Yf ] =
Z 1
x=0
(1  F (x))dx (A.32)
Then, substituting (A.31) into (A.32) yields
E[Yf ] =
u
C(f + (1=u)(s=); f)
+
s


  + 	(f + 1)

(A.33)
where   = 0:5772::: is the Euler's constant, 	(z) is the di-gamma function,
	(z) =
d
dz
ln  (z);  (z) =
Z 1
t=0
e ttz 1dt (A.34)
and C(m;n) is the generalized binomial coecient,
C(m;n) =  (m+ 1)=( (n+ 1) (m  n+ 1))
Next, our goal is to compute h(s). Let hf (s) be the Laplace transform of Yf .
Then, conditioning on the number of queued customers, h(s) is
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h(s) =
1X
f=0
h(sjL = f)P (L = f) (A.35)
=
1X
f=0
hf (s)P (L = f) (A.36)
We now turn to the computation of hf (s). Let W(i) be the i
th order statistic among
fX1; : : : ; Xf ; Zg. Consider the event
W(1)  : : :  W(i 1)  Z  W(i+1)  : : :  W(f)
We compute the Laplace transform of Yf conditioning on the value of i
,
hf (s) =
f+1X
j=1
P (i = j)hf (sji = j) (A.37)
where P (i = j) equals
1=u
(f   j + 1)(=s) + 1=u
j 1Y
i=1
(=s)(f   i+ 1)
(f   i+ 1)(=s) + 1=u
Let Ui denote an exponential random variable with rate (f   i + 1)(=s) + (1=u),
1  i  i, and Vi denote an exponential random variable with rate i(=s), 1  i 
f   i + 1. Then
hf (sji = j) = E[e smaxfW(1);:::;W(i);:::;W(f)gji = j] =
= E[e s(
Pj
i=1 Ui+
Pf j+1
i=1 Vi)] =
jY
i=1
E[e sUi ]
f j+1Y
i=1
E[e sVi ]
=
jY
i=1
(f   i+ 1)(=s) + (1=u)
(f   i+ 1)(=s) + (1=u) + s
f j+1Y
i=1
i(=s)
i(=s) + s
Substituting this last expression into (A.37) yields hf (s).
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Extensions of Lemma 2.3.1
Proof. The extension of Lemma 2.3.1 to cope with Zipan demand and to account for
the impact of the peers that wait for a publisher and immediately start to be serviced
when the publisher returns are described next.
1. Zipan demand: let k be the ratio of the mean busy period duration of the
bundled swarm over the mean busy period duration of individual swarm k.
k =
E[B(b)]
E[Bk]
; k = 1; : : : ; K
B(b) and Bk are dened similarly as in Lemma 2.3.1, except that KpK   
K^ + R. Following an argument similar to the one to prove Lemma 2.3.1, it
can be shown that k = e
(K2).
2. waiting peers: the idle periods have mean duration 1=R and the mean num-
ber of peers that arrive during each of them is upper bounded by K^. Each
peer requires mean service time upper bounded by Ks^= once the busy pe-
riod starts. The longest mean service time among the waiting peers is upper
bounded by K2s^^=(R). Therefore, to cope with the impact of peers that
wait for a publisher and immediately start to be serviced when the publisher
returns, we consider a virtual customer whose mean residence time is upper
bounded by U + K2^s^=(R). Under such conditions, Lemma 2.3.1 still holds
(note that the residence time of the rst customer is allowed to vary between
U and U +K2^s^=(R) in Lemma 2.3.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
Proof. Since all the terms in Pk, k = 1; : : : ; K, are lower bounded and upper bounded
by terms that do not depend on K, E[Bk] is bounded hence Pk = (1).
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We rewrite   logP (b) as
  logP (b) =   log 1=R
E[B(b)] + 1=R
=   log(1=R) + log(e(K2) + 1=R)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2.3.1.
We now show that   logP (b) = (K2). First, we show that   logP (b) = O(K2),
lim
K!1
  logP (b)
K2
= 1 + lim
K!1
log(e(K
2) + 1=R)
K2
<1 (A.38)
Then, we show that   logP (b) = 
(K2),
lim
K!1
K2
  logP (b) = limK!1
h
2 +
log (e(K
2) + 1=R)
K2
i 1
<1 (A.39)
from which we conclude that   logP (b) = (K2).
Derivation of equation (2.13)
Proof. The mean download time of a peer is constituted by two components: the
mean active download time and mean idle waiting. The mean active download time
is Ks= and the mean idle waiting is the probability of arriving to the system when
content is unavailable, (1=R)
.
(1=R + E[B(b)]), times the mean time for a publisher
to arrive, 1=R. According to Lemma 2.3.1, E[B(b)] = e(K
2).
Proof of remark following equation (2.13)
If K =
p
log(1=R) then E[T ]=E[T (b)] = 

R c(
p
log(1=R)) b

, b  0; c > 0.
Proof. If K =
p
log(1=R),
lim
K!1
E[T ]
E[T (b)]
=
s

+ eK
2
K s

+ eK2e (K2)
= (A.40)
= (ecK
2
=Kb) = 
 1
Rc(
p
log(1=R))b

; b  0; c > 0
where the rst equality follows from Theorem 2.3.3.
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Derivation of equation (2.14)
Proof. Consider the rst instant of time t at which there are no publishers online.
The time until the system becomes empty after t is referred to as the residual busy
period. Due to the memoryless property of the exponential random variable, the
virtual customer that starts the residual busy period is characterized by a random
variable Y = maxfX1; : : : ; Xng where X1; : : : ; Xn are exponential random variables
with mean s=. Therefore, Y is an hypoexponential distribution with parameters
(s=; s=(2); : : : ; s=(n)), which has Laplace transform
Qn
i=1(i=s)=(s + i=s) and
mean
Pn
i=1 s=(i). Equation (A.2) can be used to compute B(n; 0) for any value of
n (eq. (2.14)).
Let us denote by Ti;j the time it takes for a residual busy period which starts
with i peers to reach a population size of j < i peers, where B(i; j) = E[Ti;j].
For n > l and n > k > l, we have that Tn;l = Tn;k + Tk;l. Therefore, in general
E[Tn;l] = E[Tn;k]+E[Tk;l] and in particular, E[Tn;l] = E[Tn;0] E[Tl;0]. Equation (2.14)
and B(n; l) = B(n; 0) B(l; 0) provide a way to compute B(n; l) for arbitrary values
of n and l < n.
Equation (2.14) and congestion periods [79]
We now relate (2.14) to [79, eq. (10)]. Let  = s=. Given C > 0,
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B(C + 1; C) = B(C + 1; 0) B(C; 0) = (A.41)
=
1
(C + 1)=s
+
s

1X
i=1

s

i
i!C!i
i!i(C + 1 + i)!
=
1
(C + 1)=s
+
s

1X
i=1

s

i
C!
(C + 1 + i)!
=
1
(C + 1)=s
+
s

1X
i=C+1

s

i C
C!
(1 + i)!
=
s

1X
i=C

s

i C
C!
(1 + i)!
=
C!

1X
i=C+1
i C 1
1
i!
=
C!
C
1X
i=C+1
i
i!
(A.42)
where the last expression corresponds to (10) in [79].
Proof that B(m) = e(K
2)
B(m) =
1X
i=0
es=

s

i
i!
B(i;m) (A.43)
The corresponding quantity for the bundled swarm, B(b)(m), is obtained by replacing
in the above expression s and  by Ks and K, respectively.
First, we show that
log
 
B(b)(m)

= O(K2) (A.44)
It follows from (2.14) that
B(b)(i;m)  B(b)(i; 0) = O(Ke(s=)K2) (A.45)
The fact that B(b)(m) is a weighted sum of B(b)(i;m) (i  0), together with (A.45),
yields (A.44).
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Next, we show that
log
 
B(b)(m)

= 
(K2) (A.46)
Given the threshold coverage m, the congestion period when the system begins
with i users is given by B(i;m),
B(i;m) =
i 1X
k=m
B(k + 1; k) (A.47)
Therefore, when i > m, the congestion period B(i;m) is lower bounded by B(m +
1;m),
B(i;m)  B(m+ 1;m); i > m (A.48)
B(b)(m+ 1;m) is given by (A.42),
B(b)(m+ 1;m) =
m!
m
1X
i=m+1
i
i!
=
m!
m
 
e  
mX
i=0
i
i!
!
; (A.49)
where  = K; (A.50)
 = K2


(A.51)
Hence,
B(b)(m) 
 
1 
mX
j=0
e K
2 

(K2 

)j
j!
!
B(b)(m+ 1;m) (A.52)
=
 
1 
mX
j=0
e K
2 

(K2 

)j
j!
!
| {z }
(*)
 
m!
m
 
e  
mX
i=0
i
i!
!!
| {z }
(**)
 e
K2 

(K2 

)mK
 2(m!)
mX
j=0
(K2


)j=j! (A.53)
where (*) equals
P1
j=m+1 e
 K2 
 (K2=)j=j! and (**) is a lower bound onB(b)(i;m); i 
m+ 1; and equals B(b)(m+ 1;m).
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(A.53) yields
lim
K!1
eK
2==((K2=)m(K))
B(b)(m)
 (A.54)
 lim
K!1
eK
2==((K2=)m(K))
eK
2=
(K2=)mK
  2(m!)Prj=0(K2=)j=j! (A.55)
= lim
K!1
1
1  (K2=)mK
eK
2=
2(m!)
Pm
j=0(K
2=)j=j!
= 1
where the last equality is derived using l'Hopital rule,
lim
K!1
(K2=)m(K)
eK2=
mX
j=0
(K2=)j=j! = lim
K!1
1
2eK
2=
= 0
where 1 and 2 are constants functionally independent of K.
Therefore, if follows from (A.55) and (A.56) that
B(b)(m) = 
(eK
2==((K)(K2=)m))
which implies that
log
 
B(b)(m)

= 


log

eK
2==((K)(K2=)r)

= 
(K2)
Derivation of equation (2.16)
Proof. The probability that a request leaves without being served, P , is
P =
1=r
E[B] + 1=r
(A.56)
We now compute E[B], the expected length of the busy period of a system which
cycles between three phases: (1) one or more publishers are available; (2) no publisher
is available but content is still available; (3) the content is not available.
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Consider an instant of time t at which the system transitions to Phase 2. The
time until the number of peers reaches the value m > 0 is referred to as the residual
busy period. We denote by B(m) the expected length of a residual busy period.
Assuming peers reached steady state before the number of publishers went to zero,
B(m) =
1X
i=0
e 
s
 (s

)
i
i!
B(i;m) (A.57)
The system starts in (1). It cycles between (1), (2), (1), (2) and so on up to
reaching phase (3). Let us denote the number of times that it goes through (1) and
(2), before reaching (1) for the last time and nally (2) and (3), by a geometrically
distributed random variable C. C has support f0, 1, : : : g and success probability p,
p = PfX > B(m)g = e rB(m) (A.58)
where X is an exponentially distributed random variable with rate r. Therefore,
E[C] =
1  p
p
=
1  e rB(m)
e rB(m)
(A.59)
Phase (1) takes on average e
ru 1
r
, the busy period of a population formed only by
publishers. Phases (1) and (2) together, when not followed by (3), take on average
eru   1
r
+ E[XjX < B(m)] (A.60)
where
E[XjX < B(m)] =
1
r
 

1
r
+B(m)

e rB(m)
1  e rB(m) (A.61)
The expected active period is
E[B] = E[C]
eru   1
r
+ E[XjX < B(m)]

+
eru   1
r
+B(m) (A.62)
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Substituting (A.57), (A.59) and (A.61) into (A.62) yields
E[B] =
er(B(m)+u)   1
r
(A.63)
Replacing (A.63) into (A.56) leads to the desired result.
Derivation of equation (2.18)
Proof. The derivation is similar to the one of (2.16). Let
B(b)(m) =
1X
i=0
e 
K2s
 (K
2s

)
i
i!
B(b)(i;m) (A.64)
Let X be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate R. Then, with a
slight abuse of notation, the expected active period is, similarly to (A.62),
E[B(b)] = E[C]

U + E[XjX < B(b)(m)]

+ U +B(b)(m) (A.65)
where
E[XjX < B(b)(m)] =
1
R
 

1
R
+B(b)(m)

e RB
(b)(m)
1  e RB(b)(m) (A.66)
Substituting (A.66) and (A.59) into (A.65) yields
E[B(b)] =
eRB
(b)(m)(UR + 1)  1
R
(A.67)
and (2.18) follows from (2.3) and (A.67).
Altruistic lingering (see x 2.3.3.4)
The availability and download time theorems hold in the scenario with altruistic
lingering since adding a constant to the residence time of each peer does not change
the asymptotics of the system when K !1.
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To model altruistic lingering we use equation (A.1). Let S be an exponentially
distributed random variable with mean u, representing the residence time of publish-
ers. Let L be the sum of two exponentially distributed random variables with means
1 = s= and 2 = 1= representing the residence time of peers after starting the
download. The distribution of L is
P (L  x) = L(x) = (A.68)
=
(1=1)(e
  1
1
x   1)  (1=2)(e 
1
2
x   1)
(1=2)  (1=1)
if 1 6= 2 and Erlang(2, 1) otherwise. A customer arriving in an active period draws
its residence time X as follows,
X =
8>><>>:
L; with probability q01
S; with probability 1  q01
(A.69)
where q01 = =( + r). Therefore, we parameterize (A.1) setting  =  + r, H(x) =
S(x) = 1  e ux,  = u, G(x) = (1  q01)S(x) + q01L(x).
For the bundled swarm,  =  + R, H(x) = S(x) = 1   e Ux,  = U , q01 =
=( +R), 1 = S= and 2 = 1=.
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A.3 Trace driven arrivals
In this section we report results obtained using peer arrival patterns observed in
real swarms. We selected two les from the 2008 Olympic game opening ceremony
(which we refer to as les A and B). We scaled the arrival rates so that the swarms in
isolation were not popular but as a bundle were popular enough to be self-sustaining.
In this Planetlab experiment, we set publisher up and down times, U and D, to
be exponentially distributed with mean of 500s and 1500s, respectively. Both les
have size S=10 MB and we set the capacity of peers and publishers as 50KBps and
100KBps, respectively.
For each of the three scenarios that we considered [(1) bundle, (2) le A isolated
and (3) le B isolated] we ran a Planetlab experiment for 12 hours. The download
distributions for the three considered scenarios are shown in Figure A.4. The dots
mark the mean and the box plots show the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartiles and, the 5 and
95 percentiles. Note that the mean and variance in the bundled case are signicantly
smaller than the ones for the two individual les, with an improvement in download
time of 39% and 41%, respectively.
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Figure A.4. Experiment using trace-driven arrivals (Mean, quartiles, 5th and 95th
percentiles)
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The impact of the threshold coverage
In this section we further study the impact of the threshold coverage on our
estimates of the mean download time. Tables A.1 and A.2 show the mean number of
peers necessary to attain a self-sustainability level of 0.9 and 0.999, respectively, as
shown in Figure 3.5.
Although the assumptions in Chapter 3 are slightly dierent from the ones consid-
ered in Chapter 2 (in particular, in Chapter 3 it is assumed that there is a publisher
that is always online), the download times predicted by our model using the threshold
coverage suggested in Chapter 3 are in accordance to the ones observed in our exper-
iments (see Figure 2.6(a)). In part, this is because our model is not very sensitive
to slight variations in the threshold coverage, as illustrated in Figure A.5, obtained
using the same parameters as Figure 2.6(a), and varying the threshold coverage m
between 8 and 24.
le size suggested
(number of blocks) threshold coverage
12-18 10
20-32 11
34-58 12
60-102 13
104-172 14
174-288 15
290-482 16
484-800 17
802-1000 18
Table A.1. Suggested threshold coverage for dierent le sizes (target self-
sustainability of 0.9)
158
le size suggested
(number of blocks) threshold coverage
12-22 20
24-46 21
48-86 22
88-150 23
152-254 24
256-428 25
430-714 26
716-1000 27
Table A.2. Suggested threshold coverage for dierent le sizes (target self-
sustainability of 0.999)
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Figure A.5. The impact of the threshold coverage
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APPENDIX B
SELF-SUSTAINABILITY
B.1 An Expression of P (V = BjN = n)
We now show how to obtain P (V = BjN = n) from (3.2). Recall that, given an
upper layer state n, 
n is the lower layer sample space. Denote by S the random
variable that represents the lower layer state, and by s its realization. Then
P (V = BjN = n) =
X
s:V=B;s2
n
P (S = sjN = n) (3.2)=
X
s:V=B;s2
n
1=j
nj (B.1)
Therefore, the problem of computing P (V = BjN = n) is reduced to that of counting
the states in which all blocks are available among the peers. Using the inclusion/exclu-
sion principle, P (V = BjN = n) = j
nj 1
PB 1
i=0 ( 1)i
 
B
i
QB 1
j=1
 
B i
j
nj
: In general,
P (V = vjN = n) is also obtained using the inclusion/exclusion principle [98, Section
4.2].
B.2 Recursion to Compute  h(k; v)
Consider the scenario where k blocks are available among the peers and an addi-
tional user contributes h blocks.  h(k; v) is the probability that v blocks are available
among the peers after accounting for the blocks contributed by the additional user.
 h(k; v) can be recursively computed,
 h(k; v) =  h 1(k; v 1)B v h
B h+1+ h 1(k; v)
v
B h+1 ; 0  k; v  B; 0 < h  B
(B.2)
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The base cases are  0(k; v) = 0 if v 6= k and  0(k; v) = 1 if v = k. Note that the above
recursion is convenient to avoid numerical problems since it only involves additions
and multiplications of probabilities.
For presentation convenience, we consider an arbitrary ordering of the h blocks
contributed by the additional user. After contributing the rst h   1 blocks, there
are two cases to consider, (i) v blocks are available among the peers [and the hth
block overlaps with a previously available block, an event which happens with prob-
ability v=(B h+1)] or (ii) v   1 blocks are available [and the hth block does not
overlap with previously available blocks, an event which happens with probability
(B v h)=(B h+1)]. Cases (i) and (ii) correspond to the rst and second terms
in (B.2), respectively.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3.1
We now show that (3.12) and (3.10) are equivalent. To this purpose, we consider
an extended representation of the upper layer states. In such representation, the
upper layer state, n0, is dened as follows.
Consider the users in the system ordered uniformly at random. The number of
blocks owned by the ith user is denoted by n0i. The upper layer state is represented
by vector n0. The dimension of n0 is 1  n, where n is the number of users in the
system.
Note that n is inferred from n0. Let nl(n0) be the number of users that have l
blocks when the state is n0. Since any permutation of the users in the system is
equally likely, the steady state probability of state n0 is (n0),
(n0) =
B 1Y
l=0

nl(n
0)
nl(n0)!
e 

1
n!
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The steady state probability of state n0, conditioned on the event that there are n
users in the system, is
(n0)P
8n0:jn0j=n (n
0)
=
(n0)
e B(B)n=n!
=
1
Bn
QB 1
l=0 nl(n
0)!
(B.3)
The rst equality follows from the fact that a superposition of B Poisson processes
with rate  is a Poisson process with rate B.
The key idea of the proof consists of partitioning the state space into sets Gh(n),
0  h  B   1, 0  n. Set Gh(n) contains states in which there are n users in
the system and n0n = h. Gh(n) is dened as Gh(n) = fn0 : n0n = h and 0  n0j 
B   1; 1  j < ng. The set containing all states in which there are n users in the
system, G(n), is
G(n) = [B 1h=0Gh(n) = fn0 : 0  n0j  B   1; 1  j  ng (B.4)
Note that Gh(n) is obtained from G(n  1) by adding to each element of G(n  1)
a user that owns h blocks,
Gh(n) = f(n0; 0) + h1n : n0 2 G(n  1)g (B.5)
1n denotes a 1  n vector in which all elements equal zero, except element n, which
equals one. Let p(vjn0) be the probability of v blocks being available among the peers
when the upper layer state is n0. If n0 2 Gh(n) (n > 0),
p(vjn0) =
BX
k=0
p(kjn0   h1n) h(k; v); n0 2 Gh(n) (B.6)
According to denition (3.10),
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pn(v)=
24 X
n02G(n)
p(vjn0)(n0)
35.24 X
n02G(n)
(n0)
35 = X
n02G(n)
p(vjn0) 1
Bn
QB 1
l=0 nl(n
0)!
(B.7)
where the rst and second equalities follow from (B.4) and (B.3), respectively. Hence,
pn(v) =
B 1X
h=0
X
n02Gh(n)
p(vjn0) 1
Bn
QB 1
l=0 nl(n
0)!
(B.8)
=
B 1X
h=0
X
n02Gh(n)
BX
k=0
p(kjn0   h1n) h(k; v) 1
Bn
QB 1
l=0 nl(n
0)!
(B.9)
=
B 1X
h=0
BX
k=0
X
m02G(n 1)
p(kjm0) 1
Bn 1
QB
l=0 n
0
l!| {z }
pn 1(k)
 h(k; v)
1
B
(B.10)
=
B 1X
h=0
BX
k=0
pn 1(k) h(k; v)
1
B
(B.11)
where the rst, second and third equalities follow from (B.4), (B.6) and (B.5), respec-
tively. Note that the summands in (B.10) for which h > v or k 2 [0; v h 1][[v+1; B]
are equal to zero, since in these cases  h(k; v) = 0. Therefore, (B.10) yields (3.12).
B.4 Probabilistic Derivation of (3.14)
Next, we provide a probabilistic derivation of (3.14). An algebraic proof can be
obtained using the Sigma package [81], applying a paradigm called creative telescop-
ing [105].
Henceforth, we consider the case v < B (the case v = B follows similarly). The
probabilistic interpretation for (3.14) follows from the connection between  h(k; v)
and the hypergeometric distribution. Suppose we have an urn containing B balls,
B   k of which are white (unavailable blocks) and k are black (available blocks).
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 h(k; v) is the probability of selecting without replacement h balls, of which v k  h
are white.
Consider now another experiment, namely selecting without replacement all balls
from the urn. Let Jw be the round in which the w
th white ball is selected, 0 < J1 <
J2 < : : : < JB k < B + 1. Let Wb be the number of black balls selected between the
bth and b + 1th white, plus one. Equivalently, Wb is the number of elements in the
set S = fn 2 f0; : : : ; Bg : exactly b white balls are selected before ball ng. Then
W0 = J1, W1 = J2   J1, : : :, Wk 1 = Jk   Jk 1, and WB k = B + 1   Ji. Clearly,PB k
b=0 Wb = B + 1. By symmetry, E[Wb] = (B + 1)=(B   k + 1) (0  b  B   k).
Now let v   k be given, v   k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; vg. Let 1h be the indicator equal
to 1 if exactly v   k white balls are selected among the rst h balls. Note that
E[1h] =  h(k; v). Also, from the denition of Wv k, we have Wv k =
PB
h=0 1h.
Therefore, E[Wv k] =
PB
h=0E[1h] =
PB
h=0  h(k; v) = (B + 1)=(B   k + 1).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Replacing (3.14) into (3.13) yields,
pn(v)=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1=Bn; n  1; v = 0 (i)Pv
k=0 pn 1(k)(B + 1)=(B(B   k + 1)); n  1; 0 < v < B (ii)
1 PB 1l=0 pn(l); n  1; v = B (iii)
1; n = 0; v = 0 (iv)
0; n = 0; v 6= 0 (v)
(B.12)
In case (ii), pn(v) = pn 1(v)(B + 1)=(B(B   v + 1)) +
Pv 1
k=0 pn 1(k)(B + 1)=(B(B  
k + 1)) = pn 1(v)(B + 1)=(B(B   v + 1)) + pn(v   1) which yields (3.16).
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B.6 Expression of pn(v) When  =1
If  =1, the closed-form expression for pn(v) is pn(v)=
 
B
v
  
1+B
B
nPv
l=0
 
v
l

( 1)l(B 
v + l + 1) n, n  1; B > v  0, and pn(B) = 1 
PB 1
v=0 pn(v).
B.7 Self-Sustainability with Heterogeneous Download Times
We now present an ecient algorithm to compute swarm self-sustainability if the
block download times, h, are not necessarily equal for all h, 1  h  B.
Denote by ah;r(v) the probability that v blocks are available among the peers
conditioned on the presence of r users in layer h and all users being in layers h up to
B,
ah;r(v) = P (V = v
nh = r;ni = 0; i < h); 0  h  B; 0  r M (B.13)
M is the maximum number of users per layer. The following recursion correctly
computes ah;r, 0  h  B, 0  r M ,
ah;r(v)=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
vX
i=0
ah;r 1(i) h(i; v); r  1; h 6= B (i)P1
r=0 ah+1;r(v)h+1(r); r = 0; h 6= B (ii)
1; r = 0; h = B; v = 0 (iii)
0; r = 0; h = B; v 6= 0 (iv)
(B.14)
We approximate A by its truncated version, A
(M)
, considering only states in which
there are up to M users in each layer of the system. Recall that N is the maximum
number of users in the system, N = O(BM). A naive use of (B.14) yields an algorithm
to compute A
(M)
in time O(B3M) = O(B2N).
165
In what follows, we show how to compute A
(M)
in O(NB logB). For this pur-
pose, we re-write the sum in (B.14)(i) as a convolution, which is computed in time
O(B logB). Let
bah;r 1(k) = ah;r 1(k)k!(B k)!; 0  k  B (B.15)b h(v   k) = 1=((v k)!(h (v k))!); 0  k  v (B.16)
Then, the following convolution correctly computes (B.14)(i), bah;r = bah;r 1 
 b h.
ah;r is obtained from bah;r as
ah;r(v) =
8><>: (bah;r(v))=
 
(v   h)!(B v)! B
h

; 0  v  B   1
1 PB 1i=0 ah;r(i); v = B (B.17)
B.8 Derivation of (3.19)
We now show that (3.19) follows from (3.18). The case v = B follows trivially.
For v < B, we show that (3.19) satises (3.18), i.e., pn(v)  pn 1(v)(1=(B  v+1)) =
pn(v   1),
pn(v)  pn 1(v)(1=(B   v + 1)) =
=

B
v
 vX
l=0

v
l

( 1)l(B   v + l + 1) n  
 
B
v
Pv
l=0
 
v
l

( 1)l(B   v + l + 1) n+1
B   v + 1
=

B
v
 vX
l=0

v
l

( 1)l+1(B   v + l + 1) n l
B   v + 1 (B.18)
=

B
v   1
 v 1X
l=0

v   1
l

( 1)l(B   v + l + 2) n = pn(v   1) (B.19)
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B.9 Derivation of (3.20)
We now derive (3.20) from pn(B) =
PB
l=0
 
B
l

( 1)l(l + 1) n.
p(B) =
1X
n=0
BX
l=0
pn(B)e
 (B+1)((B + 1))n=n! = (B.20)
=
BX
l=0

B
l

( 1)le Be(B+1)=(l+1)
1X
n=0
e (B+1)=(l+1)((B + 1)=(l + 1))n=n!| {z }
=1
B.10 Probability that l tagged blocks are unavailable
The probability that l tagged blocks are unavailable, when  = , is exp

 

l(B+1)
l+1

.
Let h;r be the probability that there are l tagged unavailable blocks, conditioned
on all users being in stages h; h + 1; : : : ; B   1; B, stage h having r users (similar
in spirit to recursion presented in Appendix B.7). h is the corresponding metric,
but with no conditioning on the number of users in layer h. Given l, the following
recursion yields h;r.
h;r=
8>>>><>>>>:
(i) 1 h=B; r=0
(ii) h;r 1
Qh 1
i=0
B l i
B i h  B; r  1
(iii)
P1
m=0 h+1;mh+1(m) h  B; r = 0
(B.21)
Our goal is to nd the expression of h;0,
h;0 =
1X
m=0
h+1;mh+1(m) (B.22)
From (B.21)(ii),
h+1;m = h+1;m 1
hY
i=0
B   l   i
B   i ) h+1;m = h+1;0
 hY
i=0
B   l   i
B   i
m
(B.23)
167
Hence, replacing (B.23) into (B.22),
h;0 =
1X
m=0
h+1;0
 hY
i=0
B   l   i
B   i
m e m
m!
= h+1;0
1X
m=0
h hY
i=0
B   l   i
B   i| {z }
h+1
im e m
m!
(B.24)
Let
h =
h 1Y
i=0
B   l   i
B   i =
 
B h
l
 
B
l
 (B.25)
Therefore,
h;0 = h+1;0
1X
m=0
(h+1)
m e
 
m!
= h+1;0e
 x
1X
m=0
(h+1)
m e
 +x
m!
= h+1;0e
 x (B.26)
where  + x =  h+1,
x =   h+1 = (1  h+1) (B.27)
So,
h;0 = h+1;0 exp( (1  h+1)) = h+1;0 exp( (1 
 
B h 1
l
 
B
l
 )) (B.28)
The solution of recursion (B.28) is
h;0=
8><>:
(i) 1; h=B
(ii)
QB 1
a=h exp( (1  (
B a 1
l )
(Bl )
)); 0  h < B
(B.29)
If h = 0,
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0;0 =
B 1Y
a=0
exp( (1 
 
B a 1
l
 
B
l
 )) = exp( ( B 1X
a=0
1
!
 
 
B 1X
a=0
 
B a 1
l
 
B
l
 !)) (B.30)
The hockey stick pattern of the Pascal triangle,
PB 1
a=0
 
B a 1
l

=
 
B
l+1

, together
with (B.30), yields
0;0 = exp
 
 
 
B  
 
B
l+1
 
B
l
 !! = exp  l(B + 1)
l + 1

(B.31)
B.11 Integrating the User Dynamics into the Lower Layer
Next, we provide an alternative description of our model which explicitly charac-
terizes the evolution of the signature of each user in time.
Assume that each user selects uniformly at random one of the blocks among those
that he does not have. Each user then contacts other users uniformly at random for
opportunities to download the selected block. The time between contacts initiated
by a specic (tagged) user is characterized by a Poisson process of rate . If the
contacted user has the requested block, it is transfered immediately. Otherwise, the
tagged user is instantaneously re-directed to the publisher, who then transfers the
block. All transfers are assumed to be instantaneous.
The system described above can be fully characterized using the signatures intro-
duced in our lower layer model. Let S be the lower layer state, i.e., S is a f0; 1gBn
bit vector in case there are n users in the system, (see x3.2.2). ni(S) is the number of
users in stage i when the system state is S. Let h(S; u) be the stage of user u when
the system state is S.
Let 
n be the union of the state spaces of the lower layer model corresponding to
an the upper layer in which there are n users in the system, 
n =
S
n:jnj=n
jnj. Let

0 be the union of all possible state spaces of the lower layer model, 
0 =
S1
i=0
i.
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Starting from state S, let T0 be the state resulting from an arrival and Tu;b be the
state resulting from user u concluding the download of block b.
Let 0 denote a vector of lenght B with all elements equal to zero; ei denotes a
vector with its ith element equal to 1 and all other elements equal to zero; S n u
denotes the bit vector S after the removal of the bits corresponding to user i (bits
(u 1)B+1 up to uB). We assume that after a user leaves the system, the remaining
users are re-indexed accordingly.
T0 : 
n ! 
n+1
S ! S:0 (B.32)
(B.33)
If h(S; u) < B   1
Tu;b : 
n ! 
n
S ! S + eB(u 1)+b (B.34)
If h(S; u) = B   1
Tu;b : 
n ! 
n 1
S ! S n u (B.35)
Note that transformation Tu;b explicitly characterizes the evolution of the signature
of each user in time. (B.34) corresponds to the download of a block and a signature
update whereas (B.35) corresponds to a download completion.
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The entries of the generator matrix Q = (q(S; S 0) : S; S 0 2 
0) are
q(S; T0(S)) =  (B.36)
q(S; Tu;b(S)) = =(B   h(S; u)) (B.37)
Equations (B.36)-(B.37) provide an integrated description of the upper and lower
layer models. This model description is similar in spirit to [40]. While Hajek and
Zhu [40] are interested in studying the stability of a system that resembles the one
described above, the system considered here is always stable, and we are interested
in its self-sustainability.
B.12 Heterogeneous Capacities
Figure B.1 shows the simulation results considering heterogeneous peer upload
capacities, for B = 16. The upload rate distribution was taken from the measured
data used to generate Figure 1 in the BitTyrant study [70]. The mean capacity of the
peers was adjusted to 39KBps. After the normalization, peers with capacity larger
than 110KBps were excluded.
Figure B.1 was generated from eight simulations that lasted 100,000s each. That
is why the condence interval in Figure B.1 is smaller than the one in Figure 3.4
(generated from twenty independent simulations that lasted 10,000s each). Figure B.1
shows that our results did not qualitatively change for peers with heterogeneous
capacities.
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Figure B.1. Heterogeneous peer capacities
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APPENDIX C
RECIPROCITY
C.1 Tightness of the Bound
In this section we prove that our bound of two on the loss of eciency is tight. For
this purpose, we work with a cycle of n nodes in which node v requests content cv 1
and owns content cv, subtraction done modulo jV j = n. In particular, we show that
it is not possible to satisfy all demands with less than Tn = 2(n  1) transmissions.
In an indirect reciprocity schedule all nodes in the cycle can have their demands
satised with one transmission. In the direct reciprocity schedule, as n ! 1, if
Tn = 2(n   1) then Tnn ! 2, i.e., at least one node transmits two contents. The loss
of eciency is two. In what follows, we show that Tn  2(n  1).
In any valid direct reciprocity schedule, let the fraction of content ck sent from
node i to j be denoted by i;j;k. We denote by d(k) the demand of node i,
d(i) = i  1 (mod n) =
8>><>>:
i  1; 1  i  n  1;
n  1; i = 0
(C.1)
In general, we denote by r = x (mod n) the integer r such that (a) 0  r  n   1
and (b) qn+ r = x where x; q 2 Z and r; n 2 N.
Note that even though each node may send redundant content across multiple
links, at least one set of edge disjoint paths must exist from every source to every
destination. Henceforth, we refer to the edge from node i to node j in which content
ck is transmitted as i;j;k, when considering only the paths in which non redundant
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content is transfered, and ei;j;k when referring to the amount of additional content ck
transmitted through edge (i; j). The total amount of content ck sent from i to j is
i;j;k = i;j;k + 
e
i;j;k (C.2)
Let D denote the domain of i;j;k and ei;j;k,
D = f(i; j; k) 2 V  V  V : i 6= j; j 6= kg (C.3)
Any valid optimal direct reciprocity schedule satises the following properties:
1. the total amount of content transfered,
P
(i;j;k)2D i;j;k +
P
(i;j;k)2D 
e
i;j;k, is min-
imized;
2. the amount of content sent from node i to node j equals the amount sent from
j to i;
3. if node i is neither a source nor a sink for content ck, i.e., if i 6= k and d(i) 6= k,
the amount of (essential) content owing towards i is equal to the amount sent
by node i;
4. if node i is a source for content ck, the amount of (essential) content ck owing
from i is 1;
5. if node j is a destination for content ck, the amount of content ck owing towards
j is 1.
Equations (C.4)-(C.8) in the linear program below reect properties 1-5, respec-
tively.
174
min
X
(i;j;k)2D
i;j;k +
X
(i;j;k)2D
ei;j;k (C.4)
n 1X
k=0;k 6=j
i;j;k + 
e
i;j;k =
n 1X
k=0;k 6=i
j;i;k + 
e
j;i;k (i; j) 2 V  V; i 6= j (C.5)
n 1X
j=0;k 6=j;i6=j
i;j;k =
n 1X
j=0;i6=j;d(j)6=k
j;i;k (i; k) 2 V  V;
k 6= i; k 6= d(i) (C.6)
n 1X
j=0;j 6=i
i;j;i = 1 i 2 V (C.7)
n 1X
i=0;j 6=i
i;j;d(j) = 1 j 2 V (C.8)
i;j;k  0 (i; j; k) 2 D (C.9)
ei;j;k  0 (i; j; k) 2 D (C.10)
We now seek the dual of the above linear program. Letting  denote the vector of
Lagrange multipliers,
 = (w x y z) (C.11)
there are
1. n(n  1) constraints of type (C.5), each one associated to a variable wi;j;
2. n(n  2) constraints of type (C.6), each one associated to a variable xi;k;
3. n constraints of type (C.7), each one associated to a variable yi;
4. n constraints of type (C.8), each one associated to a variable zi.
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The Lagrangian is given by L(; ) =
=
X
(i;j;k)2D
i;j;k +
X
(i;j;k)2D
ei;j;k (C.12)
+
nX
i;j2VV;
i6=j
wi;j
 n 1X
k=0;k 6=j
i;j;k + 
e
i;j;k  
n 1X
k=0;k 6=i
j;i;k + 
e
j;i;k

(C.13)
+
X
i;k2VV;
i6=k;k 6=d(i)
xi;k
 n 1X
j=0;k 6=j;i6=j
i;j;k 
n 1X
j=0;i 6=j;d(j) 6=k
j;i;k

(C.14)
+
X
i2V
yi
 n 1X
j=0;j 6=i
i;j;i   1

(C.15)
+
X
j2V
zj
 n 1X
i=0;j 6=i
i;j;d(j)   1

(C.16)
Deriving the Lagrangian with respect to i;j;k and setting the resulting expression to
be smaller than or equal to zero we obtain
wi;j1k 6=j   wj;i1k 6=j + xi;k1 k 6=j
i6=k;k 6=d(i)
  xj;k1 k 6=d(j)
j 6=k;k 6=d(i)
+
+yi1k=i + zj1k=d(j)  1; (i; j; k) 2 V  V  V; i 6= j
Similarly, considering the derivative with respect to ei;j;k,
wi;j1k 6=j   wj;i1k 6=j  1; (i; j; k) 2 V  V  V; i 6= j
Therefore, the dual of the linear program shown in the beginning of this section is
max
n 1X
i=0
yi + zi = min 
n 1X
i=0
yi + zi (C.17)
  wi;j1k 6=j + wj;i1k 6=j   xi;k1 k 6=j
i6=k;k 6=d(i)
+ xj;k1 k 6=d(j)
i 6=k;k 6=d(i)
 
  yi1k=i   zj1k=d(j)   1; (i; j; k) 2 D (C.18)
  wi;j1k 6=j + wj;i1k 6=j   1; (i; j) 2 V  V; i 6= j (C.19)
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Denoting by p? the optimal solution of the primal and given a feasible solution  for
the dual, [14, Section 5.1.3] yields
p? 
h
0n(2n 3)   12n
i
 =  
n 1X
i=0
yi + zi (C.20)
where 0n(2n 3) denotes a vector of n(2n 3) zeros and 12n denotes a vector of 2n ones.
Henceforth, to simplify the notation, we work solely with odd cycles (n is assumed
to be odd). Note that working only with odd cycles suces for our purposes.
We show that the following constitutes a feasible solution for the dual,
1. yi = zi =  n 1n
2. wi;j =  wj;i = n 2[(j i)(mod n)]2n
3. xi;k =
2[(k i) (mod n)  (n 1)=2]
n
which together with (C.20) yields
p? 
n 1X
i=0
2
n  1
n
= 2(n  1) (C.21)
To show that 1-3 above lead to a feasible solution for the dual, we have to de-
termine that constraints (C.18){(C.19) are satised. It is easy to check that (C.19)
is always satised. To show that (C.18) is also, we work case by case with the valid
tuples (i; j; k) 2 V  V  V .
 if k = i and i = d(j),
then wi;j =
n 2
2n
=  wj;i, xi;j = xj;k = 0, and yi = zi =  n 1n . Constraint
(C.18) reduces to
 n  2
n
+
2(n  1)
n
= 1   1 (C.22)
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 if k = i and i 6= d(j),
constraint (C.18) reduces to
 wi;j+wj;i   yi   1 (C.23)
But yi =  (n  1)=n and wi;j = n 2(j i)(mod n)2n therefore  wi;j+wj;i   yi equals
(j   i)(mod n)
n
  (i  j)(mod n)
n
+
n  1
n
(C.24)
If j > i,
 wi;j+wj;i   yi = n  1 + j   i  (n+ i  j)
n
=
=
2j   2i  1
n
  1 (C.25)
If j < i,
 wi;j+wj;i   yi=2n  1 + 2j   2i
n
  1 (C.26)
 if k 6= i and k 6= d(j),
constraint (C.18) reduces to
 wi;j+wj;i xi;k1k 6=d(i)+xj;k1k 6=d(i)  1;
(i; j; k) 2 V  V  V; i 6= j; k 6= j (C.27)
There are two subcases of interest,
178
1. k 6= j, k 6= d(i), equation (C.27) reduces to
 wi;j + wj;i   xi;k + xj;k   1;
If j > i, the expression above equals
2j   2i  n 2
h
(k   i)(mod n) (k   j)(mod n)
i
  n (C.28)
and if j < i,
2j   2i+ n  2
h
(k   i)(mod n)  (k   j)(mod n)
i
  n (C.29)
We start analyzing the case j > i and the three possible subcases, (a)
k > j > i, in which case (C.28) reduces to  n   n, (b) j > k > i, when
(C.28) reduces to
2j   2i  n  2
h
k   i  (n+ k   j)
i
= n   n (C.30)
and (c) j > i > k, when (C.28) reduces to
2j   2i  n  2
h
(n+ k   i)  (n+ k   j)
i
=  n  n (C.31)
The case j < i follows similarly.
2. k 6= j, k = d(i), equation (C.27) reduces to
 wi;j + wj;i   1 (C.32)
It can be veried using an argument similar to the one above that this
inequality always holds.
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 if k 6= i and k = d(j),
constraint (C.18) reduces to
 wi;j + wj;i   xi;k   zj   1;
(i; j; k) 2 V  V  V; i 6= j (C.33)
If j > i,
2(j   i)  n  2[(k   i) (mod n) ] + 2(n  1)   n
or
(j   i)  [(j   1  i) (mod n) ] + 2(n  1)  0
If j   1   i  0 then 2n   1  0 and if j   1   i < 0 the left hand side of the
above expression equals n  1  0. If j < i,
2(j   i) + n  2[(k   i) (mod n) ] + 2(n  1)   n
or
(j   i)  [(j   1  i) (mod n) ] + n  0
If j   1   i  0 then n + 1  0 and if j   1   i < 0 the left hand side of the
above expression equals  n+ 1 + n = 1  0.
Since all valid (i; j; k) 2 V V V tuples lead to feasible solutions for the dual, we
conclude that the optimal value of the primal, p?, is p?  2(n  1), which concludes
the proof.
C.2 Splittable and unsplittable contents
Our main result assumes a uid trac model. Fractional allocations are realizable
if the time frame over which nodes interact is longer than the one over which they
180
switch schedules. In those cases, nodes can split their uplink capacities across multiple
paths.
A
C
(a) (b)
demands red
demands black
demands blue
owns red
owns black
owns blue
each arrow represents
the transmission of half
of the content
D
B
A
D
B C
Figure C.1. Converting from (a) indirect reciprocity to (b) direct reciprocity.
Nevertheless, if nodes interact for very short intervals, with duration close to the
one to transmit a block (assumed to be the minimum unit of exchange), there are
workloads for which the loss of eciency may be greater than two. Figure C.1(a)
illustrates a network satisfying indirect reciprocity which can only be converted into
a network satisfying direct reciprocity if nodes are allowed to allocate fractions of
their outgoing ows to dierent paths (Figure C.1(b)).
C.3 Main Result
We now prove the lemmas used in our main result.
Lemma C.3.1. Given an indirect reciprocity dissemination network N
1. N can be partitioned into a set of cycles
2. N is a dissemination network if and only if no cycle partition of N contains a
cycle consisting solely of edge ows carrying the same content.
Proof. 1) is is a consequence of the fact that the ow rate into each node equals the
ow rate out. 2) follows from the denition of a dissemination network.
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AC
B A
C
B
dotted lines
transmit 1/2
of content
Figure C.2. Simple cycle converted from indirect to direct reciprocity.
Hall's theorem provides sucient conditions for the existence of a perfect matching
in a bipartite graph B, [13, Theorem III.7].
Theorem C.3.1 (Hall's theorem). A bipartite graph B with vertex sets V1 and V2
contains a perfect matching from V1 to V2 i
jsB(S)j  jSj 8S  V1:
Using Hall's theorem, we derive the following lemma,
Lemma C.3.2. There exist at least two perfect matchingsM1;M2 such thatM1 6=M2
whenever n  3.
Proof. First note that one matching is M1 = f(vi; ui) : i = 1; : : : ; ng. We prove the
existence of the second perfect matching by induction.
Basis step. Consider the case where n = 3. It is easily veried that E = M1 [
f(v1; u2); (v2; u3); (v3; u1)g and that M2 = f(v1; u2); (v2; u3); (v3; u1)g.
Induction step. Suppose that the lemma holds for all values of n  k. We establish
it for n = k + 1. There are two cases.
Case i) There exists at least one v 2 V such that jsB(v)j = 1. Wlog assume that
this is vn. Construct the bipartite graph B
0 = (V n fvng; U n fung; E n E(V; fung)).
It is easy to verify that the conditions needed for the inductive hypothesis to hold
are satised and that there are two perfect matchings. Take the matching M 0 which
includes at least one edge not of the form (vi; ui). The second perfect matching for
B is M2 =M
0
2 [ f(vn; un)g.
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Case ii) jsB(v)j  2 for all v 2 V , i.e., every node can serve content to at least
two other nodes. We focus on the bipartite graph B0 obtained by removing the edge
(vn; un) from E, i.e., B
0 = (V; U;E 0 = E n f(vn; un)g). If B0 satises the conditions
needed to apply Hall's Theorem, we are done as this ensures a perfect matching
that does not include the edge (vn; un). This matching, M2, must also be a perfect
matching for B. Suppose that the conditions are not satised and that there exists
a set S  V such that jsB0(S)j < jSj. As a consequence of the construction of B0, S
takes the form S = f(vi1 ; : : : ; vi2 ; vng and  B0(S) = fui1 ; : : : ; ui2g for some 1  i1 <
i2 < n. Note that if we dene V
00 = f(vi1 ; : : : ; vi2g and U 00 = fui1 ; : : : ; ui2g, then
sB0(V
00) = U 00 and we can dene yet another bipartite graph B00 = (V 00; U 00; fe 2 E 0 :
t(e) 2 V 00; h(e) 2 U 00g). Furthermore, it is easy to show that the assumptions needed
to apply the inductive step holds and that B00 contains two perfect matchings, one
of which, M 00, which does not include all edges of the form (vi; ui). Thus the perfect
matching forB0, which is also a perfect matching forB isM 00[f(vi; ui) : i < i1; i2 < ig.
Note that it diers from M1, because of how M
00 was constructed. This concludes
the proof.
C.4 Issues When Coping With Relays
We conjecture that the bound of two on the loss of eciency due to direct reci-
procity extends from realyless networks to a more general class of networks. Next,
we illustrate some of the issues that arise when coping with relays. The presentation
is not very rigorous in nature, its main goal being to point out a battery of networks
that must be handled by any proof of the conjecture.
C.4.1 Backtracking
Figure C.3(a) shows an indirect reciprocity schedule of exchanges involving two
cycles, one cycle of size two between nodes v1 and v2, and one cycle of size three
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between nodes v1, v2 and v3. There are three contents in the network, r, g, and b.
Node v1 requests contents r and g, node v2 requests b and g, and node v3 requests
b. Under an indirect reciprocity schedule, node v3 transmits one content, and nodes
v1 and v2 transmit two contents each. Beginning with this set of exchanges, we seek
to transform this schedule into a direct reciprocity schedule. One such schedule is
shown in Figure C.3(b). Note that the number of transmissions in both schedules is
ve, so there is no loss of eciency in this example.
In the transformation shown from Figure C.3(a) to Figure C.3(b), the rst cycle
removed is v2
r! v1 b! v2, which is already a direct reciprocity cycle. The second
cycle removed is v1
g! v2 b! v3 g! v1. This cycle is transformed into direct reciprocity
using swarming, resulting in the schedule shown in Figure C.3(b).
In general, the order in which cycles are removed from the indirect reciprocity
network may lead to scenarios in which circular forwarding of the same commodity
occurs, also referred to as conicts. For example, if cycle v1
g! v2 r! v1 is removed
rst, then the transformation of the second cycle, v1
b! v2 b! v3 g! v1, yields a
conict as illustrated in Figure C.3(c). In this example, the conict can be avoided
by swapping edges v1
g! v2 and v1 b! v2 before reducing the second cycle. However,
we are unaware of a systematic way to avoid conicts. In particular, some conicts
might involve multiple hops (see Figure C.4).
input.
(a)
2
2
2
1
1
2
nodes v1 and v2 exchange redundant content (conflict).
(c)
1st removed cycle converted
2
1
2
2
 direct reciprocity schedule.
(b)
1 1
2nd removed cycle converted
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
1st removed cycle converted 2nd removed cycle converted
11
v2 v1
v3
v2 v1
v3
v2 v1
v3
v2 v1
v3
v2 v1
v3
Figure C.3. Simple example of when backtracking solution works.
184
input.
(a)
nodes v1 , v2  and v4 exchange redundant content (conflict).
(c)
 direct reciprocity schedule.
(b)
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
v2 v1
v3
demands
owns
v4
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
v2 v1
v3
demands
owns
v4
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
v2 v1
v3
demands
owns
v4
2
2
2
1
1 1
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
v2 v1
v3
demands
owns
v4
demands
owns
demands
owns
demands
owns
v2 v1
v3
demands
owns
v4
2
2
1 1
12 1 2
Figure C.4. Simple example of when backtracking solution does not work.
C.4.2 Other Issues
Figure C.5 illustrates in the upper part an indirect reciprocity network and in the
lower part the correspoding direct reciprocity network. In what follows, we point out
some of the subtleties that might come across during such conversion.
Splitting content: If the cycle ABDC (Figure C.6(a)) is removed rst and con-
verted into a direct reciprocity network as shown in Figure C.6(b) there is no other
cycle that can be removed without leading to an inconsistency. That's because after
the removal of cycle ABDC all nodes have contents red and blue, and some of them
still need black without having any commodity to use for bartering.
Choosing cycles in order: If we change the order in which the indirect reciprocity
cycles are selected, a solution is illustrated in Figure C.6(e)-(h). Note that there must
be coordination between B and A regarding which part of content blue is sent using
the rst and third cycles.
Figure C.6(i)-(l) also illustrates the importance of the order at which cycles are
treated. Note that network C.6(l) cannot be converted into one satisfying direct
reciprocity without leading to an inconsistency. This is in contrast to the network
shown in Figure C.2 which can be converted into one satisfying direct reciprocity.
Valid cycles and invalid cycles: Let a valid cycle be one such that a path of color
c in this cycle starts in the source of color c and ends in a leaf of the tree that
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AC
D
A
B
C
D
B
A
C
D
first cycle removed second cycle removed third cycle removed
each arrow
transfers
half the content
demands red
demands black
demands blue
owns red
owns black
owns blue
A
C
D
B
Figure C.5. Cycles removed in the right order.
disseminates c. Even if we stick only to valid cycles we may reach inconsistent states.
Figure C.7 shows a network which, after the removal of two valid cycles, becomes
inconsistent.
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demands red
demands black
demands blue
owns red
owns black
owns blue
A
D
B C
A
D
B
C
D
each arrow represents
the transmission of half
of the content
A
D
B C
A
C
D
B
input
first cycle removed second cycle removed third cycle removed
sample
output
incosistent
                     (a)                                              (b)                                           (c)                                                                (d)
C
D
D
B
A
B
A
C
D
first cycle removed second cycle removed third cycle removed fourth cycle removed
A
D
B C
v1
w2
w1 u1
A
D
B
C
D
first cycle removed second cycle removed third cycle removed
each arrow represents
the transmission of third
of the content
incosistent
                     (e)                                              (f)                                           (g)                                                                (h)
                     (i)                                              (j)                                           (k)                                                                (l)
D
B
each arrow represents
the transmission of half
of the content
Figure C.6. The importance of removing cycles in the right order.
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B
E
input
A
D
B
E
Cfirst removed cycle
A
D
B
option 1 option 2
C
E
A
D
B
E
C
A
D
B E
C
A
B
C
D
E
option 3 option 4
D
B
E
second removed cycle
D
B
E
option A
D
B
E
option B
Figure C.7. Removing only valid cycles might still yield inconsistencies.
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AD
B
E
C
A
D
B
E
C
Figure C.8. A valid conversion from indirect to direct reciprocity. Removing the
outer cycle from the indirect reciprocity network, though, would lead to inconsisten-
cies.
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C.5 The Feasibility of Indirect Reciprocity Schedules I
Consider a set of users, V , and a set of contents, C. Let Dv denote the set of
contents that node v demands and, as before, s(v) the set of contents that node v
has, s(v); Dv  C. Assume also that node v 2 V has a bandwidth equal to Dv. This
can be interpreted as if each node has unit bandwidth to transfer a le. We now ask
the following question: when does there exist an indirect reciprocity assignment for
such a workload?
We construct the following capacitated directed graph.
V = fs; tg [ V1 [ V2 [ V3
V1 = f(v;Dv; s(v)) : v 2 V g
V2 = f(v; c) : c 2 Dv; v 2 V g
V3 = fuc; wc : c 2 Cg
and
E = f(s; v) : v 2 V1g
[ f((v;Dv; s(v)); (v0; c)) :
(v;Dv; s(v)) 2 V1; (v0; c) 2 V2; c 2 s(v)g
[ f((v;Dv; s(v)); uc) :
(v;Dv; s(v)) 2 V1; c 2 Dv [ s(v)g
[ f(uc; wc) : c 2 Cg
[ f(wc; (v; c)) : (v; c) 2 V2; c 2 Dvg
[ f(v; t) : v 2 V2g
Note that each node in V has a counterpart in V1 with an indication of what
content it can serve, D(v) [ s(v). Similarly, each node in V2 consists of a node-
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demand pair; a unit ow to (v; c) 2 V2 represents satisfying the demand of node v
for content c. We will observe shortly, the set of nodes V3 ensures that content ows
from the sources into the network.
The edge between s and a node v 2 V1 is given a capacity equal to the number of
demands associated with v, jDvj. Edges between V1 and V3, between V3 and V2, and
between V1 and V2 are given innite capacities. Edges between nodes in V2 and t have
capacity one. Last, the capacity of edge (uc; wc) is nc   1 where nc =
P
v2V 1c2Dv
is the number of users demanding c. Note that the capacity nc   1 edges between
nodes in fucg and fwcg restrict non source nodes from supplying all copies of c to
nodes demanding it. In particular, at least one unit of content has to traverse a link
between a node in V1 and a node in V2; this occurs only if the corresponding nodes in
V consist of one source of content c and a demander of that content. We make the
following claim.
Theorem C.5.1. The min cut of the above graph is
P
c2C nc, i there exists an
indirect reciprocity schedule that satises all of the demands of the users in V .
Proof. ()) If there exists an indirect reciprocity schedule that satises all users in
V , it is easy to check that the corresponding ow satises all the constraints imposed
above and that the min cut of the graph is
P
c2C nc.
(() The min cut of the above graph is Pc2C nc in two cases,
 the ow corresponds to a legal indirect reciprocity schedule, and the result holds;
 the ow corresponds to an illegal indirect reciprocity schedule, which needs to
be ruled out. The schedule is illegal if it involves self-loops, i.e., nodes sending
content to themselves. We now show how to convert such schedule into a legal
one. If node A sends content c to itself, there are also nodes T and U such that
T sends content c to U . That is because the capacity of edge (uc; wc) being
equal to nc 1 yields at least one copy of the content being sent directly from a
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source to a destination. To rule out the self loop involving A, T sends content
c to A who sends it to U .
To illustrate how illegal schedules are ruled out in the proof above, consider the
network shown in Figure C.9(a). The corresponding ow is shown in Figures C.10
and C.9(b). To remove the self loop of node 3 (Figure C.9(b)), node 1 sends content
black to 3 that forwards it to 4 (Figure C.9(a)).
C.6 The Feasibility of Indirect Reciprocity Schedules II
We have the following alternative feasibility conditions for indirect reciprocity.
The set of demanded contents is C. Assume node capacity cu for each user u, stream-
ing rate ri for commodity i, denote Ri the set of users who want to receive commodity
i, and Si the set users who own commodity i initially. Then all commodity demands
can be satised provided the following conditions hold:
For all set I of commodities, the following two conditions are necessary for feasi-
bility,
1.
P
u2[i2IfSi[Rig cu 
P
i2I rijRij
2.
P
u2[i2ISi cu 
P
i2I ri
Assume further that
3) cu =
P
i2Du ri (where Du is the set of items demanded by u),
Conditions 1-3 are necessary and sucient for indirect reciprocity to hold.
From here on we assume ri = 1, i = 1; : : : ; jCj. The three conditions above imply,
1. the joint capacity of sources and relays for a given set of contents is greater
than the demand for that set of contents (if ri = 1 for all i, this condition is
vacuous);
2. there is a perfect matching between demanded contents and sources (see below);
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3. the capacity of a node is equal to the number of items demanded by that node.
To see why the above conditions are sucient, we construct the following capaci-
tated directed graph,
V = fs; tg
V1 = f(c) : c 2 Cg
V2 = f(v; Cv; d) : d 2 Dv; d is owned by at least one nodeg
and
E = f((c); (v0; Cv; d)) : (c) 2 V1; (v0; Cv; d) 2 V2; c 2 Cvg
[f(s; v); v 2 V1g
[f(u; t); u 2 V2g
Each element in V2 consists of a node-ownership-demand triple; a unit ow to
(v; Cv; d) 2 V2 represents node v satisfying demand of content c and receiving content
d as a compensation. All edges have capacity one. We make the following claim.
Theorem C.6.1. The min cut of the above graph is jCj i there exists an indirect
reciprocity schedule that satises all of the demands of the users in V .
Proof. Follows from Hall's theorem [13, Theorem III.7] and condition 2 above.
Note that relays can be arbitrarily added to the network associated to the graph
above.
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Figure C.9. Legal and illegal schedules.
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Figure C.10. Network ow corresponding to an illegal schedule (Figure C.9(b)) but
which can be converted into a legal one (Figure C.9(a)).
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APPENDIX D
EQUILIBRIA AND COMPETITION
D.1 Equilibrium uniqueness
In this section we verify that the hypothesis of Propositions 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 are
satised respectively for functions (5.31) and (5.30). In order to check properties like
convexity/concavity or monotonicity we can ignore multiplicative factors or scaling
factors as long as they are positive. For (5.31) we consider f1(x) = 1   e x: The
corresponding marginal cost is convex, because the the third derivative is f 0001 (x) =
e x > 0:
For (5.30) we consider f2(x) = xe
 x: The derivatives of interest are: f 002 (x) =
e x(x   2) and f 0002 (x) = e x(3   x). f2 is concave in [0; 2] and convex in (2;1). Its
derivative is convex in (0; 3).
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